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Abstract 
This thesis studies the capital structure of the regulated firm. 
Theoretical models are developed to analyse the relationship between capi- 
tal structure, the regulator's pricing decision and the allocation of risk between 
consumers and investors. It is shown that the price-cap system is almost cer- 
tainly sub-optimal because consumers are willing to trade-off price variations 
against a lower expected price. There is also a socially optimal capital struc- 
ture that depends on consumers' and shareholders' attitudes to risk. This is 
such that there are higher prices for consumers in adverse economic conditions 
but it is not necessary that shareholders' returns are lower. It might be optimal 
to insure shareholders against market risk to achieve a lower expected price. 
There is only one very special set of conditions where it is socially optimal for 
the firm to be wholly reliant on debt finance and operate on a 'not-for-profit' 
basis. In all other cases there should either be a combination of equity and 
debt or no debt at all. 
An empirical study investigates whether the behaviour of regulated firms is 
consistent with the trade-off or pecking order theories of capital structure. The 
water companies in England and Wales are used as a case study. Economet- 
ric models of the relationship between debt and capital value over the period 
1990/91 to 2002/03 indicate that water companies, at least when viewed col- 
lectively, have behaved as though they had target levels of gearing. While this 
result could be consistent with the pecking order theory if the companies had 
attempted to exert a price-influence effect, there is little indication that they 
have tried to manipulate their financial positions to that end. The overall con- 
clusion of the study is that the empirical evidence relating to water companies 
is more consistent with the trade-off theory than the pecking order theory. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The privatization of state owned industries was one of the most significant 
developments in the UK economy in the 1980's and 1990's. Although the 
privatized companies were given the freedom to manage their own affairs the 
government introduced a form of price-cap regulation and appointed regulators 
for each industry to protect consumer interests and to stimulate competition. 
This led to fundamental changes in the structure of many of the industries. In 
gas and electricity, for example, the forces of regulation and competition have 
driven the separation of energy production, distribution and supply. 
However, the government adopted a relatively cautious approach when it 
established the financial structure of the companies at privatization. This was 
necessary to secure the successful flotation of the companies as they would 
have a continuing need to rely on the capital markets to finance their large 
investment programmes. In addition, the regulators were given a statutory 
duty to ensure that the regulated businesses could finance their functions. 
However, by the turn of the century, some companies began to look at radical 
ways of improving their financing efficiency. 
The most significant proposals came from the water industry. Unlike the 
other utilities the structure of the water industry has remained largely un- 
changed since it was privatized in 1989 and the water companies are still ver- 
tically integrated regional monopolies with virtually no competition in their 
product markets. Introducing competition in the water industry has posed 
special problems; especially regarding compliance with drinking water quality 
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standards. As a consequence regulatory activity has been mainly focused on 
the Periodic Reviews of water prices. Reviews were carried out in 1994,1999 
and 2004 and each took about three years to complete. The 1999 Periodic 
Review was particularly important as, at the time, the companies and many 
commentators considered that it represented a significant tightening of the 
regulatory contract. Whether or not this was the case, it certainly seems to 
have provided a stimulus for a number of water companies to consider making 
fundamental changes to both their structure and their financing arrangements. 
Two quite innovative proposals were soon submitted to Office of Water Ser- 
vices (Ofwat), the industry's regulatory body headed by the Director General 
of Water Services (DGWS)l. One concerned a major restructuring of York- 
shire Water and was put forward by its parent company, Kelda. The other 
came from Glas Cymru, a company set up by the management of Dyr Cymru 
(Welsh Water), and involved the acquisition and restructuring of Welsh Water 
after its original owner, Hyder, encountered financial difficulties and was it- 
self acquired by an energy company. Both proposals envisaged separating the 
ownership of assets from the provision of operational and customer services 
with the latter being carried out under contract. Although new to the UK, 
such arrangements are common in the US and Europe where assets are often 
held in municipal ownership and day-to-day operations are contracted out to 
private suppliers. 
However, both proposals also contained a more radical suggestion. This 
was to place the ownership of assets in a new 'not-for-profit' company that 
would be wholly reliant on debt for its external financing needs. As the new 
company would be run on a 'not-for-profit' basis any surpluses would be used 
to reduce prices or improve services. The owners would, therefore, have no 
financial interest in the company as no dividends would be paid nor would 
they be responsible for the company's liabilities. To this end Glas Cymru was 
established as a 'not-for-profit' company limited by guarantee but Kelda went 
further suggesting that the new company should be a mutual with Yorkshire 
Water's customers owning the company and, therefore, the assets. 
Kelda's proposal received a sceptical reaction locally, including from the 
Yorkshire Ofwat Customer Services Conunittee, and it was eventually with- 
drawn in July 2000 when the then DGWS said it could not proceed in its 
'The Water Industry Act 2003 replaces (after 1 April 2005) the office of the DGWS by a 
body corporate viz. the Water Services Regulation Authority. 
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current form. Glas, however, obtained regulatory approval in January 2001 
and successfully completed its acquisition of Welsh Water in May 2001. At the 
time the DGWS said that the Glas proposal was, in many ways a special case, 
and that he did not see it as a model to be followed by the whole industry. A 
detailed description and analysis of the Kelda and Glas proposals is contained 
in Stones (2001). 
Shortly afterwards other water companies put forward proposals for capital 
restructuring but none included the use of 'not-for-profit' companies. However, 
they all entailed gearing (the ratio of debt to total capital value) increasing to 
levels well above the industry average which, by 1999/00, had reached 44.2%2. 
These restructurings took one of two basic forms: 
Major financial restructurings based on 'enhanced financial structures' 
that used debt tranching techniques and tight covenant packages and 
required regulatory approval. These structures were designed not only 
to protect the interests of bondholders but also to reduce business risk so 
that the companies could still sustain investment grade credit ratings at 
gearing levels in excess of 75% and achieve a lower overall cost of capital. 
Less complex refinancings that did not use enhanced financial structures 
but where debt was increased to enable special dividends or sharebuy- 
backs. 
By the end of 2002/03 half of the water companies had implemented, or 
were in the process of implementing, a capital restructuring in one of these 
two forms. 
Such developments, however, have not been confined to the water indus- 
try. In October 2002 Network Rail, a 'not-for-profit' company established by 
the UK government, replaced Railtrack plc as owner and operator of the rail 
network after the government put Railtrack into administration a year earlier. 
Capital structures that rely wholly or predominantly on debt finance clearly 
represent a significant departure from the conventional model of equity owner- 
ship on which the privatizations were based and their use remains controversial 
2 Average gearing is defined for these purposes as the ratio of the total net debt of the 
regulated water companies to their total capital value at the relevant financial year end. 
Total capital value is calculated as the total of the net debt and share capital and reserves 
of the companies on a historical cost accounting basis. 
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from both and economic and a political perspective. In broad terms, the eco- 
nomic issues that have been raised concern the extent to which such structures 
might: 
e produce benefits for consumers in the form of lower prices through their 
greater reliance on debt finance, 
9 increase the risks for consumers by changing the allocation of risks be- 
tween consumers and the providers of capital, 
* adversely affect efficiency incentives and service delivery. 
Appendix LA illustrates these issues by using simple models to compare 
the prices that would apply under price-cap regulation in two extreme cases 
viz. when the firm is financed entirely by equity and when it is wholly debt 
financed and operates on a 'not-for-profit' basis. 
This thesis is in two main parts. The first part looks in detail at the 
relationship between the capital structure of the regulated firm, the regula- 
tor's pricing decision and the allocation of risks between consumers and the 
providers of capital. In particular, chapter 2 examines the theoretical ques- 
tions of whether and under what conditions there is a socially optimal capital 
structure for the regulated firm when the regulator's pricing decision is de- 
signed to achieve an optimal allocation of risks. Chapter 3 takes the analysis 
further and looks at the interaction between the regulator's decision on prices 
and the cost of equity finance, the effect this has on the socially optimal cap- 
ital structure and the conditions under which it is socially optimal for the 
regulated firm to be wholly reliant on debt finance. 
The second part of the thesis is an empirical study of the capital structure 
of the water companies in England and Wales and is presented in chapter 4. 
There is an extensive literature on both the theory and the empirical evidence 
relating to the capital structure decisions of firms and two main theories have 
emerged viz. the 'trade-off' theory and the 'pecking order' theory. The study 
develops econometric models to test which of these two competing theories is 
consistent with the behaviour of water companies over the 13 years since they 
were privatized. 
Some overall conclusions from the thesis are presented in chapter 5. 
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In order to put the various issues considered in this thesis into context, the 
next section of this introductory chapter summarizes the principles on which 
the two theories of capital structure are based and then describes how decisions 
on capital structure can bring about a 'price-influence effect' in the regulated 
firm. It is not intended to provide an exhaustive review of the literature on 
the theory of capital structure as there are several well known surveys of the 
field, for example, Harris and Raviv (1991). Indeed, the significance of these 
issues for the water industry is such that Ofwat comniissioned its own survey, 
OXERA (2002), for the 2004 Periodic Review. Consequently, the aim here is 
just to set out the principal arguments. The final section of this introduction 
provides an outline of the thesis and its main contributions. 
1.2 Theories of capital structure 
1.2.1 Capital structure and taxation 
Among the most important contributions to the theory of finance are the 
propositions about capital structure that were made by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) and (1963). They showed that, in competitive capital markets with full 
information and no corporate taxes, the value of the firm is unaffected by its 
capital structure and that an increase in gearing leads to an increase in the cost 
of equity which leaves the overall (weighted average) cost of capital unchanged. 
Any gains from using lower cost debt are cancelled out because interest costs 
are a prior claim on profits and shareholders need to be compensated for 
increasing financial risk as gearing and interest costs rise. Modighani and 
Miller went on to show that, when firms obtain tax relief on their interest 
payments, the value of the firm will increase in line with its level of debt. 
Their arguments can be demonstrated as follows 3. Let: 
VU = the market value of the unlevered firm (i. e. no debt) 
VL = the market value of the levered firm (i. e with debt) 
D= the market value of the firm's debt 
E= the market value of the firm's equity 
3 It is assumed that there is no system of imputation tax under which dividends are paid 
net of tax to shareholders who are then credited with a proportion of the corporation tax 
paid on company profits. Such a system applied in the UK until Advance Corporation Tax 
and the associated credits on dividends were abolished from 1999/00. 
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7r = the expected pre-interest, pre-tax operating cashflow of the firm 
(assumed for simplicity to be an annuity) 
tc = the corporation tax rate 
tp = the personal tax rate on equity income 
td = the personal tax rate on income from debt 
r,, == the return on assets for the unlevered firm (pre-personal tax) 
re = the return on equity (pre-personal tax) 
rd = the return on debt (pre-personal tax) 
r,, = the weighted average cost of capital (pre-personal tax) 
for the levqed. finn 
As the market value of a firm is the present value, PV, of its post-tax 
cashflows, the value of an unlevered firm is: 
vu = Pv 
[7r (I 
- tc) 
(I 
- tp)] ý 
(1.1) 
and the value of a levered firm, which receives tax relief on its interest pay- 
ments, is: 
VL = E+D7 (1.2) 
= PV 
[(7r 
- rdD) 
(I- tc) (I - tp) + rd 
(I 
- td) D], (1.3) 
= VU + PV rd (I - td)D I- 
(I - tc) (I -tp 1 
(1 
- td) 
If it is assumed that the discount rate applicable to tax payments is 
rd (I - td) , then: 
VL=Vu+D I- 
(i - tc) (i - tp) 
(I 
- td) 
and if it is also assumed that the personal tax rates of investors in equity and 
corporate bonds are equal, that is tP : -: td, then: 
VL = Vu + t, D. 
Consequently when t, =0 then the value of the unlevered firm is the the same 
as that of the levered firm, which is Modigliani and Miller's Proposition I. 
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The effect of gearing on the cost of equity can be seen by considering the 
market value of the equity, that is: 
E=PV[(7r - rdD) (1 - t, ) (I - tp)], 
and since the discount rate on equity is r, (I - tp): 
reE =7r 
(I 
- tc) - rdD (I - t, ). (1.8) 
By definition: 
r. Vu = rwvL = 7r (1 - tc), 
and so, from (1.6): 
're --:::: ra + 
(ra 
- rd) 
(I 
- tc) 
D 
E' 
This is Modigliani and Miller's Proposition II and shows that the cost of equity 
increases in proportion to the debt-eqWty ratio. 
It also follows that: 
ra I- tc 
D)= 
re 
E+ 
rd (I - tc) 
D 
(1.11) 
VL VL VL' 
Consequently, when t, = 0, the weighted average cost of capital is not affected 
by the level of gearing and remains the same as for the unlevered firm. 
It can be seen from (1.6) that the value of the tax shield on debt is max- 
imized when the firm is wholly financed by debt. However, in practice it is 
unusual for companies to be 100% financed by debt or even to have a capital 
structure close to this; the most common examples of such arrangements be- 
ing'not-for-profit' organizations, specially created project finance vehicles and 
highly leveraged management buyouts. The reason why 100% debt finance is 
so unusual and the factors that determine the optimal balance between debt 
and equity finance has been the subject of much debate in the literature. 
Indeed, Miller (1977) questioned whether firms do gain an advantage from 
debt finance as the benefits of the tax shield need not necessarily be received by 
firms and might be received instead by investors in corporate bonds. According 
to Miller this depends on the relative personal tax position of investors in 
corporate bonds and equity. As can be seen from (1.5) the value of the tax 
shield for the firm will be zero when the assumption that tp = td does not 
11 
apply and: 
(1 
- tc) 
(I 
- tp) 
(I 
- td) - 
For example, when the personal tax rate on equity income for the marginal 
investor is zero (or very low) and that on income from corporate bonds is equal 
to (or above) the rate of corporation tax then interest rates have to be high 
enough to compensate bond investors for their higher tax payments compared 
with the tax paid on equity investments of equivalent risk. This implies there 
is a bond market equilibrium which determines the aggregate level of debt in 
the economy and where (1.12) applies but there is no tax advantage from debt 
for any one firm 4. 
Firms, however, also have tax shields on profits for reasons other than debt 
finance. Sigrdficant capital allowances on assets can reduce a firm's effective 
rate of corporation tax thereby reducing the potential value of the tax shield 
on interest. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argued that, where companies have 
different marginal effective tax rates, only companies with effective tax rates 
above that of the marginal firm gain an advantage from debt. Consequently, 
when the personal tax rate on equity income for the marginal investor is zero, 
the bond market equilibrium is where the personal tax rate on income from 
corporate bonds for the marginal investor equals the effective rate of corpora- 
tion tax for the marginal firm5. This suggests that, since capital allowances 
on assets are substitutes for the tax shield on interest, the optimal level of 
debt is lower for companies that have high capital allowances. Further, as 
debt levels rise there is greater uncertainty about the level of expected profits 
which increases the probability that the tax shields may be underutilized and 
reduces the expected value of the tax shield. 
1.2.2 The trade-off theory 
These arguments suggest there may be a tax advantage from debt finance at 
least for some companies. However, if there is a positive tax advantage to 
debt there must be reasons why 100% debt finance is not more commonplace. 
4 According to this argument the tax rate of the marginal investor td is, therefore, not a 
constant but a function of the aggregate level of debt, DA; that is, td 7-- td (DA) with, at 
some point, td (DA) > 0- 
5 In this argument neither tc nor td are constants and the corporation tax rate for the 
marginal firm tc is also a function of the aggregate level of debt, DA; that is, tc = t, (DA) 
with, at some point, t, ' (DA) < 0. 
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One argument is that there are costs as well as benefits from increasing gear- 
ing. These include the costs of 'financial distress', such as bankruptcy costs 
and the effect of distortions to incentives when close to bankruptcy, and the 
agency costs associated with debt such as monitoring and bonding costs. This 
implies there is an optimum level of gearing where its marginal cost equals 
its marginal benefit, and so this is often described as the 'trade-off' theory of 
capital structure. 
It should be noted that the trade-off theory does not necessarily depend 
on the existence of a tax advantage to debt. The agency cost model first 
set out in Jensen and Meckling (1976) argues that agency costs are not only 
associated with debt but also with external equity. External shareholders 
incur monitoring costs to ensure that management, the internal shareholders, 
act in the external shareholders' best interests and do not divert resources to 
increase managers' wealth. Increasing management's share of the equity by 
increasing the level of gearing reduces these costs. In addition, as pointed 
out in Jensen (1986), debt reduces the amount of 'free cashflow' available to 
managers reducing the scope for unwise investments. Consequently, increased 
gearing is associated with both agency costs and benefits which creates a 
trade-off and leads to an optimal capital structure for the firm. 
1.2.3 The pecking order theory 
The optimal capital structure question has also been approached by intro- 
ducing a further market imperfection into the analysis, viz. the information 
asymmetry between a firm's managers and its investors. If managers have 
better information about the value of the firm then managers will have an in- 
centive to inform the capital market if they consider their firm is undervalued. 
Clearly, such information has to be credible and this has resulted in the devel- 
opment of models where managers use capital structure decisions as a signal in 
order to bring the value of the firm as perceived by the market into line with 
its actual value. Both Ross (1971") and Leland and Pyle (1977) developed 
signaling models where higher levels of debt indicate a higher value for the 
firm. In the former case this is because a higher debt level is associated with a 
lower probability of bankruptcy while, in the latter, it signifies managers own 
a greater proportion of the equity. 
However, Myers and Majluf (1984) considered the signalling effects of using 
13 
different forms of finance to fund investment opportunities and came to quite 
different conclusions. Their model has become known as the 'pecking order' 
theory. According to this theory, since the firm's managers and shareholders 
have asymmetric information about its prospects, shareholders assume that 
the firm's shares are overpriced if it makes a rights issue. Managers might, 
therefore, reject profitable investment opportunities rather than issue new eq- 
uity that would be undervalued unless they have access to less costly forms of 
finance. Consequently, low risk debt, whose pricing is less sensitive to private 
information, is preferred to equity issues and 'financial slack', in the form of 
cash and marketable securities, is preferred to both. This implies that firms do 
not have a target capital structure. Instead, they operate a pecking order or 
financing hierarchy where they use internal finance before turning to sources 
of external finance and raise debt rather than issue new equity which is only 
used as a last resort. A firm's capital structure, therefore, simply reflects its 
cumulative earnings and investment decisions. 6 
The conclusion that firms do not have an optimal capital structure means 
the pecking order theory clearly contradicts the predictions of the traditional 
trade-off theory. There has been extensive empirical research into these two 
competing theories but OXERA's (2002) overall assessment is that the empir- 
ical evidence is inconclusive. 
1.2.4 Price-influence effects and the regulated firm 
The literature on the theory of capital structure has almost entirely been con- 
cerned with firms operating in competitive product markets and very little 
attention has been paid to the capital structure decision when the firm is a 
regulated monopoly. In the theories described above it is generally assumed 
that the firm's revenues are independent of its capital structure. This assump- 
tion, however, may not be appropriate for a regulated firm. 
In the case of a regulated firm it is possible that its capital structure might 
influence the prices that are set by the regulator. While virtually all the lit- 
erature on rate of return regulation makes the implicit assumption that the 
regulated firm is wholly financed from equity, there are papers that relax this 
assumption. These papers are reviewed in chapter 2 which finds that, gener- 
6 However, Harris and Raviv (1991) point out that there are other models that allow for a 
wider range of financing options which produce different results and the firm does not follow 
this strict pecking order. 
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ally, they study the firm's decision rather than the regulator's. In particular, 
they show that a price-influence effect occurs if a firm can use its capital struc- 
ture to influence the price set by the regulator. This result is based on a moral 
hazard problem where the firm benefits from a high level of gearing because 
regulators wish to set prices at a high enough level to avoid the firm becoming 
financially distressed with adverse effects on services. 
However, this literature takes a point of view which is probably more suited 
to the US experience. In the US most regulated firms are long established 
and, typically, regulators take capital structure as a given. The UK situation 
is markedly different. Most regulated firms were privatized relatively recently 
and at the subsequent reviews of price limits regulators have, in a number of 
cases, assumed a significant increase in gearing levels. 
The regulated firm may, therefore, be subject to a second kind of price- 
influence effect which depends on the the way the regulator sets prices. For 
example, if the regulator considers that there is an optimal level of gearing 
which minimizes the overall cost of capital, price limits will be set to reflect 
the assessed optimum. It follows that, if the trade-off theory is correct, a 
price-cap system of regulation reinforces the incentive for the regulated firm to 
adjust gearing to the level that maximizes its financing efficienCy7. In addition, 
different systems of regulation vary in the extent to which variations in the 
firm's costs are carried through into price variations. This affects the allocation 
of risk between consumers and investors which, in turn, may have implications 
for the firm's capital structure. This is because the risks to be carried by 
investors will influence both the amount of equity finance that is needed and, 
potentially, its cost. It follows that capital structure may not be irrelevant for 
the regulated firm even if the conditions underlying the Modigliani and Miller 
Propositions are satisfied. . 
It is not surprising, therefore, that risk, the cost 
of capital and capital structure have been the. subject of considerable debate 
between regulators and regulated utilities at price-cap reviews in the UK. 
7 However, as Gordon (1967) points out, to the extent that the regulator passes the tax 
benefits of debt finance to consumers through lower prices, the firm will become increasingly 
indifferent to its capital structure. This is more likely to be the case under rate-of-return 
regulation but, as explained in Chapter 4, it has become an important issue in the UK water 
industry where a system of price-cap regulation applies. 
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1.3 Outline of the thesis 
1.3.1 Capital structure and the allocation of risk 
The relationship between the regulator's pricing decision, the allocation of risk 
and the firm's capital structure has been largely ignored in the literature and 
is the subject of chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 develops a highly stylized model 
for this purpose and analyses the regulation of a monopolist that supplies a 
product which is fixed in quality and for which the demand is price inelastic. 
The model makes reasonably realistic assumptions about the attitude of the 
various stakeholders towards risk. Consumers and shareholders are risk averse, 
managers are risk neutral up to a point, and debtholders are infinitely risk 
averse. Unlike the standard model of regulation, the financial structure of 
the regulated firm is determined endogenously. An increase in gearing that 
reduces the overall cost of capital gives the regulator scope for price reductions, 
but it also creates a trade-off, because it reduces the amount of equity capital 
that can be used as a buffer to absorb adverse exogenous shocks. Once the 
amount of equity capital falls below a certain level, the expected price can 
be lowered only at the expense of greater price variability. Using this model 
it is also possible to derive the socially preferred capital structure. This is 
such that consumers face some risk, in the sense that the price they pay varies 
according to the underlying economic conditions. One interpretation of this 
result is that the price cap mechanism, where price variations are allowed only 
in exceptional circumstances, is suboptimal, even when there is symmetric 
information as this model assumes. 
The model developed in chapter 2 simply assumes the firm's cost of equity 
to be a function of the level of debt as a proxy for the relationship between the 
cost of equity and investment risk. The classic formulation of that relation- 
ship is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed in Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965a) and Lintner (1965b) where shareholders base their investment 
decisions on the vector of returns and their covariance with the return on the 
market portfolio. The proxy function used in chapter 2 is consistent with such 
models because an increase in a firm's level of debt increases the covariance 
between the returns to shareholders and the market return and, therefore, the 
cost of equity. However, it is this proxy function which leads to the result that 
there must some variability in consumer prices once gearing reaches a certain 
level. Above that level the buffer provided by equity finance is insufficient 
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to aborb all the risk of cost variations and still meet the firm's obligations 
to lenders and shareholders. Consequently, the model only allows the reg-Lila- 
tor's decision on prices to influence the cost of equity indirectly through the 
regulator's choice of capital structure. 
Chapter 3 examines the more general case when the level of gearing and the 
regulator's decision on prices both have an independent and direct effect on the 
covariance of the shareholders' returns with the market return and, therefore, 
on the firm's cost of equity. Indeed, a novel feature of the model presented in 
chapter 3 is that it explicitly allows for the possibility that prices can be set 
in such a way that the risks and returns for shareholders are either positively 
correlated, uncorrelated or even negatively correlated with the market return. 
As a result the firm's cost of equity can either be greater than, equal to or 
lower than the cost of debt. In other words, the regulator's ability to determine 
the extent to which prices may vary means that the risks and returns for 
shareholders need not necessarily be tied to the firm's underlying business 
risk. 
Two sets of results are obtained from this more general model. Firstly, 
it is shown that, in contrast to chapter 2, some variation in prices is optimal 
for consumers at all levels of gearing except in an unlikely case where the 
willingness of managers to carry risk exceeds the inherent risk in the business. 
Prices are still higher for consumers in adverse economic conditions but it turns 
out that the returns to shareholders and the cost of equity need not be lower. 
Indeed, an interesting possibility emerges when comsumers have a relatively 
low aversion to risk and prefer a lower expected price. In these circumstances 
it might be optimal for the regulator to set prices so that profits are higher in 
adverse economic conditions. As this would provide shareholders with a form 
of insurance against market risk, the cost of equity would be lower than the 
cost of debt; the result being lower financing costs and a lower expected price 
for consumers. 
Secondly, it is shown that the regulated firm has a socially optimal capital 
structure that depends on both the consumers' aversion to the risk of price 
variations and the shareholders' trade-off between risk and returns. A key 
result is that, in this model, there is only one particular case in which the 
preferences of consumers and shareholders make it optimal for the regulator 
to set prices where the rate of return is equal to the cost of debt and such a 
return is also satisfactory for investors. In all other cases there should either be 
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a combination of equity and debt or no debt at all. In other words, there is only 
one very special set of conditions where it is socially optimal for the regulated 
firm to be a 'not-for-profit' company that relies wholly on debt finance. This 
latter result is of more than just theoretical interest. As noted above, 'not-for 
profit' utility companies have been established in the UK and similar types of 
organizations have been increasingly used there to provide public services. 
1.3.2 The water industry: an empirical study 
Neither of the models developed in chapters 2 and 3 requires a stance to be 
taken on the competing theories of capital structure summarized in section 
1.2. For the regulator, capital structure is a mechanism for allocating risk 
between consumers and investors and determines the effect of any particular 
allocation on both consumer prices and the returns required by investors. In 
addition, although the firm's actual capital structure is generally outside the 
regulator's direct control, the models give the regulator, de facto, control. 
Once prices have been set it is in the shareholders' own interests to choose the 
same capital structure as that selected by the regulator. This is a consequence 
of the assumption that the regulator has complete information and there are 
no information asymmetries. In practice, of course, this will not be the case 
and once prices are set by the regulator the actual capital structure decisions 
that are subsequently taken by regulated firms may well reflect one of the two 
competing theories described in section 1.2. 
Chapter 4 takes an empirical approach to this question and seeks to dis- 
cover whether the behaviour of regulated firms is consistent with the trade-off 
theory or the pecking order theory. For this purpose, the water industry over 
the period 1990/91 to 2002/03 is used as a case study. 
Econometric models have been developed with the aim of addressing two 
specific questions: 
Did the water companies behave as though they had target gearing lev- 
els? 
What effect did the regulatory reviews of price limits appear to have on 
the capital structure decisions of water companies? 
The model that is used as a starting point is an unrestricted Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag Model (ADLM). This incorporates a number of model types 
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according to the restrictions placed en the parameters and of particular interest 
here are the Static Long Run Model (SLRM), the Partial Adjustment Model 
(PAM) and the Error Correction Model (ECM). However, the methodology 
used in this study has a number of novel features compared with other studies 
that have relied on adjustment models, usually the PAM, to test whether firms 
move towards target levels of gearing. In particular: 
a general-to-specific model reduction process is applied to the estimated 
ADLM to determine which model, if any, provides the best explanation, 
target gearing ratios are estimated directly instead of proxy numbers 
being calculated separately and used as input data, 
cointegration tests are used to assess whether the results reflect causal 
relationships, although the reliability of these tests is limited by the 
relatively short time period for which data is available. 
In broad terms it is concluded that that the evidence from this case study is 
more consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure than the pecking 
order theory. The econometric models that have been estimated indicate that 
water companies, at least when viewed collectively, have behaved as though 
they had target levels of gearing. Although such targets are predicted by the 
trade-off theory, it should be emphasized that the evidence has been obtained 
from adjustment models and so does not necessarily demonstrate that a trade- 
off actually exists. This would require more extensive models to be developed 
where the target level of gearing is specified as a function of the explanatory 
variables that determine the costs and benefits of increasing gearing. Unfor- 
tunately, a number of those variables, for example, agency costs and the costs 
of financial distress, are extremely difficult to measure. 
Adjustment models can, however, provide evidence that the behaviour 
of firms is inconsistent with the pecking order theory since it predicts that 
firms do not have target gearing levels. Even so, as the water companies are 
highly regulated, it is also important to assess whether they have tried to use 
gearing levels to exert a price-influence effect on regulatory decisions because it 
possible that their behaviour might otherwise have reflected the pecking order 
theory. The study, therefore, assesses whether companies have attempted to 
exert a price-influence effect by considering: 
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the principles used to set price limits in the water industry and, in par- 
ticular, the effect that gearing levels have on the regulator's decisions, 
9 whether there are indications that water companies have increased gear- 
ing in advance of a Periodic Review to levels that coifld be regarded as 
an attempt to put pressure on the regulator to set more favourable price 
limits. 
There appears to be little evidence that water companies have generally 
tried to manipulate their financial positions in order to exert a price-influence 
effect and it, therefore, seems reasonable to conclude that their behaviour has 
not been in accordance with the predictions of the pecking order theory. 
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Appendix LA Prices under the equity and 'not-for- 
profit' models 
This appendix sets out two simplified models to compare the consumer prices 
that would apply under price-cap regulation when the firm is financed entirely 
by equity and when it operates on a 'not-for-profit' basis and is wholly debt 
financedg. The aim is to demonstrate how the two models involve making a 
trade-off between: 
o the possible benefits for consumers from lower prices as a result of debt 
financing, 
o the increased the risks for consumers and the adverse effects on costs 
and prices from reduced efficiency incentives in a 'not-for-profit' firm. 
1. A. 1 Consumer utility 
The utility of the representative consumer is assumed to depend on the con- 
sumption of two goods viz. bread, b, and water, w, so that: 
u (b, w). 
Consumers also face an income constraint, V, which limits total consump- 
tion given the prices of bread, Pb, and water, p, that is: 
Y= pbb + pw. 
The demand for water is assumed to be inelastic. Normalising the con- 
sumption of water and the price of bread so that: 
Pb Ii 
w=1, 
gives: 
b=Y-p. 
The analysis presented in this Appendix was published in Stones (2001). 
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This leads to the indirect utility function: 
U(p)=u(V_p). 
For simplicity it is assumed that consumers have constant absolute risk 
aversion so that, if it is also assumed that p varies in accordance with a normal 
distribution, the utility function can be expressed in mean-variance form, as 
follows: 
'Y 2 U(p) =Y -E(p) -20, P) 
where a2 is the variance in p and -y is the measure of the consumers' absolute p 
risk aversion to variations in 
I. A. 2 Equity model 
In the equity model the regulator sets a price cap, P, which allows the firm 
sufficient revenue to earn a reasonable return on its capital and to cover its 
expected operating costs in meeting consumer demand. It is assumed that: 
o the capital stock is fixed with an indefinite asset life and a sunk cost, K, 
that has been financed entirely by equity, 
the allowed rate of return on equity, rE, is sufficient to compensate 
shareholders for carrying all the risk of variations in operating costs, 
the regulator sets an efficiency target, e-E, for the firm to reduce its 
operating costs below the zero-effort level, L. 
L is subject to uncertainty and is normally distributed with variance, 
2 
L' 
Consequently, the price cap set by the regulator is: 
rEK +E (L) - e-E 
with: 
Consumer utility is, therefore: 
U(P) =V-P. 
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LA. 3 'Not-for-profit' model 
In this model the capital stock has been wholly financed by debt and the firm 
operates on a 'not-for-profit' basis. The cost of debt is rD. The firin wiR wish 
to set the price, T, to ensure that it receives just enough revenue to cover its 
interest and operating costs. Any surpluses are returned to customers through 
rebates in prices. It is assumed that: 
all variations in operating costs are passed on to consumers through 
variations in ý and SO rE > rD, 
9 efficiency incentives lead management to reduce the zero-effort level of 
operating costs by e-D- 
The price set by the firm is, therefore: 
rDK +L- e-D, 
provided that j5 < p. Consequently: 
E (p--) == rDK +E (L) - e-D) 
UZ = 0.2 p L- 
Uncertainty in the level of operating costs creates uncertainty in the level 
of j5 and so consumer utility is: 
U (p-p) =Y-E (pp-) -2 
I. A. 4 Comparison between the models 
The price paid by the consumer is lower in the 'not-for-profit' model if: 
P-P> 
that is, if: 
(rE 
- rD) K> [L -E (L)l + (e-E - e-D) . 
Consequently, for prices to be lower in the 'not-for-profit' model, the savings in 
financing costs must exceed any additional costs arising because the zero-effort 
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level of actual operating costs is greater than its expected level and efficiency 
gains are lower than the regulator's target. 
Consumer welfare is higher in the 'not-for-profit' model if: 
u (P-P) -u (P) > 01 
that is, if: 
"Y 2 
p- E(p) - -ay > 01 2ý 
or: 
(rE 
- rD) K> 'y UZ + (e-E - O-D) - 2P 
Consequently, consumers' utility is higher in the 'not-for-profit' model if the 
savings in financing costs exceed the consumers' aversion to the risk of price 
variations and any loss of efficiency savings. In other words, consumers may 
be willing to accept a lower expected price in exchange for a degree of price 
uncertainty. It follows that the 'not-for-profit' model will be preferred by 
consumers if they are risk neutral (i. e. 7= 0) and/or there is no uncertainty 
(o4 = 0) and the savings in financing costs exceed any loss of efficiency savings. P 
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Chapter 2 
Risk and Capital Structure in 
the Regulated Firm 
2.1 Introduction 
The price cap regulation mechanism, adopted in the UK and in other European 
countries, allows the regulated firm's owners to benefit from a reduction in cost 
below the level assumed by the regulator in setting the prices the firm is allowed 
to charge for a given period. Cost reductions may come both from improved 
productive efficiency, and from lower financing costs. To the extent that debt 
is cheaper than equity, ' increasing the proportion of debt finance would lower 
total cost. This can be taken to its extreme by the radical step of dispensing 
with equity finance altogether. For example, in May 2001 Glas Cymru, a 
'not-for-profit' company limited by guarantee and 100% reliant on debt for 
its external finance, acquired Welsh Water after its original owner, Hyder p1c, 
had encountered financial problems. As another example, Network Rail was 
established by the UK government using the same corporate structure and 
replaced Railtrack plc as owner and operator of the rail network in October 
2002 after the government had put Railtrack into administration a year earlier. 
This leaves open the theoretical question as to whether there is a socially 
optimal capital structure for the regulated firm; the question which is inves- 
tigated in this chapter. Surprisingly, given its prominence both in practice 
and in the theoretical study of unregulated firms, the issue of the choice of 
capital structure by the regulator has been largely ignored. As Spiegel (1996) 
notes, virtually all the literature on rate of return regulation makes the im- 
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plicit assumption that the regulated firm is wholly financed from equity. Some 
papers relax this assumption. Typically, however, they study the firm's deci- 
sion rather than the regulator's; the firm uses its capital structure to influence 
the price set by the regulator. In these papers, firms benefit from a high debt- 
capital ratio (leverage, or gearing) because regulators will wish to set prices 
high enough to avoid the firm becoming financially distressed with adverse 
effects on services (e. g. Taggart (1981) and (1985), Dasgupta and Nanda 
(1993), Spiegel (1994), and Spiegel and Spulber (1994) and (1997)). 1 This lit- 
erature takes a point of view probably suited to the American situation, where 
most regulated firms are long established, and where, typically, regulators do 
take the capital structure as given. Indeed, US regulators generally set the 
allowed rate of return as the weighted average of the cost of debt and equity, 
with weights given by the proportions of debt and equity finance, measured 
according to the firm's book value (Sidak and Spulber (1997)). The UK sit- 
uation is markedly different. Most regulated firms were privatized relatively 
recently and at subsequent reviews of prices regulators have, in a number of 
cases, assumed a significant increase in the debt-capital ratio (leverage). 
We study the role of the capital structure of the regulated firm with a 
highly stylized model. The firm's chosen policy turns out to depend on the 
risk attitude of the various stakeholders, and we make specific, but, we believe, 
realistic assumptions in this respect. Consumers and shareholders are risk 
averse, managers are risk neutral up to a point, and debtholders are infinitely 
risk averse. Unlike the standard model of regulation, we let the financial 
structure of the regulated firm be determined endogenously, either by the 
regulator itself, or - equivalently in our simplified set-up - as a consequence of 
the shareholders' attempt to maximize the return on their shares. An increase 
in leverage that reduces the overall cost of capital gives the regulator room for 
price reductions, but it also creates a trade-off, because it reduces the amount 
of equity capital that can be used as a buffer to absorb negative exogenous 
shocks. Once the equity capital falls below a certain level, the expected price 
can be lowered only at the expense of greater price variability. 
In section 2.4, we derive the socially preferred capital structure. This is 
'The effect of the firm's capital structure is considered by Kale and Noe (1995) where 
regulation creates underinvestment incentives and by Spiegel (1996) who argues that reg- 
ulatory opportunism can lead to an inefficient (low fixed cost) choice of technology. They 
conclude that debt finance can alleviate both these problems although some of these results 
have been questioned: see Kiihn (2002a) and Kiihn (2002b) and Spiegel (2002). 
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such that consumers face some risk, in the sense the price they pay varies 
according to the underlying econornic conditions. One interpretation of this 
result is that the price cap mechanism, where such variability is allowed only in 
exceptional circumstances, is suboptimal, even in the conditions of symmetric 
information posited in the paper. 
The format of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the model. The 
optimal prices when the capital structure is exogenously given are developed 
in section 2.3. Section 2.4 considers the case when the capital structure varies. 
Finally, some conclusions are provided in section 2.5, which places the results 
of the analysis in the context of recent developments in the UK. 
2.2 The model 
We study the regulation of a monopolist. The product it supplies is fixed in 
quality, and demand is price inelastic 2 and normalized to 1. There are four 
groups of agents with an interest in how the firm is run; managers, share- 
holders, debtholders and of course consumers. The rest of this section focuses 
on the stylized assumptions we make concerning the attitude of these agents 
towards risk. 
The firm is run by a management, who can reduce cost by exerting effort, 
e>0, and whose utility is given by their remuneration, w, reduced by the cost 
of their effort. This is measured by a function ýb (e), satisfying 0' (e) , 0" 
(e) > 
0. Managers will only accept employment if they are guaranteed to receive at 
least their reservation level of expected utility, uO > 0. They are risk neutral 
down to zero utility, but infinitely risk averse below that level; they will not 
accept employment if there is a positive probability of negative utility. 
The variable cost of production is made up of three components; an exoge- 
nously given component 0>0, the cost reducing effort by the management, 
-e, with e>0, and a random cost reducing component, which is either -c or 
0, with c>0. The probability of the last being -c is xE [07 1]. 
We can therefore write the firm's variable cost as: 
0-e-c with probability x, 
0-e with probability I-x. 
2 This reflects the fact that the product is necessary and justifies it being regulated. 
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We make the following assumption: 
xc > U0. (2.1) 
The interpretation of (2.1) is that the firm can, in expected terms, reduce 
its costs by more than the amount necessary to entice the manager to accept 
employment. 
Production also requires a capital investment M>0, which is exogenously 
given and which can be financed by a mixture of debt and equity. We denote 
by DG [0, M] the extent of debt financing. The maintenance and depreciation 
costs of such assets are included in 0, and/or -c. 
The cost of debt is exogenously given at the market interest rate rD > 0- 
Moreover, lenders are infinitely risk averse. They must be guaranteed that the 
debt and the interest will be paid under all circumstances. 3 Consequently, the 
firm cannot go bankrupt, and hence there are no costs of financial distress, so 
that rD equals the risk free rate of return. 
Shareholders are risk averse, and therefore they require a higher expected 
rate of return to compensate for an increase in the variance in the return, 
depending on the covariance of the shareholders' rate of return with the return 
on the market portfolio. In a world where shareholders take their decisions 
using all the information available, they would base their investment decisions 
on the vector of returns and their probabilities and covariance with the market 
return. In practice, shareholders use a limited set of indicators to assess the 
riskiness of a given firm. We proxy this behavior with the assumption that 
shareholders require a higher rate of return when the debt of their firm is 
higher. Their required rate of return is rE (D), with r' (D) >ý 0. Since rD is E 
the risk free rate, 
'rE(D) > rD 
for every DG [0 1 M] - 
(2.2) 
Shareholders also have limited liability in the sense that they cannot be 
obliged to finance a shortfall in revenue through, for example, a rights issue. 
The regulator's objective is to maximize the representative consumer's 
3 In practice, lenders do accept some risk, as they typically recover only part of their loan 
in the event of bankruptcy. The extreme assumption that they accept no risk at all simplifies 
the model, while capturing the essential fact that lenders bear lower risks than shareholders, 
and their expected rate of return is lower. 
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expected utility. This is given by a standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function in income, U(Y), with U'(Y) > 0, FP(Y) < 0, to reflect risk aversion. 
From this, in view of the assumption of inelastic demand, it is straightforward 
to derive the indirect utility function, U (p) =0 (Y -p), with U, (p) , U" 
(p) < 0, 
where p is the price charged by the regulated firm. 
It is worth comparing the assumptions made with respect to the utility 
functions of the various stakeholders. Consumers, managers and debtholders 
have standard utility functions, concave in income, though the managers' in- 
come is reduced by the cost of effort, and the utility function has the extreme 
shape of being vertical at uo and linear for higher values. The debtholders' 
utility function is even more extreme and is horizontal beyond their reservation 
value. The shareholders, on the other hand, have a utility function depending 
on both their income and the debt level of their firm. Thus debtholders are the 
most risk averse. Managers are "locally" risk neutral, but there is a limit to 
the amount of risk they can bear. Shareholders' and consumers' risk aversions 
are determined by the shape of the functions rE(D) and FJ(Y). 
While the price is set by the regulator before the value of the cost parameter 
is realized, it can be made conditional on this realization. 4 Since there are 
only two states of the world, this amounts to choosing PH, the price when 
the cost is high (i. e. the random component is 0), and PL, the price when 
the cost is low (i. e. the random component is -c). Once prices are fixed by 
the regulator, shareholders buy shares, raise debt from lenders, and decide 
the reward structure for the management. The managerial compensation can 
be conditioned on the realized profit, and therefore, in our simple case, it is 
given by a pair (1VH ý WL) , the remuneration 
in the two possible states of the 
world. Finally, cost is realized, production and consumption take place, the 
price chosen by the regulator is paid by the consumers, the lenders are paid 
back, the managers receive their remuneration, the shareholders keep what is 
left, and the game ends. 
4 There are many ways of achieving this; for example, rather than allowing the regulated 
firm to increase prices in adverse economic circumstances, regulators can require them to 
lower their prices in favorable conditions. While equivalent from a mathematical viewpoint, 
it may be radically different as a public relations exercise. 
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2.3 Prices with a given capital structure 
We begin with analysis of the regulator's pricing decision when the capital 
structure is exogenously given. This has independent interest, and is a first 
step in the analysis of the general model set out in the previous section. 
Note that, although shareholders and managers can negotiate any contract, 
the regulator will factor their negotiations into the price formula, and will, 
essentially, operate in such a way so as not to leave the managers any additional 
rent over and above what is strictly necessary to ensure their participation. 
Therefore we can solve the game as if the regulator could choose the managerial 
compensation mechanism, as well as the prices. In view of this, the regulator's 
problem is the choice Of PLi PHi e-ý WL, and wH to maximize the consumer's 
expected utility subject to a number of constraints, described in what follows. 
Firstly, the regulator must ensure that the managers are willing to accept the 
contract. They must be guaranteed non-negative utility in each of the two 
states of the world, and their expected utility must be at least equal to its 
reservation level: 5 
WH -e 
(e) >- 03 (2.3) 
WL - ýb (e) >, 0, (2.4) 
> (2.5) -rWL + X) WH (e) - UO- 
There are also two break even constraints imposed by the shareholders' limited 
liability and the lenders' unwillingness to allow the possibility of bankruptcy 
as there must be sufficient revenues to ensure that the debt and the interest 
can be paid in full in both states of the world. 
PH - (WH +0- e-) - 
(I + rD) D >, 0, (2.6) 
PL - (WL+ 0 -e -c) - (1 +rD)D > 0. (2.7) 
The last constraint ensures that the expected profits are sufficient for share- 
holders to be willing to invest, that is, the expected profits are high enough to 
5 Note that an increase in uO increases not only the cost of the managerial input, but also 
the potential variability in the wage received by the managers, that is, their willingness to 
bear risk. 
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pay shareholders their required rate of return and to recover their investment. 
'Zý (PL - WL + C) +(l - -'l) 
(PH - WH) -O+e-- (I +rD) D >_ (1 + rE (D)) (M - D) 
(2.8) 
To sum up, the regulator will: 
max XU (PL) + (1 - 27) U (PH) subject to: (2.3)-(2.8). (2.9) PL, pH, e, 
WH 9WL 
We can now state the main result of this section. 
Proposition 1 Let p*, p* , e*, w*, and w* be the solution to problem LHLH 
(2.9). Then 0'(e*) = 1, and the managers and the shareholders receive their 
reservation expected utility. 
Moreover, let D satisfy: 
XC - UO D=M- 
I+ rE (-D)' 
Then, PL = p* if and only if D <, 15. If D> Dý p* < p* and p* HLHH 
+0- e*) - (1 + rD) D=0; the shareholders make zero profit when the 
(WH 
random component of cost is high. 
Proof. See appendix 2. A. 0 
The prices derived in Proposition I are illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
When D< 15, price is given by: 
PL = PH = p* (D) = uo+? p (e-*)+O-e-*--, -"c+(l + rD) D+(I + rE (D)) (M - D). 
(2.10) 
Note that the slope of the function p* (D) depends on the relationship between 
the level of debt, D, and the rate of return required by the shareholders, 
rE (D). The latter has generated substantial interest since Modigliani and 
Miller's celebrated seminal analysis (1958 and 1963). Thus, for example, if 
the conditions underlying Modigliani and Miller's propositions are satisfied, 
so that the overall cost of capital is in fact independent of the level of debt, 
then rDD + rE (D) (M - D) is constant and, therefore, so is p* (D). This is 
the dotted line in Figure 2.1. On the other hand, if an increase in leverage 
did reduce the overall cost of capital, then p* (D) would be decreasing, as 
shown by the dashed line, up to the point where rE is independent of D, in 
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Figure 2.1: The prices chosen by the regulator as a function of the debt ratio 
which case rE (D) =0 and the slope of the curve is constant and given by 
- (? 'E (D) - rD). However, the circumstances where the debt level is lower 
than D, and the relationship between the level of debt and the rate of return 
required by shareholders may affect the price that the regulator can set, are, 
in a sense, outside the scope of this paper. This is because, as the Figure 
illustrates, as far as the regulator is concerned, debt levels lower than D are 
(at least) weakly don-Linated by D, and therefore will not be chosen by the 
regulator (this is shown precisely in Lemma 1 below). 
At debt levels higher than D, it is impossible to pay the debt and the 
interest charges in both states of the world and keep the price independent of 
the realized cost without violating the shareholders' limited liability constraint 
(2.6). So, as the debt level increases, a scissor is opened between the prices in 
the two states of the world. These are given in the next proposition. 
Proposition 2 Let D>D. The prices chosen by the regulator when cost 
is high and low, p* and p*, respectively, are given by: HL 
P* V) (e*) +0- 6* + (I + 7-D) D, (2.11) H 
UO 
+O(e, *) +O-e* -c+ (I+ rD)D+ 
+ rE (15)) (M - D). PL 
xx 
(2.12) 
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Proof. The key to the proof is the observation that at D the share- 
holders lose their entire investment when the cost realization is high. In order 
for shareholders to be willing to invest in the company, their total returns 
when the cost is low must be at least (M - 
U). This determines the 
price for the two cost realizations, p* (D-), given in (2.10). Next note that, for 
a higher level of leverage, the shareholders' rate of return in the two states of 
the world will be the same as when D=D. Returns cannot be negative (due 
to limited liability) in the high cost state, and therefore they do not need to 
be higher than 
X 
(M - D) in the low cost state. The rest of the proof 
is obtained by deriving p* from Proposition I and p* from equating the LHS HL 
of (2.7) to (M - D). 0 
The implication of this result is that the are linear in the level of 
debt (with slopes (I + rD) and (I + rD) -X in the high and low cost 
case, respectively). The expected price, 
E(p*)ýUO+O(e-*)+O-e*-XC+(I+rD)D+(I+? 'E(-D))(M-D), (2.13) 
is also decreasing in the level of debt. 
2.4 The choice of capital structure 
In the above section the level of debt is taken as given. As prices vary with 
D, so does welfare, which is obtained by substituting the values of p* and p* HL 
given in (2.11) and (2.12), into the regulator's payoff (2.9). 
U (Uo + ýb (e*) +0- e* - XC + 
(1 + rD)D+(I+ rE (D)) (M - D)), 
if D <, V; 
W (D) 
XU Y-Q+O(e*)+0-6*-C+(I+rD)D+ (M - D) 
(xx 
x) U (o (e*) +0- e* + (1 + rD) D), 
if D>D. 
While the determination of the firm's actual capital structure is generally 
outside the regulator's control, it should be apparent from the discussion in 
the above section, that, by selecting prices and then letting the firm choose 
its preferred capital structure, the regulator can, A facto, choose the capital 
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structure itself. To see this, suppose that the regulator's preferred value of 
debt is Do > Suppose also that the regulator imposes the prices obtained 
by substituting Do into (2.11) and (2.12). The regulated firm will then have 
no choice but to select D= Do. This follows from the fact that if it has a 
leverage ratio lower that that implied by D= Do, then the shareholders would 
be able to increase their return by increasing the leverage. On the other hand, 
if the level of debt were higher than Do, the firm would not be able to satisfy 
the lenders' requirement that the debt and the interest charges be paid in both 
states of the world. 
In the rest of this section we therefore study the regulator's preferred level 
of debt. The following lemma is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2. 
Lemma 1 The regulator's payoff is non-decreasing in D for every DG 
loý DI - 
Proof. Simply differentiate W (D) for D<D: 
W'(D) = U'(p*) (rE (D) (M - D) - 
(rE (D) - rD)) - 
F`tom Proposition 1, the overall cost of capital is non-increasing when D <, 
, 
(D) (M - D). The Lenuna then follows using (2.2) and SO rE (D) - rD 
> rý, 
and U'(p) < 0.0 
The following is the main contribution of this paper. 
Proposition 3 Let D* be the socially optimal level of debt. Then D* > D. 
Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that, if it exists, D* is in [-D, M]. Since 
W (D) is continuous in the compact interval [D-, M], it has a maximum in 
[-D,. All]. Now we simply need to show that this maximum is not at D* 
To this end, differentiate W (D): 
W'(D) = xU'(p*) 
(I 
+rD 
+ rE + x) Ul (p* ) (I + rD) , 
(2.14) LxH 
We need to show is that W' > 0. At D=D, P*L = PH) and so we have: 
Ul (P*) (X (1 +rD) + rE (D)) + x) + rD)) 
: -- -Uf 
(P*) (rE (15) - 7D) 
This establishes the result. 0 
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In terms of the diagram in Figure 2.1, the proposition shows that the 
socially optimal level of debt D* is to the right of 15. In words, the socially 
optimal capital structure leaves some price uncertainty. This runs counter to 
the practice of price cap regulation in most countries, but the intuition for 
this conclusion is quite natural. Increasing debt reduces the expected value 
of the price, but it also increases the variability of prices. The former is a 
social benefit, the latter, with risk aversion, a social cost. The optimal capital 
structure will be set where the benefit of an expected price reduction balances 
exactly the cost of the increase in variability. But now note that when p* = p* L H) 
the benefit is a first order effect, measured by U' (xp* + (I - x) p*), and the LH 
welfare loss a second order effect, and it is, therefore, dominated by the welfare 
gain. 
We close this section with a brief analysis of the effect of changes in the 
exogenous variables on the preferred level of debt. We take the case in which 
the optimal leverage is strictly less than I (otherwise the debt level remains 
at M for sufficiently small changes in exogenous variables). 
Corollary 1 If D* < M, then: 
dD* (I X) U" L U, 
(I + rD) (P*) 
L 
de < 
0) 
-W1l (D) 
(2.15) 
dD* 
ult * 
U/ 
(PH) 
P 
(( 
*) - 
U/I * E- (P 
X) U'(PH*) (I + rD) uI 
mpý 
H 
- -- - (2.16) dO W" (D) 
dD* 
- 
1 dD* 
> 01 (2.17) duo x dc 
dD* 
-- 
dD* 
-D* + 
XU, (P*) + (i - X) U, (P* ) LH 
drD dO -W" (D) 
Proof. Take (2.15). Total differentiation of the first order condition for 
an interior optimum, W'(D) = 0, keeping 0, UO, rD, andrE (D) constant, 
where W' (D) is given in (2.14), yields: 
W" (D) dD *) 1+rD- 
1 +rE (VD) ) 
dc = 0. - XUII (PL 
(x 
From which it is immediate to derive (2.15), using (2.14), which can be written 
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as: 
+rD 
I+ rE(D)) xH Ul 
(P* ) 
(I +rD) 
xx U/ (P*L) 
The remaining statements in the Corollary are obtained in the same manner. 
E 
Further insight into the effects of changes in 0 and rD can be gained with 
the assumption that the representative consumer has decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (this is a realistic restriction, as noted by Hirshleifer and Riley (1992). 
Use the direct utility function U (Y - p) to write the first term in the numerator 
of (2.16) as: 
-Uff(Y- PH 
UI(Y - P* ) H 
-Ulf(Y - PL*) 
UI(Y - P*) L 
(2.19) 
This is the difference in the coefficient of absolute risk aversion evaluated at 
Y- p* and Y- p*, which is positive, as Y- p* <Y- p*. Therefore, if the HLHL 
consumers have decreasing absolute risk aversion, then both dD* and 'dD* are dO drD 
negative. 
The interpretation of the results in Corollary I is fairly straightforward, 
keeping in mind the main trade-off between lower expected price but higher 
variation in this price. 
Consider an increase in c. This reduces the expected cost by xc, and there- 
fore the expected price, but it also increases the gap between the prices (see 
(2.11) and (2.12), or (2.32) in the proof of Proposition 1). The regulator, 
therefore, takes the benefit of the reduction in the expected cost with a reduc- 
tion in both the expected price and in the variability of the price; the latter 
being achieved via a reduction in debt. An increase in 0 increases the overall 
cost of the industry, making the consumers poorer (the expected price increase 
by the same amount as 0, see (2.13)). When consumers display decreasing ab- 
solute risk aversion, then they prefer less risk the poorer they are, and the 
regulator reduces the amount of risk they carry by setting prices such that 
the level of debt is lower and the overall cost of providing the good increases. 
An increase in rD has clearly the same effect as an increase in 0. In addition, 
there is also a substitution away from the form of financing that is becoming 
more expensive. Finally, the overall cost of an increase in uO means both that 
managers become more "expensive" and that they are willing to accept more 
risk. This is, therefore, analogous to a reduction in c (higher cost, but less 
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variability). The effect on the preferred value of D is therefore the same, and 
for the same reason. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
The paper studies the role of the financial structure in a regulated firm. It is 
found that the price cap mechanism, which fixes the prices and thus permits 
no cost sharing between shareholders and consumers, is sub-optimal. If the 
regulator maximizes the welfare of consumers with a standard von-Neumann- 
Morgenstern utility function, the optimal regulatory mechanism is such that 
the consumers pay more when the underlying econon-. Lic conditions are bad. 
n-om a practical point of view, of course, it is conceptually much simpler 
to say "no price variation" than to say "some price variation, but not too 
much". The former is unambiguous, the latter would be likely to open the 
gates for endless negotiations about the price level, whereas with a price cap 
negotiations occur only at the periodic price review. It is however important 
to note that, from a theoretical viewpoint, there are welfare losses determined 
by the imposition of a fixed price rule, even in the symmetric information 
set-up of the paper. 
Our analysis also indicates that the regulator should take a view on the 
optimal capital structure of the regulated firm, as this may affect the cost 
of capital, and therefore, ultimately, the price paid by consumers. This is 
very much reflected in the practice of regulators in the UK. During recent 
periodic reviews, UK regulators have stated explicitly their opinion about 
what constitutes an efficient capital structure. Table I summarizes a number 
of regulators' most recent judgments of the industry efficient capital structure. 
The assumptions made by the regulators with regard to the level of leverage 
significantly exceeded the actual level at the time of the relevant Periodic 
Review in virtually all cases, suggesting that UK regulators would somehow 
welcome an increase in the level of debt of regulated companies, to the extent 
that it translates into lower prices paid by the consumers. 
Although there is no requirement that the regulated firms adjust their 
capital structures in line with these figures, as argued in the present paper, 
they clearly have an incentive to do so to the extent that this reduces the cost 
of capital. 
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Table 1: Recent assumptions by UK regulators about efficient capital structures. 
Regulator (Reference) Leverage assumption 
Water companies (Ofwat 1999) _ 45%-55% 
Railtrack (ORR 1999) 50% 
Public electricity suppliers (Ofgem 1999) 50% 
National Grid Company (Ofgem 2000) 60%-70% 
'Iýansco (Ofgem 2001) 62.5% 
Mobile phone operators (Oftel 2001) 10%-30% 
What constitutes an efficient capital structure has become a significant 
issue in the UK. For example, after the 1999 Periodic Review several water 
companies took action to increase leverage well above the level assumed by the 
regulator. A significant recent development has been the use of 'not-for-profit' 
companies limited by guarantee that rely 100% on debt for external finance to 
replace privatized utilities with serious financial problems. Glas Cymru and 
Network Rail were both established on this basis to replace, respectively, Welsh 
Water in May 2001 and Railtrack plc as owner and operator of the rail network 
in October 2002. However, as our analysis illustrates, there is no theoretical 
reason to suggest that a 100% debt financed company is socially optimal. Too 
much debt may imply too much variability in the prices paid by the consumers. 
This possibility seems to have been recognized in the design of 'not-for-profit' 
structures. Such structures require the creation of a buffer in the form of liquid 
reserves to protect consumers and lenders from unexpected variations in costs 
in the event of adverse economic conditions. Even so, consumers pay for this 
protection and, in effect, take on the role of shareholders (but without the 
ownership rights) to the extent that these reserves have to be built up initially 
and then replenished out of charges to consumers. 
How UK regulators will respond to these developments remains to be seen. 
However, the water regulator (Ofwat (2002)) has expressed the view that the 
assumptions about the cost of capital used to set prices should not pressure 
companies to adopt highly geared capital structures that create undue risks 
for consumers. 
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Appendix 2. A Proof of Proposition 1 
Proof. The Lagrangian function for the problem (2.9) is: 
L:: --:: -lU 
(PL) + (1 - 20 U (PH) 
" AH (WH 0 W) + AL (WL (e)) +Y (-ZWL + X) WH ?P (e-) UO) 
" 7H (PH (WH +0- e-) - 
(I + 7D) D) + 7rL (PL (WL +0 e- - C) (I + rD) D) 
" 7r (X (PL WL + C) + (I - X) (PH - WH) -0+e (I +rD) D- (I + rE (D)) (M - D)) 
where PH) PL) Pý IrHý 7L and 7r are the multipliers associated to constraints 
(2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) and (2.8), respectively. The first order conditions 
are: 
I 
ý) r 
= XUf (PL) + 7rL + X7r = 0) (2.20) 
49PL 
aL == (1 - X) Ul (PH) + 7rH + (I - X) 7r = 07 (2.21) 
49PH 
aL (PH + 1-0 7PI (e) - fto'(e) + 7rH + 7rL + 7r = 01 (2.22) 
l9e 
aL 
19WL 
= PL + PX - 7rL - X7r = 
01 (2.23) 
aL =-- PH + 11 x) - 7rH - (I - X) 7r = 0. (2.24) 5WH 
Suppose that managers' utility is above 0 in each state of the world; then 
ILH =: YL = 0. Notice that if both (2.6) and (2.7) are binding, 7rH> 0 and 
7rL> 0, the shareholders' participation constraint (2.8) would be violated. So 
it must be the case that at least one of the constraints (2.6) and (2.7) is slack. 
Begin with (2.7): when it is slack, the firm makes positive profit when the cost 
is low. Therefore 7rL = 0. And, from (2.20): 
-Ul 
(PL) ý 7r- (2.25) 
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Using this, we can obtain: 
7r I 
7rH ý 07 
PL ý PHi 
from (2.23); 
from the above and (2.24); 
from (2.25) and (2.21); (2.26) 
from (2.22). (2.27) ýY (e) =1ý 
So the consumers pay the same price (they do not carry any risk) and the 
shareholders and the managers are kept at their reservation expected utility 
(both ft and 7r are strictly positive). Let e* be the value of e determined by 
(2.27). 
While the expected salary is given by uo + V)(e*), the two salaries WL and 
WHare indeterminate. One way of fixing these values could be to let managers 
be at their reservation utility and only be paid for the cost of their effort when 
costs are high so that: 
which implies that: 
WL 
WH 
0 (6*) + UO - 
(I 
- I)WH 
a; 
(2.28) 
U0 
+ -. (2.29) x 
In this case, the profit in the two states of the world is: 
p* -O(e*)-O+e*-(I+rD)D, H 
UO 
PL-'O(e-*)-- 
x 
in the high cost and the low cost states respectively. By (2.1), profit is higher 
when the random component of cost is low, and therefore our starting assump- 
tion that (2.7) is slack is verified. 
To ensure that the shareholders receive their reservation utility, the price 
must satisfy: 
PH-":: ýPLýP : ---. ': UO+O(e*)+O-e-*-XC+(l+rD)D+(I+rE(D))(M-D). 
(2.30) 
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This is possible without violating (2.6) if and only if: 
(I + rE (D)) (M - D) >, xc - uo. (2.31) 
Note that, by (2.1), the RHS of (2.31) is positive, and therefore, when D=M, 
(2.31) is certainly violated. Let D be the solution to (2.31) when it holds as 
an equality, if one exists, otherwise let 0. Note that the LHS of (2.31) 
is decreasing in D since the overall cost of capital rDD + rE (D) (M - D) is 
either constant or decreasing in debt. This implies that there is only one value 
of D such that (2.31) holds as an equality, implying that D is well defined. 
Therefore, for D (2.31) holds, the solution to the regulator's problem is 
given by (2.27), (2.28), (2.29) and (2.30). This proves the first two parts of 
Proposition 1. 
Now suppose that D>D. In this case, (2.31) is violated, and therefore 
the above cannot be the solution. If salaries are fixed on the same principle 
as before so that WL > WH, we will have: ILL = 0, and WH = V) (6) - Rearrange 
the first order conditions as follows: 
7rL -r 
GL 
- 70 from (2.2 3); 
X (Ul (PL) + 7r) +X GI - 70 
05 from (2.20); 
/-t - Ul (PL) 
7rH - 
(1 
- X) 
(Ul (PH) + 7r) from (2.2 1); 
PH = (1 - X) 
(Ul (PL) - Uf (PH)) from (2.24). 
Note that PH >0 implies Uf (PL) > UI (PH)ý that is PL < PH- Putting the 
values of the multipliers derived in the above into (2.22) gives: 
- (1 - 
(Uf (PL) - Uf (PH» ý)/ (e) + Uf 
(PL) ý)1 (e-) 
- 
(1 - X) 
(Ul (PH) + 7r) -X 
(Ul (PL) + 7r) +, 7r = 
Rearranging gives: 
-(I - 01 
(e)) (XUI (PL) + (I - X) Ul (PH)) ý 
which implies: 
7p, (e) = 1. 
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Effort is, therefore, still set optimally at e= e* and salaries will be at the 
same level as before in (2.28) and (2.29): 
*+ UO 
L 
x 
WH 
Next note that: 
7rL :: -- -X 
(Ul (PL) + 7r) , 
7rH :::::::: - 
(1 
- X) 
(Ul (PH) + 7r) . 
and therefore, because Uf (PL) > UI (PH)) we can have 7H > 0, and7r L : --- 0) 
but not vice versa. Consequently, the profit is 0 when the firm has high cost. 
Fýom (2.6) this determines the price in this case as: 
PH ::::: WH* -0+ e-* - (I + rD) D 
Using (2.28) gives the price p* in (2.11). Rom Proposition 2 the price when H 
the cost is low' PL given in (2.12), is obtained using (2.8): 
+ C)+(l - X) 
(PH-4F)-O+e*-(l + rD) D= (I + rE X (PL - WL 
For this solution to be consistent with the assumption made at the outset, the 
price difference, 
uo I+ rE (-D) 
PH PL ":: ý C-xx (M - D), (2.32) 
must be positive. That is: 
xc - uo > 
(I + rE (-D)) (M - D), 
which is precisely the case when (2.31) is violated. This ends the proof. N 
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Chapter 3 
Risk Sharing, the Cost of 
Equity and the Optimal 
Capital Structure of the 
Regulated Firm 
3.1 Introduction 
The worldwide trend to privatize utilities and liberalize the markets for provid- 
ing public services has been accompanied by a considerable amount of research 
on incentive schemes for controlling monopoly power when there are asym- 
metries in the information available to the regulator and the firm; a classic 
example being Laffont and Tirole (1993). In practice, however, price controls 
are the only mechanism that is generally used to regulate privately owned mo- 
nopolies. Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994), in their study of the UK's 
experience, point out that design of the price control system involves making 
a trade-off between allocative and productive efficiency because a firm's costs 
are determined by factors outside its control as well as by its own efforts, both 
of which are largely unobservable by a regulator. There has, therefore, been 
much discussion about the relative merits of the 'price-cap' and the 'rate-of- 
return' systems of regulation. In its extreme form, rate-of-return regulation 
is simply an arrangement under which the firm's prices are determined by, 
and continuously adjusted in accordance with, its actual costs. Although this 
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might achieve allocative efficiency and avoid excessive profits it provides no 
incentive for the firm to reduce costs and achieve productive efficiency. Con- 
versely, under a pure price-cap system, there is a predetermined upper limit on 
prices and while this creates strong incentives to increase productive efficiency 
it is likely to result in allocative inefficiency since prices can be out of line with 
costs. It also leads to the possibility of monopoly rents. Consequently, neither 
mechanism has been implemented in its extreme form and regulatory systems 
in many parts of the world have evolved into hybrids of both these methods 
of price control. 
While the literature has concentrated on the effect of different price control 
mechanisms on incentives and the behaviour of the firm, little attention has 
been given to their effect on consumers and investors. In particular, a rate-of- 
return system with an annual adjustment of prices in line with actual costs is 
likely to result in greater variability in prices than a price-cap system where 
an upper limit on prices is set prospectively and remains unchanged for a 
considerable period of time; generally four or five years in the UK. This greater 
variability in prices implies a higher level of risk for consumers and a lower 
level of risk for the firm. This in turn suggests that the cost of capital and 
the financing costs of the regulated firm should be lower under rate-of-return 
regulation if the firm's business risks are positively correlated with the return 
on the market portfolio. There is, therefore, a further potential trade-off to 
consider when making decisions on regulatory policy viz. the trade-off for 
the cons-Luner between greater price variability and the possibility of a lower 
expected price. Although Cowan (2004) acknowledges the possibility of a 
relationship between the form of the price control and the cost of capital, his 
analysis of the optimal allocation of risk between consumers and the regulated 
firm takes a different approach and the firm is assumed, instead, to be risk 
averse with a utility function that is solely dependent on the firm's profits. 
In addition, little attention has been paid in the literature to the capital 
structure of the regulated firm. Typically, as Spiegel (1996) notes, an implied 
assumption is made that the regulated firm is wholly financed by equity with 
the cost of equity being determined exogenously in the capital markets. For 
example, this is the approach in Laffont and Tirole (1993). As described in 
chapter 2, even where the firm's capital structure has been considered, the 
focus is again on the firm's behaviour and the potential use of high levels of 
gearing (the debt-capital ratio) to exert a price-influence effect on regi_ýdatory 
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decisions. 
In an early important contribution to finance theory Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) and (1963) showed that, in the absence of corporate taxation, the value 
of a firm and its overall cost of capital is unaffected by its capital structure. 
However, their analysis makes the key assumption that the firm's revenue is 
determined exogenously and so is not affected by its capital structure. Al- 
though this is a reasonable assumption for a firm that is not regulated, it is 
argued here that this may not be the case for a regulated firm which is subject 
to price controls. The form of the price control mechanism will determine 
the risks to be carried by investors and this will influence both the amount of 
equity finance that is needed and, potentially, its cost. It follows that capital 
structure may not be irrelevant for the regulated firm even in the absence of 
corporate taxation. It is not surprising, therefore, that risk, the cost of capital 
and capital structure have been the subject of considerable debate between 
regulators and regulated utilities at price-cap reviews in the UK. For example, 
there was a particularly extensive exchange of views on these issues shortly 
after privatization of the water industry as can be seen in Ofwat (1991) and 
WSA/WCA (1991). 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the relationship between the form 
of the price control and the allocation of risk between consumers, the firm's 
managers and its shareholders and to determine under what conditions there 
is a social optimum. The question of whether there is a socially optimal capital 
'structure for a regulated firm has previously been considered by De R-aja and 
Stones (2004) and their paper is included here as chapter 2. They developed a 
model of a regulated firm in which its capital structure is determined endoge- 
nously and, in effect, by the regulator and they showed that an increase in 
gearing which reduces the overall cost of capital not only gives the regulator 
scope for price reductions but also creates a trade-off. Increasing the level of 
gearing reduces the amount of equity capital that can be used to absorb the 
cost of downside risks and so, once gearing rises above a certain level, a reduc- 
tion in the expected price can only be achieved at the expense of greater price 
variability. De F'taja and Stones (2004) concluded that, when consumers are 
risk averse, there is a socially optimal capital structure in which in consumers 
carry some risk, in the sense that they are willing to accept a degree of price 
variability and pay higher prices when there are adverse economic conditions. 
It follows that a price cap system, in which prices are fixed or only varied in 
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exceptional circumstances, is sub-optimal. 
In De Fraja and Stones (2004) the cost of equity was simply assumed to 
be a function of the level of debt as a proxy for the relationship between 
the firm's cost of equity and investment risk. The classic formulation of that 
relationship is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed in Sharpe 
(1964), Lintner (1965a) and (1965b) where shareholders base their investment 
decisions on the vector of returns and their covariance with the return on the 
market portfolio. The proxy function used by De Fraja and Stones (2004) 
is consistent with such models because an increase in a firm's level of debt 
increases the covariance of the returns to shareholders with the market return 
and, therefore, the cost of equity. However, it is this proxy function which 
leads to their result that there must some variability in consumer prices once 
gearing reaches a certain level. Above that level the buffer provided by equity 
finance is insufficient to aborb all the risk of cost variations and still meet 
the firm's obligations to lenders and shareholders. Consequently, their model 
only allows the regulator's decision on prices to influence the cost of equity 
indirectly through the regulator's choice of capital structure. 
This chapter examines the more general case when the level of gearing and 
the regulator's decision on prices both have an independent and direct effect 
on the covariance of the shareholders' returns with the market return and, 
therefore, on the firm's cost of equity. Indeed, a novel feature of the model 
presented in this chapter is that it explicitly allows for the possibility that 
prices can be set in such a way that the risks and returns for shareholders are 
either positively correlated, uncorrelated or even negatively correlated with the 
market return. As a result the firm's cost of equity can either be greater than, 
equal to or lower than the cost of debt. In other words, the regulator's ability to 
determine the extent to which prices can vary means that the risks and returns 
for shareholders need not necessarily be tied to the firm's underlying business 
risk. It is by recognising this point that the model takes into account the 
consumer's trade-off between increasing price volatility and a lower expected 
price. 
Two sets of results are obtained from the analysis. Firstly, it is shown, in 
contrast to De Fraj a and Stones (2004) , that some variation in prices is optimal 
for consumers at all levels of gearing except in the unlikely case where the 
willingness of managers to carry risk exceeds the inherent risk in the business. 
Although prices are higher for consumers in adverse economic conditions, the 
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returns to shareholders need not be lower. Indeed, an interesting possibility 
emerges when comsumers have a relatively low aversion to risk and prefer 
a lower expected price. In these circumstances it might be optimal for the 
regulator to set prices so that profits are higher in adverse economic conditions. 
As this would provide shareholders with a form of insurance against market 
risk the cost of equity would be lower than the cost of debt; the result being 
lower financing costs and a lower expected price for consumers. 
Secondly, it is shown that even in the absence of corporate taxation the 
regulated firm has a socially optimal capital structure that depends on both 
the consumers' aversion to the risk of price variations and the shareholders' 
trade-off between risk and returns. A key result is that, in this model, there is 
only one particular case in which the preferences of consumers and shareholders 
make it optimal for the regulator to set Prices where the rate of return is equal 
to the cost of debt and such a return is also satisfactory for investors. In all 
other cases there should either be a combination of equity and debt or no debt 
at all. In other words, there is only one very special set of conditions where it 
is socially optimal for the regulated firm to be a 'not-for-profit' company or a 
similar entity that relies wholly on debt finance. 
This latter result is of more than just theoretical interest. The use of not- 
for profit companies to provide public services can have political attractions 
and in the UK, for example, such companies have been established to take 
over the assets and operations of privatized utilities that have encountered 
financial difficulties. However, these developments remain controversial and, 
as Stones (2001) describes in his commentary on the water industry, not all 
proposals to introduce such structures have been successful. 
The format of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 sets out the model. 
Section 3.3 considers the regulator's pricing decision if the firm's capital struc- 
ture is given exogenously and the results of the analysis lead to a number of 
Lemmas and Propositions. The detailed analysis of the regulator's problem is 
given in appendix 3. A while the proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions are 
provided in appendices 3. B and 3. C respectively. In section 3.4 the regulator 
can vary the firm's capital structure and the conditions under which there will 
be a social optimum are similarly set out in the form of a series of Propositions. 
Appendix 3.1) sets out the solutions for a social optimum in detail and the 
proofs of the associated Propositions are contained in appendix 3. E. Finally 
some conclusions are presented in section 3.5. 
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3.2 The model 
3.2.1 Demand and variable costs 
It is assumed that a monopoly firm supplies a product that is fixed in quality. 
Demand for the product is price inelastic and normalized to 1. The regula- 
tor's objective is to maximize the representative consumer's expected utility 
by choosing the price p that the firm can charge. Assuming the consumer 
has a standard von Neumann- Morgenstern utility function in income, the con- 
sumer's indirect utility function is U(p) with U'(p), U" (p) <0 to reflect risk 
aversion. 
The firm is run by a management who can reduce costs by exerting effort, 
e>0. Managers' utility can be measured by their remuneration, w which is 
reduced by the cost of their effort. This cost is measured by a function ýb (e), 
satisfying VV (e) , 0" 
(e) > 0. Managers will only accept employment if they are 
guaranteed that their expected remuneration will be at least their reservation 
level of expected utility, uO > 0. 
The variable cost of production is made up of three components: 
9 an exogenously given component 0>0; 
* the cost reducing effort by the management, -e, with e>0; and 
a random cost reducing component, which is either -c or 0, with c>0. 
The probability of this component being -c is xG [05 11. 
Consequently, there are only two states of the world in cost terms. The 
variable cost is either high (i. e. the random component is 0) or low (i. e. 
the random component is -c). Subscripts are used to indicate the values of 
variables in each state of the world (e. g. PH is the price when cost is high and 
PL is the price when cost is low. ) 
3.2.2 Investment and financing 
Production also requires a capital investment M>0, which is exogenously 
given and financed by a mixture of debt and equity. The extent of debt 
financing is denoted by DG [0 1 M] - 
The cost of debt is exogenously given at the market interest rate rD > 0. 
Moreover, lenders are guaranteed that the debt and the interest will be paid 
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under all circumstances and so the firm cannot go bankrupt. Consequently, 
rD is also the risk free rate of return. 
The finn's shareholders are risk averse and have limited liability in the 
sense that they cannot be obliged to finance a shortfall in revenue. 
3.2.3 The cost of equity 
So far the structure of the model is the same as that used by De Fýaja and 
Stones (2004) but they go on to make the simplifying assumption that the 
cost of equity is a function of the level of debt. This is used as a proxy for the 
relationship between the firm's cost of equity and investment risk. However, 
this chapter considers the more general case where, in accordance with asset 
pricing models such as the CAPM, the cost of equity finance rE depends on 
the covariance of the shareholder's rate of return RE with the return on the 
market portfolio R, that is: 
rE ý rE (cov (RE, R, )) 
Using the notation 'rE (cov (RE, R, )) == rE (-) it is assumed that the cost of 
equity will vary directly with the covariance between the shareholder's rate of 
return and the market return, that is: 
rE (-) > 0- (3.2) 
It is also assumed that the rate of return on the market portfolio is higher 
when the firm's costs are low so that': 
, 
AI: 4n ' (RmL - RmH) > 0- (3.3) 
The above model leads to the following Lemma 2. 
'Although RL is the return on the market portfolio when the firm's costs are low, and 
R,. H is the return when the firm's costs are high, it should be noted that this does not imply 
there are two states of the world for the return on the market portfolio. It is only necessary 
to assume that each outcome for the firm's costs always coincides with a particular level of 
11", - 2 The proof is given in appendix 3.13. 
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Lemma 1 The covariance of the shareholder's rate of return RE with the 
return on the market portfolio 14n is: 
COV (RE, R, ) =x 
(I X) (C - (WL - WH) - (PH - PL)) (3.4) M-D 
The cost of equity in this model is, therefore, not only a function of the 
level of debt but, crucially, it is also a function of the regulator's decision on 
prices. This approach, therefore, allows both effects to be taken into account 
independently. 
It can also be seen from Lemma I that, under a price cap system of regu- 
lation where the, upper limit on prices is invariant to cost levels and the firm 
charges at the limit (i. e. PH : --: PL) , the cost of equity does not depend on 
the level of the price cap set by the regulator. At first sight this might seem 
counterintuitive as it suggests a price cap review which tightens the regula- 
tory contract and decreases revenue would not result in higher rates of return 
being required by shareholders. The point to note here is that cost of equity is 
detern-Lined by the covariance of the shareholders' returns with the market and 
this would be unaffected by a 'one-off' reduction in revenue 3. Of course, the 
decrease in revenue would lead to a reduction in the market value of the equity 
but the cost of equity would not rise. However, as Grout (1995) points out, the 
rate of return required by shareholders in normal times will exceed the cost of 
eql-iity if the regulator's decision leads shareholders to expect that future price 
cap reviews will result in negative shocks to the firm's future revenues from 
further tightening of the contract. 
3.3 Prices with: a given capital structure 
3.3.1 The regulator's problem 
It is assumed that the regulator has complete information and so there is no 
information asymmetry between the regulator and the firm. As there are only 
two states of the world in cost terms the regulator's problem when the capital 
structure is given exogenously is to choose PL, PH, e, WL, and WH in order to 
3 This is because the size of the covariance between two variables is not affected if one of 
the variables is increased or decreased by a constant amount. 
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maximize the consumer's expected utility subject to a number of constraints 4- 
Firstly, there are two rationality constraints and a participation constraint 
to ensure the managers are willing to accept employment: 
WH (e) 0j (3.5) 
WL (e) 03 (3.6) 
XWL + (1 - X) WH - ýb (e-) >, - UO- 
(3.7) 
Secondly, there are two break even constraints on the firm's profits, IIH 
and fIL, and a shareholders' participation constraint. The former preserve the 
limited liability of shareholders and ensure that the firm meets its obligations 
to lenders while the latter ensures that the firm's expected profits, E (fl), are 
high enough to cover the cost of equity and the repayment of the initial equity 
investment: 
IIH = (1 + REH) (M - D) 0, (3.8) 
IIL = (1 + REL) (M - D) 0, (3.9) 
E (11) 
->- 
(1 + rE (-» (M - D), 
where: 
rIH - PH-(WH+0-6-)-(I+rD)D, 
(3.11) 
rIL - PL-(WL+O-e-c)-(l+rD)D, 
(3.12) 
E(II) X(PL-WL+C)+(I-X)(PH-WH)+0-10-(1+7D)D. 
(3.13) 
The regulator's problem is, therefore: 
max XU (PL) + (I - X) U (PH) subject to (3.5) - (3.10) (3.14) PLýPH9 
WH, WL, e 
The feasible solutions to this problem are derived in appendix 3. A while 
the proofs of the associated Lemmas are given in appendix 3. B. This section 
sets out the main results in the form of a series of Propositions and associated 
4 Although the regulator must set the price before the random component of costs is 
realised it can be made conditional on the outcome. 
A more detailed description of the 
sequence of events in this model is given 
in Chapter 2. 
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Corollaries for which the proofs are given in appendix 3. C. 
For these purposes p*, p* , e*, w*, and w* are used to represent the LHLH 
solution to the problem (3.14) while II* and M are the firm's profits, LH RýL 
and Rý are the shareholders' rates of return and rý is the cost of equity EH E 
(*) 
produced by that solution. The resulting covariance of shareholder returns 
with the market return is denoted cov* (. ). 
3.3.2 Consurner preferences and risk 
The first proposition is concerned with the consumer preferences regarding the 
risk of price variations. 
Proposition 1 If uo > xc then. the prices chosen by the regulator are such 
that p* = p* when w* > w* > V) (e, *), II* >0 and fI* =0 otherwise HLLHHL 
H*P> P* L' 
Proposition I states that consumers prefer some variation in prices, with 
prices being higher when the firm's costs are high, unless certain conditions 
apply. Firstly, for price certainty to be optimal the managers' reservation 
level of expected utility uO must exceed xc, the expected variation in the 
firm's costs5. In other words, managers must be willing to absorb the whole 
of the firm's business risk. Secondly, the managers' remuneration must exceed 
the cost of effort and provide positive utility in both states of the world to 
ensure they receive their reservation level. Thirdly, profits must be zero when 
the firm's costs are low and positive when costs are high so that financing 
costs and, therefore, prices are minimized. This means the cost of equity 
is lower than the cost of debt. It follows that to maintain price certainty 
the difference in managers' remuneration between the two states of the world 
must be sufficient to cover both the variation in variable costs and the returns 
received by shareholders when costs are high. 
In practice, however, it is unlikely that x and/or c would be so small or 
uO so large that the optimum for consumers would be a pure price cap system 
of regulation in which there is price certainty for consumers and no sharing 
of risks. It should also be noted that there are no feasible solutions to the 
problem where P* < P* H L' 
5 This possibility is not considered by De Fraja and Stones (2004) as they specifically 
assume that xc > uo. 
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This conclusion applies at all levels of gearing whereas in De Fraja and 
Stones (2004) it is only optimal for prices to vary once gearing increases beyond 
a certain level. In De Fraja and Stones (2004), once gearing reaches a certain 
level the cost of equity is fixed and the risk that is carried by consumers 
through price variations can, therefore, only be adjusted by varying the total 
amount of equity finance and hence the capital structure of the firm. This 
model, however, allows price variations and capital structure to have separate 
and independent effects on the cost of equity. As both effects can be taken 
into account an optimal variation in consumer prices can be determined at 
any level of debt. 
Proposition I also demonstrates a key feature of this model in that, unlike 
De Fraja and Stones (2004), it provides the regulator with the option of setting 
prices that allow shareholders to receive higher profits when the firm's variable 
costs are high. In other words, by manipulating consumer prices, the regulator 
changes the risks carried by shareholders and it is possible to set prices so 
that the shareholders' returns are positively correlated, uncorrelated or even 
negatively correlated with the risk of variations in the firm's costs (which are 
assumed to be positively correlated with the market return). Consequently, 
it is possible that cov* 0 and so the cost of equity can be higher than, 
lower than or equal to the cost of debt. 
Two Corollaries follow from this Proposition. 
Corollary 1 Mien p* > p* then w* (e*) + ! ýý and w* = V) (e*). HLLxH 
When the optimum for consumers is a variation in prices the managers' 
remuneration provides zero utility when costs are high. This is because man- 
agers need only receive their reservation level of expected utility and so once 
the optimum variation in prices has been detern-. Lined the balance of the re- 
maining risk must be carried by shareholders. 
Corollary 2 If uO >, xc then r* (. ) < rD i- e- the cost of equity is lower than E 
the cost of debt. 
If managers are willing to carry all the firm's business risk then financing 
costs are minimized by providing the shareholders with higher returns when 
costs are high so that the cost of equity is lower than the cost of debt. As shown 
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in Proposition I this is a requirement when the optimum is price certainty but 
it also applies when the optimum is such that p* > p* H L' 
3.3.3 Consumer risk and the cost of equity 
The next three propositions are concerned with the relationship between con- 
sumers' and shareholders' preferences and their aversion to risk when p* >p* H L' 
Proposition 2 sets out the conditions for an internal optimum while Proposi- 
tions 3 and 4 describe the 'comer' solutions. 
Proposition 2 When p* > p* and fl* , rl* >0 then 
Xu (PL d? IL 
HLHL (I-X)U/(P* dp* HL 
Proposition 2 states that, when there is an interior solution for the opti- 
mum, the consumer's marginal rate of substitution between a change in PL* 
and p* equals the slope of the shareholders' participation constraint (3.10). H 
Further, the slope of (3.10) itself reflects the effect of the change in p* and p* LH 
on the cost of equity as can be seen from the following Lemma. 
Lemma 2 When p* > p* the shareholders' participation constraint HL 
satisfies 
dp-ý 
dPL 
E 
In other words, at the optimum the consumers' aversion to risk is such 
that the loss of utility from a marginal increase in the price variation is just 
matched by the benefit of the associated reduction in the cost of equity. 
In addition, since shareholders receive positive returns in both states of 
the world it is possible for the cost of equity to be higher than, lower than or 
equal to the cost of debt depending on the different risk profiles of consumers 
and shareholders. 
Proposition 3 Khen p* > p*, fl* = 0, and M>0 HLHL 
xu, PP* then -(L>H and r* 
(. ) > rD- (1-X)U'(P* dp* E HL 
Proposition 3 concerns the case when the consumer's marginal rate of 
substitution between a change in p* and p* is greater than the slope of the LH 
shareholders' participation constraint at the optimum. Consumers have a 
relatively high aversion to risk compared with shareholders and it is optimal 
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for consumers to carry relatively less risk and for profits to be higher when the 
firm's costs are low and zero when its costs are high. As shareholder returns 
vary directly with the market return the cost of equity is higher than the cost 
of debt. 
Proposition 4 When p* > p*, fl* > 0, and rl* =0 HLHL 
then - 
XU'(PL 
and r* (. ) < rD (I - X) U, (P, ý) 
< dp L* E H 
If the converse applies and the consumer's marginal rate of substitution 
between a change in p* and p* is less than the slope of the shareholders' LH 
participation constraint then consumers have a relatively low aversion to risk 
compared with shareholders. Proposition 4 states that it is then optimal for 
consumers to carry relatively more risk. Profits are higher when costs are high 
and zero when costs are low. Consequently, shareholder returns vary inversely 
with the market return and the cost of equity is lower than the cost of debt. 
3.3.4 Manager remuneration and shareholder returns 
The final proposition in this section relates to the remuneration of the man- 
agers and the returns for shareholders when prices are at an optimum. 
Proposition 5 The prices chosen by the regulator are such that the marginal 
cost of managers' effort equals the marginal reduction in variable costs, i. e. 
ýY(e*) = 1, the managers' expected utility equals their reservation level uo, 
and the shareholders' expected rate of return equals the cost of equity rý E 
0' 
In all the solutions for an optimum described above the regulator wishes 
to ensure that the expected price is at a minimum. Consequently, it is always 
optimal for the level of managerial effort to be where the marginal cost of 
their effort equals the marginal reduction in the variable cost of production. 
Similarly, the managers' expected utility should equal their reservation level 
of utility and the shareholders' expected rate of return should be in line with 
the cost of equity. It follows that in all solutions to the problem the managers' 
and the shareholders' participation constraints (3.7) and 
(3.10) are binding. 
The prices charged by the firm will, therefore, always be at the level chosen 
by the regulator. 
55 
3.4 The socially optimal capital structure 
3.4.1 The regulator's problem 
In the previous section the level of debt was taken as given. However, since 
prices vary with D, so does welfare which is obtained by substituting the values 
of p* and p* into the regulator's payoff function in (3.14): HL 
W (D) = xU (p* (D)) + (I - x) U (p* (D)). LH 
Consequently, the regulator's problem when the capital structure can be varied 
is to choose D in order to maximize (3.15) subject to the constraints that the 
capital investment is financed wholly from equity or debt finance or a mixture 
of both: 
D 
->- 
03 (3.16) 
M-D>0. (3.17) 
The problem can, therefore, be stated as: 
max xU (p* (D)) + (I - x) U (p* (D)) subject to D>0 and M-D>, 0. DLH 
(3.18) 
Appendix ID derives the solutions to (3.18) and the conditions under which 
the socially optimal level of debt D* is either an internal optimum (i. e. 0< 
D* < M) or a corner solution where the social optimum is 100% equity finance 
(i. e. D* = 0) or 100% debt finance (i. e. M= D*). 
By comparing the solutions to problem (3.18) with the solutions to problem 
(3.14) it is possible to determine the conditions under which an optimum for 
consumer prices is not only feasible but also when the firm's capital structure 
is such that this represents a social optimum. This section sets out the main 
results in the form of five propositions for which the proofs are provided in 
appendix 3. E. Propositions 6 and 7 describe the conditions where zero debt 
is the social optimum while Propositions 8 to 10 set out the conditions where 
a mixture of debt and equity finance and where 100% debt finance is socially 
optimal. 
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3.4.2 Zero debt 
Proposition 6 glen p* = p* then D* LH 
This Proposition concerns the conditions for an optimum in the unlikely 
case when p* = p* as described in Proposition 1. Proposition 6 states that LH 
there is a corner solution to (3.18) at which the socially optimal level of debt is 
zero when p* = p* . The reason is that, in this case, the managers' willingness LH 
to carry risk exceeds the inherent business risk in the firm. This allows the 
cost of equity to be lower than the cost of debt and so the firm should be 100% 
financed from equity to minimize prices for consumers6. 
XU'(PL) d Proposition 7 T"en p* > p* and - 
EL then D* = 0. HL dpý ('-X)UI(PH) L 
Propositions 3 and 4 set out the conditions for an optimum when p* > p* HL 
and there is a corner solution where the consumer's marginal rate of sub- 
stitution between a change in p* and p* does not equal the slope of the LH 
shareholders' participation constraint. Proposition 7 states that, in these cir- 
cumstances, the social optimum is again where the level of debt is zero. There 
are two possibilities here. 
Firstly, if consumers' risk aversion is relatively high the optimum is the 
lowest possible variation in prices. This is where the firm only makes profits 
when its costs are low, in which case the cost of equity exceeds the cost of 
debt. Even though a reduction in the level of debt increases the expected 
price this is more than offset by the benefit obtained from a smaller variation 
in priceST. This is because, with high risk aversion, the gain in consumers' 
utility is relatively large compared to the loss of utility from the increase in 
the expected price. Consequently, the socially optimal capital structure is a 
corner solution to (3.18) where the firm is wholly financed from equity. 
Secondly, if the converse applies and consumers have a relatively low aver- 
sion to risk then the optimum is the lowest possible expected price. This is 
where the firm makes profits when costs are high and no profits when costs 
are low. The cost of equity is then lower than the cost of 
debt. Although a 
6 Lemma 5 in Appendix 3. B shows that 
d (p ) 
ý:, 0. 
dD 
7 When ýLpk < xu, 
(Pý) Lemma 5 in Appendix 3. B shows that 
d(E(p*)) 
<0 and 
dpý - X) U, 
(P; 4 ) dD 
H (D) - p*'(D) >0 Lemma 6 shows that p*' L 
p., 
reduction in the level of debt results in a lower expected price it also produces 
an increase in the variation in prices8. However, the loss in consumers' utility 
is relatively small with low risk aversion and this is more than offset by the 
benefit from the lower expected price. The socially optimal capital structure 
is, therefore, a corner solution where the firm is, again, wholly financed from 
equity. The regulator's ability to reduce the cost of equity below the cost of 
debt through the decision on price variations also explains why there is no 
corner solution in which 100% debt finance is the social optimum. 
3.4.3 A combination of debt and equity 
xu, (P*) Proposition 8 When p* > p* and -L 
dp then 0< D* <M if HL (1-X)Ul(p* dp* HL 
rE* 7-D otherwise D* = M. 
Proposition 8 states that when p* > p* the socially optimal capital struc- HL 
ture can be a combination of debt and equity finance provided that Proposition 
2 applies, that is, it must be an internal optimum where the consumer's mar- 
ginal rate of substitution between a change in p* and p* is equal to the slope LH 
of the shareholders' participation constraint. In this case the cost of equity 
can be higher than, lower than or equal to the cost of debt. However, if the 
cost of equity at the optimum does not equal the cost of debt then the socially 
optimal level of debt is less than 100%. Clearly, if the optimum for prices 
coincides with the position where the cost of equity equals the cost of debt the 
social optimum is equivalent to the firm being wholly financed by debt and 
consumers carry all the business risk that is not allocated to managers9. 
3.4.4 100% debt finance 
The conditions under which 100% debt finance is the social optimum can be 
examined further by considering the relationship between the cost of equity 
and the cost of debt at a social optimum and the circumstances in which they 
are equal. This is the subject of Proposition 9. 
8 Xul(PO 
d(E(p*)) 
When dp; ' >- Lemma 5 in Appendix 3. B shows that >0 and dpý (I - X) U, (P,! ý ) dD 
Lemma 6 shows that PH*' (D) - p*' (D) < 0. L 
9 When cov 0 it can be seen from Lemma I and Corollary I that p; ý - p* =c- 2a. Lx 
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Proposition 9 Mien ý> pý and D= D* then rý PH LEW= rD + COV* G) r*l G) E 
This Proposition states that when p* > p* the cost of equity at a social HL 
optimum is a linear function of the covariance of the shareholders' returns 
with the market return. As shown in appendix 3. E this is because, firstly, the 
shareholders' participation constraint (3.10) must be binding at all levels of 
debt and, secondly, at a social optimum, the ratio of the changes in p* and L 
p* from a marginal increase in debt must equal the slope of that constraint H 
given in Lemma 2. These two conditions require the following relationship to 
hold at a social optimum: 
rE* G) = rD + COV* () rE*'(-) - 
This relationship demonstrates the linkage between the general form of the 
function for the cost of equity in (3.1) used in this model and the specific case 
of the CAPM. Appendix IF shows that r*' E0 is a constant in the CAPM and, 
specifically, that: 
rE 
(I? m) - rD) 
u 
(3.20) 
2 
where am is the variance of the return on the market portfolio. The relation- 
ship in (3.19) also leads to the following Proposition. 
Proposition 10 When p* > p* and D= D* then there is a social optimum HL 
where D* =M if r*" 0. However, if r*" 0 then the social optimum EE 
satisfies D* =M for a set of parameter values that has measure zero in the 
parameter space. 
The main conclusion of this section is set out in Proposition 10 which 
specifies the conditions under which it is socially optimal for the regulated 
firm to be wholly reliant on debt for its external finance. This Proposition 
can be explained by noting that differentiating (3.19) with respect to cov* 
requires that the following is satisfied: 
(3.21) rE G) COV* G) = 0' 
Consequently, if r*(. ) is E not a constant (i. e. r*" (. ) E :? ý 0) there can only 
be a social optimum where the cost of equity is equal to the cost of debt 
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which is equivalent to the firm being wholly financed by debt. Although the 
cost of equity in this model is determined by the general function (3.1), which 
makes no assumptions about rE(*)7 much of finance theory assumes that 
the shareholders' utility is determined by the mean and standard deviation of 
portfolio income. In these circumstances the CAPM would apply, r*'(. ) would E 
be a constant and the socially optimal capital structure when r*' E0 is not a 
constant would be of no significancelo. 
Clearly. when r*'(. ) is a constant then (3.21) is satisfied by any value of E 
cov* (. ). However, from Propositions 7 and 8, if the cost of equity does not 
equal the cost of debt at the optimum for prices then the socially optimal level 
of debt is less than 100%. In addition, from Lemma 2, when r*' (. ) is a constant E 
the slope of the shareholders' participation constraint is also a constant. Since 
the consumers' utility function is concave it follows that there is only one very 
special case in which the consumer's marginal rate of substitution between a 
change in p* and p* is equal to the slope of the shareholders' participation LH 
constraint at a point where the cost of equity is equal to the cost of debt. 
The set of parameter values that would produce such a solution, therefore, 
has measure zero in the parameter space. In other words, any change in the 
value of any of the parameters, however small, would move the social optimum 
away from the position where all investors are satisfied with a rate of return 
equal to the cost of debt. This is the only case where it is possible for 100% 
debt finance to be the socially optimal capital structure as Propositions 7 and 
8 also show that such a solution can only apply at an internal optimum. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Although the model considered in this chapter is highly stylized and assumes 
the regulator has complete information, it has features that are of interest 
from a regulatory policy perspective. 
Firstly, it is shown that the regulated firm's cost of equity will be affected 
by the extent to which the regulator allows prices to be adjusted in line with 
the firm's costs and these costs vary with fluctuations in the economy as a 
whole. In practice, even under price cap systems, prices do change in response 
to changes in the firm's costs. For example, there are often cost pass through 
'0 For example, see Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) for a derivation of the CAPM from these 
assumptions. 
60 
arrangements which allow price adjustments in specified circumstances and 
there is generally a complete reassessment of costs when a price cap is re- 
viewed. The design of the price control mechanism can, therefore, determine 
the degree to which systematic risks are carried by shareholders and, in turn, 
the cost of equity. Similarly, any changes to the operational principles and 
methodologies used by regulators to assess allowable costs at a review of the 
price cap can also have an effect. Indeed, this chapter shows that prices can 
be set so that shareholders' returns are either positively correlated, uncorre- 
lated or even negatively correlated with the market return. In other words, 
the shareholders' risks and rewards need not be tied to the regulated firm's 
business risks and so its cost of equity can either be greater than, equal to or 
lower than the cost of debt. The effect of such decisions on shareholder risk 
should, however, be distinguished from the term regulatory risk which is nor- 
mally used to describe the asymmetric downside risks of arbitrary regulatory 
or political interventions that tighten the regulatory contract. The model as- 
sumes that the cost of equity used to set prices is fully adjusted in accordance 
with changes in the allocation of systematic risks between shareholders and 
consumers. The regulatory risk is that, in practice, this might not occur. 
Secondly, by allowing explicitly for the effect of the regulator's pricing de- 
cision on the cost of equity, the analysis shows that some variation in consumer 
prices is optimal at all levels of gearing except in the unlikely case that the 
managers' willingness to carry risk exceeds the inherent risk in the business. A 
price cap system in which prices are fixed or vary only in exceptional circum- 
stances is, therefore, almost certainly sub-optimal. Further, although prices 
should be higher when there are adverse economic conditions, it is not neces- 
sary for the returns to shareholders to be lower. Whether or not this is optimal 
depends on the consumers' and the shareholders' relative aversion to risk. For 
example, consumers might have such a low aversion to risk that prices should 
be set to provide shareholders with higher returns when economic conditions 
are unfavourable. Shareholder returns would then be negatively correlated 
with the market return providing shareholders with insurance against maxket 
risk. As result the cost of equity would be lower than the cost of debt leading 
to lower financing costs and a lower expected price for consumers. 
Thirdly, it is concluded that capital structure does matter for the regulated 
firm even in the absence of corporate taxation. This is because it determines 
the amount of equity finance and, in conjunction with the regulator's decision 
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on price variations, the distribution of risks between consumers and share- 
holders. There is, therefore, a socially optimal capital structure that depends 
not only on consumers' aversion to the risk of price variations but also on the 
shareholders' trade-off between risk and returns. 
Finally, differences in the attitudes of consumers and shareholders towards 
risk are shown to have implications for the socially optimal capital structure. 
If the optimum for consumer prices is such that, at the margin, consumers and 
shareholders do not have the same aversion to risk then the social optimum 
is a capital structure with no debt. When consumers have relatively high risk 
aversion compared to shareholders then consumers prefer the lowest possible 
price variation even though this produces a higher expected price. Conversely, 
when consumers' risk aversion is relatively low, it is optimal to set prices so 
that the risks for shareholders are consistent with a cost of equity that is lower 
than the cost of debt in order to produce the lowest possible expected price. 
In either case, debt finance produces no benefit for consumers. 
However, if consumers and shareholders both have the same aversion to the 
risk of price variations at the margin, then there is only one very special set of 
conditions in the model where it is socially optimal for the regulated firm to 
be a 'not-for-profit' company or some other organization which relies wholly 
on debt for its external finance. For this to be the case, the prices that are 
optimal for consumers must produce a rate of return on equity that is equal to 
the cost of debt and this return must also be sufficient to satisfy shareholders. 
Apart from this unique case the social optimum is the combination of debt 
and equity finance that balances the distribution of risks. At the optimum 
consumers accept some variation in prices in exchange for a lower expected 
price and the residual risk is carried by shareholders for a reward that is in 
line with the relevant cost of equity. 
In the UK here have been two recent cases where 'not-for-profit' compa- 
nies have been established to replace privatized utilities. In 2001 Glas Cymru 
acquired Welsh Water and in the following year Network Rail was created to 
take over the operations of Railtrack. The new owners are both companies lim- 
ited by guarantee which have no equity interest and can only obtain external 
finance from the debt markets. It is noticeable that, in both cases, the com- 
panies that previously supplied the services were in financial difficulties and a 
primary aim of the new arrangements was to secure the companies' long term 
finances. Consequently, when the new companies were being established, the 
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attitude of lenders towards risk and, therefore, the terms on which the new 
debt finance could be raised, was a key consideration. While the outcome 
rrLight have been satisfactory for the lenders this chapter shows it is almost 
certain that the resulting risk profile for consumers will not be optimal. 
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Appendix 3. A Solutions for a given capital struc- 
ture 
This appendix derives the feasible solutions to the problem (3.14). 
The Lagrangian function for the problem (3.14) is: 
--":: -'ZýU 
(PL) + (1 - -0 
U (PH) 
" AH (WH V) (e)) + AL (WL - ýb 
(0) +A (XWL + (I - X) WH 
W- UO) 
" 7rH (PH (WH +0- e) - 
(1 + rD) D) 
" 7rL (PL (WL +0-e C) - (I + rD) D) 
" 7r(X (PL -'WL + C) +- X) (PH - WH) -0+ e- - 
(1 + rD) D 
- 
(1 + rE W) (M - D)). (3.22) 
wherePHi PL, P7 7H, 7rLand7r are the Lagrange multipliers associated with 
constraints (3.5) to (3.10). Let p*, p* , e*, w*, and w* be the solution to LHLH 
this problem and let II* and II* be the firm's profits, and R* be the LH RýL EH 
E (. ) be the cost of equity produced by that shareholders' rates of return and r* 
solution, that is: 
lI* = (I+R* (3.23) L EL) (M - D) 
= p* -w* -O+e*+c-(l+rD)D, LL 
rl* (1 + R* H) (M - D) (3.24) HE 
* -O+e-(l+rD)D, PH WH 
r* (. ) = r* (cov EE 
Using Lemma I in appendix 3. B the first order conditions for an optimum 
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are: 
a£ 
= XUI (PL) + 7rL + x7r - 7rrE (-) X (1 - X) AR, = 0, (3.25) PPL 
d9, C 
'::: ý (1 - X) Uf (PH) + 7rH + (1 - x) ir + 7rrE (-) X (1 - x) AR, = Oj C9PH 
(3.26) 
a, c 
- :: -- ILL + PX - 7rL - x7r + 7rrE(. ) x (1 - x), AR 0, (3.27) 19WL 
(9f- 
-= PH + 11 X) -7rH X) 7r - 7rrE(. ) x- x) AR, == 0, 19WH 
(3.28) 
a, c 
-=- 
(PH + PL + M) ý)/ (e) + 7rH + 7rL + 7r = 0. (3.29) (9e 
U) - Rearranging these gives: 
7rL -XUI 
(PL) 
- X7r 
(I 
-rE 
G) (1 
- X), 
Alqm) 
) (3.30) 
7rj-j - (I - X) Ul (PH) - (I - X) 7r 
(1 + rE (-) XARn) (3.31) 
AL 7rL- Itx + x7r r' (. ) (1 - x) Allr,, ) (3.32) E 
= -X (Ul (PL) + [1) 1 
1-'H 7rH - p(l -x) + 
(I 
- x)7r 
(I +rE(. ) xAR, ) (3.33) 
- (I - X) 
(Ul (PH) + bt) 7 
0 (XUI (PL) + (I - X) Uf (PH)) 
(I 
- Of (e)) - 
(3.34) 
Also adding (3.30) and (3.31) and adding (3.32) and (3.33) gives: 
7rL + 7rH : -- -XUf (PL) - 
(1 
- X) Uf (PH) - 7r) (3.35) 
YL + YH : --ý -XUI (PL) - (I - X) Ul (PH) - IL. (3.36) 
It follows from (3.34) that in all solutions to this problem the optimum 
level of effort e* will be where: 
, 0/ e* = 1, (3.37) 
that is, the marginal cost of effort will equal the marginal reduction in the 
variable cost of production, 1. 
The feasibility of solutions to this problem can be determined by examining 
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the implications of different values for the Lagrange multipliers 7r, 7rL, 7rH, tL, 
PL and AH which must all be greater than or equal to zero at an optimum. 
The four Cases shown in Table 3.1 provide a framework for identifying all the 
feasible solutions when the capital structure of the firm is exogenously given. 
Each Case is analysed individually below and the Cases which have a feasible 
solution lead to a number of Propositions for which the proofs are given in 
appendix 3. C. 
Table 3.1: Multiplier values 
7H -::::: 
0 7rL -::::: 
0 PH f0 ILL : -: ": 
0 
Case x x I/ V/ 
x x x V/ 
x x V/ x 
V/ V/ x x 
x I/ x x 
V/ x x x 
x x x x 
Case 2 2(1) V/ V/ V/ V1, 
2(2) x V/ V/ V/ 
2(3) %/ x V/ 
Case 3 3(1) x 
3(2) x x 
3(3) x x 
Case 4 4(1) V/ V/ x V/ 
4(2) x I/ x 
4(3) %/ x x 
Note: / multiplier value applies 
x multiplier value does not apply 
3. A. 1 Case 1: Both manager rationality constraints and/or 
both break even constraints binding 
( '7rH, 7rL> 0 and/orPHIML > 0) 
Firstly, if 7rH >0 and 7rL> 
0 then both the shareholders' break even con- 
straints (3.8) and (3.9) are binding and so: 
l+REL ý1 +REH ý 0- (3.38) 
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However, as the shareholders would make zero profits and lose the whole of 
their investment in both states of the world, the shareholders' participation 
constraint (3.10) would be violated. It would not be rational for shareholders 
to invest if profits were to be zero in both states of the world. They would 
be better off investing in the risk free asset". Consequently, in all feasible 
solutions to the problem: 
I+ rEG) >0 (3.39) 
As it is not feasible to have both, 7rH >0 and 7rL >0 it must be the case that 
at least one of the multipliers 7rH and7rL is 0- It follows that the conditions 
7rH >0 and ? rL >0 restrict the problem to finding a solution when there are 
no shareholders and there is, therefore, only one possible level of debt, viz. 
D=M. However, this restricted form of the problem does not need to be 
considered separately and can be treated as a special case of the more general 
problem in which shareholders do participate. This is because the solution to 
the restricted form of the problem will be equivalent to a solution to the more 
general problem in which cov (R* , R,,, 
) =0 and, therefore, r* (. ) = rD - In EE 
other words the optimum for consumers and managers when there is 100% debt 
finance will be the same as where the solution to the more general problem 
produces the result that shareholders carry no risk and receive the same returns 
as the providers of debt finance. 
Secondly, if PH >0 and YL >0 then both the managers' rationality 
constraints (3.5) and (3.6) are binding and so: 
WL: ýý WH 0 (6) - (3.40) 
As it is assumed that: 
UO >0 (3.41) 
the managers would not, therefore, receive their reservation utility and their 
participation constraint (3.7) would be violated. Consequently, it is not feasi- 
ble to have both I_LH >0 and AL >0 and so it must be the case that at least 
one of the multipliers AH and YL is 0- 
1 'Indeed, even when rE (. ) < 'rD it would be not be rational for shareholders to invest 
unless they were to receive more than (1 + rD) (M - D) in one state of the world if their 
income was to be lower than (1 + rD) (M - D) in the other state of the world. 
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3-A-2 Case 2: Managers' utility above zero 
(PH 
= AL = 
Relationship between p* and p* LH 
If ILH - AL =0 then neither (3.5) nor (3.6) are binding and the managers' 
utility is above zero in each state of the world. It follows from (3.32) and 
(3.33) that, in this case, the optimum must satisfy: 
-U'(p)==-U'(p). 
Since U'(p) <0 then in all solutions for this case: 
> 
07 
and: 
PL = PH- 
(3.42) 
(3.43) 
(3.44) 
Consequently, the managers' participation constraint (3.7) is binding i. e. 
managers are held at their reservation level of expected utility, and consumers 
pay the same price in both states of the world. 
To assess the feasibility of solutions when PH == YL =0 the following three 
specific cases must be considered: 
Case 2 (1) 
Case 2 (2) 
Case 2 (3) 
Case 2 (1): 7rL = 7rH `::: 
: 7rH 7rL :: -- 
: 7rH >0 and 7rL --::::: 01 
: -7rH= 0 and 7L > 0- 
If 7rL == 7rH= 0 then neither of the break even constraints (3.8) and (3.9) are 
binding and the firm makes positive profits in both states of the world, that 
is 11* 11* > 0. It follows from (3.30), (3.31) and (3-35) that the optimum 7 L) H 
must satisfy: 
Ir = 
(XU' (P*) + (1 - x) U' (p* ». 1- r*'(. ) (1 - x) ARm 1+ r` (. ) xARrn (3.45) 
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Since U'(p) <0 it follows from (3.45) that: 
7r (3.46) 
and so (3.10) is binding. This means that the expected income to shareholders 
is just high enough to meet the cost of equity and to recover their investment, 
that is: 
E XRIL + (1 - X) RIH- 
It also follows from (3.42) and (3.45) that: 
7r (1 - r*'(. ) (I - x) AR, 
) = 7r (1 + r*(. ) xAR,, ), EE 
and from (3.46), that: 
-r 
G) 
Iýklým : --": 
0- 
(3.47) 
(3.48) 
However, (3.48) is not consistent with the assumptions (3.2), and (3.3) and so 
Case 2(1) is not a feasible solution. 
Case 2(2): 7rH >0 and 7rL -0 
If 7rH >0 and 7rL =0 then (3.8) is the only binding break even constraint and 
so the firm makes positive profit when its costs are low and zero profit when 
its costs are high, that is, rI* > 0,11* =0 and RýL > R* , Consequently, LHE 
cov (R* , R, 
) >0 and so r* (. ) > rD - EE 
When 7rL =: 0 it follows from (3.30) and (3.42) that the optimum must 
satisfy: 
I 
-U'(p* )= ?r (1 - r*'(. ) (I - x) 
ARTn) 
-U 
(PLI) =HE 
Since U'(p) <0 and7r <0 is not feasible it follows that: 
7r > 01 
and so (3.10) is binding. 
It also follows from (3.31) and (3.49) that: 
7rH : --:: -7rr*'(. ) x) AR, E 
(3.49) 
(3.50) 
(3.51) 
However, (3.50), (3.51) and the assumptions (3.2) and (3.3) would require 
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*7rH 0. Consequently, Case 2(2) is not a feasible solution. 
Case 2 (3): 7rH= 0 and 7rL >0 
If 7rH =0 and 7rL >0 then (3.9) is the only binding break even constraint and 
so the firm makes positive profit when its costs are high and zero profit when 
its costs are low, that is, fI* > 0) 11* =0 and RýL < R6' Consequently, HL 
cov (R* , R, 
) <0 and so r* (-) < rD - EE 
When 7rH =0 it follows from (3.31) and (3.42) that the optimum must 
satisfy: 
=- U' 
(P* )= 7r (I + r*' (P*L) HE 
Since U'(p) <0 it follows from the assumptions (3.2), and (3.3) that: 
7r 
and so (3.10) is binding. 
It also follows from (3.30) that: 
*1 
7rL = 7rrE (. ) xAR,. 
(3.52) 
(3.53) 
(3.54) 
Consequently, from (3.53) and the assumptions (3.2) and (3.3) the values of 
the multipliers in this case are consistent with a feasible solution. 
However) the prices for consumers when 7rH =0 and 7rL >0 are: 
w* +O-e*+(l+rD)D+ 
+ rý (. ) (M - D), (3.55) HI-x 
p* = W* +O-e*-C+(l+rD)D. LL 
and soý from (3.7), (3.43) and (3.44): 
p*=uo+ýb(e*)+O-e, *-XC+(l+rD)D+(I+r* 
(. ))(M-D) E 
where P* A=P H 
This solution also requires that: 
*-p* PH 
(3.56) 
(3.57) 
(3.58) 
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that is: 
UO = xc + wjý -0 (e*) +x H (1 + r* (M - D). (3.59) 1-xE 
Since PH = 0, that is wý >0 (e, *), it follows from (3.39) and (3.59) that Case 
2(3) is only feasible if: 
UO > xcý (3.60) 
which means managers' reservation level of expected utility must exceed the 
firm's ability, in expected terms, to reduce its costs. This will be the case if 
x and or c are relatively small. Consequently, consumers can be given price 
certainty because the managers' willingness to carry risk exceeds the inherent 
risk in the business. However, in practice it is unlikely that uO > xc and 
indeed, De Fraja and Stones (2004) specifically assumed that xe > uo. In 
these circumstances Case 2(3) would not be a feasible solution 12 
Also from (3.39), (3.44), (3.55), and (3.56): 
I +r* ( 
WL -WH =C+ 
E (M - D) > 0, 1-x 
that is: 
> L WH- 
Summary Case 2 
(3.62) 
There are no feasible solutions for Case 2 (AH ý ILL ý 0) unless uO > xc. In 
this unlikely case consumers pay the same price in both states of the world, i. e. 
P*=*. Managers are also held at their reservation level of expected utility L PH 
(p > 0) and their remuneration is higher when costs are low, i. e. w* > w* L H' 
Shareholders' expected income is just high enough to meet the cost of equity 
and to recover their investment (7r > 0) but their returns are high when the 
firm's costs are high (7rH = 0) and zero when the firm's costs are low (? rL > 0) 
and so r* 
(-) < 'rD E 
Consequently, when xc >, uO a solution will only be feasible if the managers' 
utility is zero in at least one state of the world (i. e. either AH >0 or AL > 0)- 
12 In a more simplified model without managers this solution would require c<0 which is 
clearly not feasible. The solution would also not be feasible if uO = 0. 
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3-A. 3 Case 3: Managers' utility zero when costs are high 
(11H> 0 and YL = 0) 
Relationship between p* and p* and w* and w* LHLH 
If PH >0 and 11L ýý 0 the manager's utility is zero when the firm's costs are 
high and (3.5) is the only binding managers' rationality constraint. When 
PL "::: ý 0 it follows from (3.32) that, in this case, the optimum must satisfy: 
(3.63) 
Since U'(p) <0 then: 
> 01 (3.64) 
also applies in all solutions for this case. However, when I-tH >0 then from 
(3.33): 
(PH 
and so: 
*) 
7 
(3.65) > U'(PH U'(PL 
that is: 
*Hp (3.66) 
Consequently, (3.7) is binding, i. e. managers are held at their reservation 
level of expected utility, and consumers pay a higher price when the firm's 
costs are high. 
Also from (3.64) and (3.7): 
W* (3.67) H 
W* + _U0 (3.68) Lx 
and so: 
*L (3.69) 
To assess the feasibility of solutions when AH >0 and [IL =0 the following 
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three specific cases must be considered: 
Case 3(l) 
Case 3 (2) 
Case 3 (3) 
Case 3 (1): 7rH 7-- 7rL 
7rH ý 7L 
7rH >0 and 7rL :: -- 01 
7rH= 0 and7rL > 0- 
If 7rL :: = 7rH= 0 then neither of the break even constraints (3.8) and (3.9) are 
binding and the firm makes positive profits in both states of the world, that 
is) fl*) 11* > 0.. It follows from (3.30), (3.31) and (3.35) that the optimum LH 
must satisfy: 
7r = 
-ul (PL*) 
I- r*'(. ) (I - E 
-U'(PH (XU' (P*) + (i - X) U, (P* I+ r*'(. ) xAllm LH E 
(3-70) 
Since U'(p) < 0, it follows from (3.70) that: 
7r (3.71) 
and so (3.10) is binding. Case 3(1) is, therefore, a feasible solution only if: 
1> r*' (3.72) 0 (1 - X) AlýM' 
Also from (3.70) Case 3(1) is only feasible if: 
U, (P*) r*'(. ) (I - x) AR, LE (3.73) 
Ul (P* + r*' (. ) xAR, HE 
or: U'(P*) - U'(PH (3.74) E G) 
xUl (P*) + (i - X) U/ (P* ) LH 
When7rL = 7rH= 0 the prices for consumers are: 
P*= H w* +O-e* H +(I+rD)D+(l+R6)(M-D), (3-75) 
P* L w* +O-e* L -c+(l+rD)D+(I+R* EL) 
(M - D). (3.76) 
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and so from (3.7) and (3.64) the expected price is: 
E (p*) =UO+ýb(e*)+O-e*-XC+(l+rD)D+(I+r* (. ))(M-D). (3.77) E 
As the price difference for this solution is: 
PH PL C-x (Uo + WH*) -E 
1 
(RýL - R* H) (M - D) (3.78) 
it follows from (3.66), (3.67) and (3.78), that Case 3(1) is only feasible if: 
(R* L EH) (M - D). (3.79) XC-UÜ>X E -R 
Consequently, a feasible solution for Case 3(l) does not require the as- 
sumption made by De Fraja and Stones (2004) that xc > uo. If xc < uo then 
R* < R* that is, profits are lower when the firm's costs are low (11* < fI* ) EL EHý LH 
and so r* (-) < rD. However, if xc > uO then the price difference determines E 
whether profits are higher or lower when the firm's costs are low (and vice 
versa) and so whether rý (. ) - 
ý; 
rD E< 
Case 3(2): 7H >0 and 7rL::::::::: 0 
If 7rH> 0 and7rL= 0 then (3.8) is the only binding break-even constraint and 
so the firm makes positive profit when its costs are low and zero profit when 
> R* its costs are high, that is, rI* > 0, M=0 and RýL EH * Consequently LH 
cov (R* , 
R,, ) >0 and so r* (. ) > rD EE 
When 7rL =0 it follows from (3.30) that the optimum must satisfy: 
ir (1 - rý' (. ) (1 - x) AR, ) . 
(3.80) 
Since U'(p) <0 and, 7r <0 is not feasible, it follows that: 
7r (3.81) 
and so (3.10) is binding. Case 3(2) is, therefore, a feasible solution only if 
(3.72) also applies here. 
Consequently, from (3.31) and (3.80): 
(1 - x) U(p*) (1 + r*(. ) xAR, ) 7rH X) ul (P* + H) 
E0 
(1 - X) ARM) 
1 
74 
and SO 7rH >0 if: 
ýý ý(P) 1- r*' (-) (I - X) Apt" 
Ul 
<E (3.82) (PH*) + xAlýn E 
or: 
H 
U'(PL - U'(P* )> (3.83) 
Xul (P*) + (1 - X) U/ (P* )E LH 
It not, therefore, possible for Case 3(2) to be a feasible solution at the same 
time as Case 3(a). 
When 7rH >0 and 7rL =0 the prices for consumers are: 
PH* WH* +0- e* + (I + rD) D. (3.84) 
I+ r* PL WL*+0-6-*-C+(I+rD)D+ E (M - D). (3.85) x 
and so from (3.7) and (3.64) the expected price is: 
110 + ýb (e*) +0- e* - XC + (1 + rD) D+ (I + r* (. )) (M - D). (3.86) E 
As the price difference for this solution is: 
*-*=c-1 PH P (uo +0 (e*) - w* + (1 + r* (. )) (M - D)), (3.87) LxHE 
it follows from (3.66) and (3.67) and (3.87) that: 
xc - uo > (I + r* (. )) (M - D). (3.88) E 
Consequently, from (3.39), Case 3(2) is only feasible if: 
xc > uoý (3.89) 
which is also the assumption made by De Fraja and Stones (2004). 
Case 3(3): 7H =0 and 7rL >0 
If 7rH= 0 and *7r L> 
0 then (3-9) is the only binding break even constraint and 
so the firm makes positive profit when its costs are high and zero profit when 
its costs are low, that is, I1* > 0, r1* =0 and RýL Consequently, HL< 
R6* 
75 
cov (R* , R, 
) <0 and so r* (. ) < rD EE 
When 7rH ý0 it follows from (3.31) that the optimum must satisfy: 
7r + r*'(. ) xAR, ) (3.90) E 
Since U'(p) <0 it follows from the assumptions (3.2), and (3.3) that: 
7r > 07 (3.91) 
and so (3.10) is binding. 
Consequently, from (3.30) and (3.90): 
I (P*) xU'(p* ) (1 - r*'(. ) (I - x) AR, ) 7rL -XU L+HE (I + r*'(. ) xAR, ) E 
andSO '7rL >0 if: 
U, (P*) r*'(. ) (I - x) AR, LE (3.92) 
U/ (P* + HE 
or: U/ (P*) 
- 
ut 
L 
(PH*) 
Xul (P*) + (1 _ X) Ul 
(P* )< rE (. ) AR,,,,. (3.93) 
L 
It is not, therefore, possible for Case 3(3) to be a feasible solution at the same 
time as Case 3(1) or Case 3(2). 
Note that (3.90) and (3.92) do not require the condition in (3.72) to apply 
for Case 3(3) to be a feasible solution and so there are two possibilities. 
Firstly, if (3.72) does apply then: 
i 
-, r*l X) APLM 
>0 (3.94) 
r*'(-) XA&n E 
Secondly, if (3.72) does not apply, that is: 
1 9, r*f (. ) (1 - ARrn, (3.95) 
then: 
r*' E0 (1 -< 
'o (3.96) + r*/ I E G) lm 
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When 7 L> 0 and 7rH 0 the prices for consumers are: 
1+ 
r* (. ) PH WH* +0+ (1 +rD) D+ --- E- (M - D), (3.97) 
P* W* 
1-x 
LL+0C+ (1 +rD) D, (3.98) 
and so from (3.7) and (3.64) the expected price is: 
uo ++0- e* - --rc + (1 + rD) D+ (1 + r* (. )) (M - D). (3.99) E 
As the price difference for this solution is: 
1+ 
rý (. ) +Eý PH PL=C- 
x 
(UO + WH I-x 
(M - D), (3.100) 
it follows from (3.66), (3.67) and (3.100) that: 
x 
xc - uo > -- (I + 1-x 
Consequently, from (3.39) it is not necessary to make the assumption that 
xc > uo for Case 3(3) to be a feasible solution. 
Summary Case 3 
All the solutions in Case 3 are feasible under certain conditions. In all solutions 
consumers pay a higher price when costs are high i. e. p* > p*, managers are HL 
held at their reservation level of expected utility (it > 0) and shareholders' 
expected income is just high enough to meet the cost of equity and to recover 
their investment (7r > 0). The conditions under which the solutions in Case 
3 are feasible are summarized below. The assumption made by De Fraja and 
Stones (2004) that xc > uo is only required for a solution to be feasible when 
shareholder returns are high when the firm's costs are low (7rL = 0) and zero 
when the firm's costs are high (7rH > 0) and so r* (. ) > rD- E 
The intuition behind the conditions for an optimum in (3.73), (3.82) and 
(3.92) is that they show how the consumer's marginal rate of substitution 
between a change in p* and p* compares with the slope of the shareholders' LH 
participation constraint (3.10) which itself reflects the effect of the change 
in p* and p* on the cost of equity. This can be seen by considering the LH 
shareholders' participation constraint at an optimum which, from Lemina 2 in 
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appendix 3. B, satisfies: 
dP H* r*'(. ) (1 - x) AR, ) E (3.102) dp* (1 - x) (1 + r` (. ) XAR, )' 
Consequently, the solutions for Case 3 are feasible if they satisfy the fol- 
lowing mutually exclusive conditions: 
dpý Case 3 (1) H 
dpý 
L 
Xul 
X) 
(P*) 
L- 
U, (P* 
H 
and 1> r*'(. ) (I - x) AR, (3.103) E 
dpý 
< Case 3 (2) : dp* L 
xu/ 
(I _ X) 
(P*) L 
Ul (P* ), H 
1> r*'(. ) (i - x) AR, and xc > uo. E 
(3.104) 
Case 3 (3) : 
dpý 
> * 
xu/ (P*) L 
, 
(3.105) 
dp L X) ul (P* ) 
Case 3(1) is the solution for an internal optimum while Case 3(2) and Case 
3(3) are corner solutions. 
Since U'(p) <0 it also follows from (3.102) that in: 
Cases 3(l) and 3(2) 
dpý 
dp* L 
Case 3(3) 
dpý 
dp* L 
0 since I> r*' E G) (1 - "O'ýk'ýTnl 
0 when I> r*'(. ) 1- x) AR,,,, E 
and 
dpý 
dp* L 
0 when I< r*'(. ) (I - x) AR, E 
3. A. 4 Case 4: Managers' utility zero when costs are low 
(1-'H= 
and YL ýý' 
Relationship between p* and p* LH 
If PL >0 and PH =0 the manager's utility is zero when the firm's costs 
are low and (3.9) is the only binding managers' rationality constraint. When 
IIH =0 it follows from (3.31) and (3.33) that the optimum must satisfy: 
Since U(P) <0 then: 
P= -U'(PH (3.106) 
[L 07 (3.107) 
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also applies in all solutions for this case. However, when ILL >0 then from 
(3-32): 
and so: 
tL,:: ý -ul (P*L) 
U'(P*H) > U'(P*L) (3.108) 
that is: 
(3.109) > PH PL 
Consequently, (3-7) is binding i. e. managers are held at their reservation level 
of expected utility and consumers pay a higher price when the firm's costs are 
low. 
To assess the feasibility of solutions when PL >0 and PH =0 the following 
three specific cases must be considered: 
Case 4(l) 
Case 4(2) 
Case 4(3) 
Case 4(l): 7rH =7rL = 
71'H 7rL ý 01 
: 7rH >0 and 7rL - 07 
: 7rH =0 and 7rL > 0- 
If 7r L : -- 7TH `:: ý 
0 it follows from (3.30), (3.31) and (3.35) that the optimum 
must satisfy: 
_uf -Ul 
(p* ) 
7r 
(PL 
H- (XUI (A) + X) U, (P* »- 
-, r*f 
+ xARm 
LH 
E E X) 
ARm 
Since U'(p) <0 it follows that: 
7r > 01 
and so (3.10) is binding. 
When PH =0 it also follows from (3.33) that: 
7r 
(i +, r*l 
(. ) 
XARM) 
E 
(3.111) 
(3.112) 
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and fron, (3.32) that: 
-7rrE (. ) xAR,. (3.113) 
However, (3.111), (3.113) and the assumptions (3.2) and (3.3) would require 
YL 'ý-- 0- Consequently, Case 4(1) is not a feasible solution. 
Case 4(2): 7rH >0 and 7rL 7-- 0 
If 7rL- 0 it follows from (3.30) that the optimum must satisfy: 
-Ul (P*) =7 (1 - r*' (-) (I - x) AR, ). (3.114) LE 
Since U'(p) <0 and7r <0 is not feasible, it follows that: 
7r 
and so (3.10) is binding. 
When PH =0 it also follows from (3.33) that: 
= 
7rH 
+ 7r (1 + r*'(. ) xARn) YI-xE 
and from (3.32) that: 
x 
7rr *1 (. ) xAll,,,. (3.117) PL: --ý --7rH -E I-x 
However, since '7rH > 0, then (3.115), (3.117) and the assumptions (3.2) and 
(3.3) would require that YL ": ý 0. Consequently, Case 4(2) is not a feasible 
solution. 
Case 4(3): '7rH =0 and 7rL >0 
If 7rH =0 it Mows from (3-31) that the optimum must satisfy: 
f*)= 7r (I + r*' (. ) xAR,,, ) -U (PH E 
Since U'(p) <0 it follows from the assumptions (3-2) and (3-3) that: 
7r > 07 (3.119) 
and so (3.10) is binding. 
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When PH =0 it also follows from (3.33) that: 
7r + r*' (. ) xAP,,, ) (3.120) E 
and froln (3-32) that: 
*1 PL :: -- 7rL- ? rrE G) (3.121) 
Since 7rL > 0, the values of the multipliers are consistent with a feasible 
solution. 
However, when 7L >0 and7rH= 0 the prices for consumers are: 
1 +r* PH = WHý+O-e*+(l+rD)D+ E- 
0. 
(M - D), (3.122) 
* +O-e, *-c+(I+rD)D. (3.123) PL = WL 
R-orn (3.7) and (3.107) the price difference is, therefore: 
II+ r* 
-C- U0 +E PL PH Ix(- WL Ix 
(M - D). (3.124) 
Since YL > 0, that is w* (e*), then from (3.109) Case 4(3) is only feasible L 
if : 
(1 - x) c- uo > (I + r* (. )) (M - 
However, from (3.39) this would require: 
-(1 -x) c-uo (3.125) 
Consequently, from the assumption (3-41) Case 4(3) is not a feasible solution. 
Summary Case 4 
There are no feasible solutions for Case 4. 
3. A. 5 Summary of results 
The conditions under which the solutions to the problem (3.14) are feasible or 
not are summarized in Table 3.2 and the relative magnitudes of the variables 
in each feasible solution are given in Table 3.3. 
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Appendix 3-B Lemmas 
Lemma 1 The covariance of the shareholder's rate of return RE with the 
return o7-t the market portfolio R, is: 
cov (RE, R, ) =x 
(1 - x) (C - (WL - WH) - (PH M-D 
Proof. In this model cov (RE, R, ) is: 
Cov (RE) Rm) =E ((RE -E (RE)) (Rin -E (177n))) 
=E 
rl -E (11) (Rm -E (1?, n)) 
(( 
M-D 
) 
where the firm's profits are 11. Using subscripts to indicate the values of 
variables in the two states of the world (e. g. REL is the rate of return on 
equity when the firm's costs are low and REH is the rate of return on equity 
when its costs are high) then: 
cov (RE, R, ) x 
IIL -E (rl) (RmL -E 
(1?, 
Tn)) + 
(( 
M-D 
) 
X) 
rIH 
-E (rl) (RinH -E (Rm)) 
(( 
M-D 
) 
Since 
HL = (I+REL)(M-D)=PL-WL-O+e+C-(l+rD)DI 
rIH (1 + REH) (M - 
D): 
----=: PH - WH -0+6- 
(I + rD) D, 
(II) X (PL - WL + C) + (I - X) (PH - WH) -0+ e- - 
(1 + rD) D, 
it follows that: 
rIL -E (11) = 
rIH -E (rl) = 
Consequently, from (3.3): 
(I - X) (PL - WL +C- PH + WH) 
-X (PL -'WL +C- PH + WH) - 
cov (RE, R, ) =x 
(i - X) (C - (WL - WH) - (PH - PL)) ARm M-D 
This ends the proof 
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Using the notation cov (. ) = cov (RE, R, ) note that: 
cov (. ) =x (1 - x) 
(REL 
- REH) ýkRmi 
and so, from (3.3), cov 0 when REL REH- 
Note also that: 
acov Ocov (. ) Ocov acov 2ý (I AR, 
09PL 49PH OWL 49WH M-D 
0 
Lemma 2 Mien p* > p* the shareholders' participation constraint satis- HL 
, 
fieS dp, ý 
-x(I-rE(. 
)(l-x)AR, ) 
dPL (1-x)(l+r*'(. )xAR, ) E 
Proof. Since 7r >0 at an optimum in Case 3, from (3.7), and (3.64), the 
shareholders' participation constraint (3.10) becomes the following: 
x (p* + c)+(l - x) p* -uo-o (e*)-O+e*-(l + rD) D= (I + r* (. )) (M - D) LHE 
Differentiating with respect to p* and p* gives: LH 
xdp* + (1 - x) dp* r*I (. ) 
acov 
(M - D) dp* + r*'(. ) 
acov 
(M - D) dp* 
(9p* 
LE ap* LH 
Rom Lernnia I this can be written as: 
* (x - r` (. ) x (1 - x) AR .. 
)= -dP* «1 - x) + r*'(. ) x (1 - x) AR, 
) 
, dPL EHE 
that is: dp* x (I - r*' x) AR.. ) HE 
dp* (I - x) (I + r*'(. ) xAl")' LE 
This ends the proof 
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Lemma 3 In Case 2(3), Case 3(2) and Case 3(3) the optimurn satisfies ! M) d(cov(R* 'RM 
---I = 0. 
a 
dD 
Proof. Using the notation cov* (. ) = cov (Rý, Rm), it follows from Lemma 1, 
from (3.44) and (3.61) in Case 2(3) and from (3.67) and (3-100) in Case 3(3) 
that, at the optimum in both Case 2(3) and Case 3(3): 
cov* (-) = -x (1 + r* (. » AR, 
Differentiating with respect to D gives: 
and so: 
d (cov* 
_r ., (. ) xd 
(cov* (. )) 
A R, 
dD E dD I 
d (cov* (. » 
dD 
(1 + (*) XAIý') 
Rom the assumptions (3.2) and (3.3) this can only hold when: 
(cov * (. » 
0. 
dD 
In Case 3(2) from (3.67) and (3.87) it follows from Lenima 1 that: 
* (. ) = (1 - x) (1 + r* (. » AR, cov 
Differentiating with respect to D gives: 
d (cov* 
r*l 
d (cov* (. )) 
AR, 
dD E 
G) (I X) dD 
and so: d (cov* 
r*(. ) (1 - x) AR, ) = 0. dD E 
However, Case 3(2) is only feasible if (3.72) applies and so this can only hold 
if: 
This ends the proof. m 
d (cov * (-» 
0. 
dD 
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Lemma 4 In Case 3(2) and Case 3(3) -d2ýL does not vary with D. dpt 
Proof. According to Lenuna 2: 
dp* x (I - r*'(. ) (I - x) ARn) HE 
dp* (1 - x) (I + r*'(. ) xARn)' LE 
Consequently the Lemma will hold if: 
d (r*' (. )) E 
dD 
Since: 
d (r *' (. )) ,, (. ) d 
(cov* E 
dD dD 
and from Lemma 3 in Case 3(2) and Case 3(3): 
(cov* 
dD 
it follows that the condition for the Lemma to hold is satisifed. 
This ends the proof 
In the case of the CAPM it should be noted that the Lemma holds because 
rE (. ) is a constant, and so r' (. ) = 0, as shown in Appendix 3. F. m E 
Lemma 5 In Case 2(3) d(p*) > 0, in Case 3(2) 
d(E(p*)) 
<0 and in dD dD 
Case 3(, q) d(E(p*)) > 0. dD 
Proof. In Case 2(3) differentiating (3.57) with respect to D gives: 
d (p*) 
+ rD + r* + (M - D) r*'(. ) 
d (cov* 
dD EE dD 
since e* is determined by (3.37), which is independent of D. However, from 
Lenuna 3: 
d (cov* (. )) 
0) 
dD 
and since r* (-) < rD in Case 2(3): E 
(p*) 
1( = rD - rE dD 
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In Case 3(2) differentiating (3.86) with respect to D gives: 
d(E( 
+ rD + r* + (M - D) r*'(. ) 
d (cov * (. )) 
dD EE dD 
since e* is determined by (3.37), which is independent of D. However, from 
Lemma 3: 
d (cov * (. )) 
0 
dD 
and since r* G) > rD in Case 3(2): E 
(E (p*» 
= rD - rE* (-) < 0- dD 
Similarly, in Case 3(3) it follows that: 
d (E (p*)) 
- rD - rE* G) > 01 dD 
since r* G) <rD- E 
This ends the proof m 
Lemma 6 In Case 3(2) p*' (D) - p*'(D) >0 and in HL 
Case 3(3) p*' (D) - p*'(D) < 0. HL 
Proof. In Case 3(2) differentiating (3.84) and (3.85) with respect to D gives: 
pH (D) +rD, 
(D) +rD 
+ rE* (')) + (M - D) r*'(. ) 
d (cov * (. )) 
LxE dD 
since w* , w* and e* are determined by 
(3.37), wbich is independent of D. HL 
However, from Lemma 3: 
d (cov * (. )) 
aL) 
Consequently: 
+ 
p (D) -p*'(D) 
E 
x 
In Case 3(3) differentiating (3.97) and (3.98) with respect to D gives: 
+ r* (. )) d (cov E+ (M - D) r*'(. ) xE dD 
*f 
PL (D) I+rD- 
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since w* , w* and c* are determined by 
(3.37), which is independent of D. HL 
However, from Lemma 3: 
d (cov* (-» 
= 0. dD 
Consequently: 
(i 
pý (D) - p*' (D) 
E 
0) 
L-x 
This ends the proof m 
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Appendix 3. C Propositions for a given capital struc- 
ture 
Let pý HI PIL, e, * ý WH, and w* be a feasible solution to the problem (3.14). L 
Proposition 1 If uO > xc then the prices chosen by the regulator are 
such that pý = pý when wý > wý *>0 and flý = 0, other-wise HLLH> V)(e*), nH L 
p>p, * H L* 
Proof. The only feasible solution where p* = p* is Case 2(3). In Case HL 
2(3) the only break even constraint that is binding is (3.9) and so 11* >0 H 
and rlý =0 In addition neither (3.5) nor (3.6) are binding and the solution L- * 
is only feasible when (3.60) and (3.62) both apply. The only other feasible 
solutions are in Case 3 where p* > p*. This ends the proof m HL 
Corollary 1 When p* > p* then w* = ýb (e*) + ! ýa and w* = ýb (e-*) HLLxH 
Proof. The only feasible solutions when pý > pý are in Case 3. In Case 3 HL 
(3.5) is binding and the solutions for w* and w* are (3.67) and (3.68). This LH 
ends the proof. m 
Corollary 2 If uo > xc then r* G) < IrD Z*-e- the cost of equity zs lower E 
than the cost of debt. 
Proof. The only feasible solutions when uO > xc are Case 2(3), Case 3(1) and 
Case 3(3). In Case 2(3) and Case 3(3) (3.9) is the only binding break even 
constraint and so the firm makes positive profit when its costs are high and 
zero profit when its costs are low, that is, fl* > 0,11* =0 and RýL < R* HL EH* 
Consequently, cov (Rý, I?, ) <0 and so r* (. ) < rD- In Case 3(1) from (3.79) E 
if xc < uO then RýL < R* and so r* EH E G) < rD. This ends the proof. m 
xu, k) dp, ý Proposition 2 I+Wen p* > p* and fl* , rl* >0 then 
H 
HLHL(, 
-X)ul(p* dp* HL 
Proof. Case 3(1) provides the only feasible solution when p* > p*, and HL 
11* 1 11* > 
0. In Case 3(3) there is an optimum where (3.103) applies. This HL 
ends the proof. 
Note that, in addition (3.79) must apply and if xc <, uO then R* < R* EL EH' 
Consequently, cov (R* R, ) <0 and so r* 
() < rD. However, if xc > UO then E) E>> 
Rý > Consequently, cov (Rý, R, ) =0 and so rý EL ýý RýH' < 
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Proposition 3 When p* > p*, 11* = 0, and r1* >0 HLHL 
then - 
xu, k) 
>dý! and r* (. ) > rD- (J-X)U/(P; 4) dp* E L 
Proof. Case 3(2) provides the only feasible solution when p* > p* ýM=0 HLH 
and 11* > 0. In Case 3(2) there is an optimum where (3-104) applies. Also L 
since 11* - 0) M>0 then RýL Consequently, cov(R* Rm) >0 HL> R6 *E 
and so r* G) > rD- This ends the proof. m E 
Proposition 4 T+Wen p* > p*, n* > 0, and rI* =0 HLHL 
then - 
xu, k) 
<dý! L and r*(. ) < rD (J-X)U'(P* dp* E 
HL 
Proof. Case 3(3) provides the only feasible solution when p* > p*, H* >0 HLH 
and 11* = 0. In Case 3(3) there is an optimum where (3.105) applies. Also L 
since M>0, r1* =0 then RýL < R6' Consequently, cov (R* , R, 
) <0 HLE 
and so r* (. ) < rD. This ends the proof. m E 
Proposition 5 The prices chosen by the regulator are such that the mar- 
ginal cost of managers' effort equals the the, marginal reduction in variable 
costs, i. e. ? P' (e*) = 1, the managers' expected utility equals their Tuservation 
level uO, and the shareholders' expected rate of return equals the cost of equity 
r* E 
Proof. From (3.34) in all solutions to the problem the optimum level of 
effort e* is where (3.37) applies. In addition, the only feasible solutions to 
the problem are in Case 2(3) and Case 3. In all these solutions the managers' 
participation constraint (3.7) and the shareholders' participation constraint 
(3.10) are both binding. This ends the proof. m 
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Appendix 3. D Solutions for a socially optimal cap- 
ital structure 
This appendix derives the solutions to the problem (3.18) and the conditions 
for a socially optimal capital structure. Comparing these solutions to the 
feasible solutions to the problem (3.14) set out in appendix 3. A leads to a 
number of Propositions concerning the social optimum for which the proofs 
are given in appendix 3. E. 
The Lagrangian function for the problem (3.18) is: 
L= xU (p* (D)) + (I - x) U (p* (D)) + AD + -ý (M - D), (3.126) LH 
where A and 7 are the multipliers associated with constraints (3.16) to (3.17). 
Let D* be the solution to this problem. 
The first order condition for an optimum is: 
a£ 
-= xU' (p* ) p*' (D) + (1 - x) U' (p* ) p` (D) +A- -y = 0, aD LLHH 
and so there are four cases to consider: 
CaseA A>Oand-y>O, 
Case B A=-y=O, 
Case C A>Oand-y=O, 
Case D A=Oand-Y>O. 
3. D. 1 Case A 
(3.127) 
If A>0 and -y >0 then D* =0 and M- D* = 0. This is not feasible as 
M>0. 
3. D. 2 Case B 
If A= -y =0 then M> D* >0 and so the solution is an internal optimum 
where W' (D) = 0. R-om (3.127) this is where: 
P*' (D) xu, H (P*L) (3.128) 
PL (D) (i - X) U, (P* ) H 
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L 
(D) >0 then p*' (D) <0 and vice versa. Since U'(p) <0 it follows that if p*' H 
This is a global optimum if it is assumed that W'(D) <0 when D< D* and 
W'(D) >0 when D> D*- 
3. D. 3 Case C 
If A>0 and -y =0 then D* =0 and the optimum is 100% equity finance. This 
is a corner solution where W'(D) < 0. Since U'(p) <0 then from (3.127) this 
is where: 
p*/ (D) xu, (P* ff > -- 
L) if p*'(D) > 0, (3.129) 
p*l (D) X) U/ (P* L LH 
pý' (D) 
< 
XU' (Pý) if p*'(D) < 0. (3.130) 
p*1 (D) X) U, (P* L LH 
This is a global optimum if it is assumed that W'(D) <0 when D>0. 
3. D. 4 Case D 
If A=0 and -Y >0 then D* =M and the optimum is 100% debt finance. This 
is a corner solution where W(D) > 0. Since U'(p) <0 then from (3.127) this 
is where: 
P*/ (D) xu, (P* H< L) if p*'(D) > 0, (3.131) 
X) U/ (P* L PL (D) H 
pý' (D) 
> 
XU'(P*L) if p*'(D) < 0. (3.132) (I - X) U, 
(P* L PL (D) H 
This is a global optimum if it is assumed that W'(D) >0 when D>0. 
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Appendix 3. E Propositions for a socially optimal 
capital structure 
Let D* be a feasible solution to the problem (3.18) 
Proposition 6 When p* = p* then D* = 0. LH 
Proof. When p* = p* the only feasible solution is given by Case 2(3) and: LH 
*1 
PL (D) = p*' (D). H 
Consequently, from (3.42) and since U(p) < 0: 
P*' (D) H> XU'(PL*) 
*1 PL (D) (I - X) U, 
(P* 
H 
From (3.129) in Case C this is the condition for a social optimum where D* =0 
only if p*' (D) > 0. L 
In Case 2(3) differentiating (3.56) with respect to D gives: 
*1 D= w*f D+I+ rD, PL L 
since e* is determined by (3.37), which is independent of D, and w* > w* > LH 
0 (e*). 
From (3.7) and (3.43): 
and so: 
'-"WL* + (1 - X) WH* ='O 
(6*) + UO 
*1 (1 - X) *f WL (D) = --WH(D). x 
However, (3.61) also applies if Case 2(3) is feasible so that: 
I+ 
r* (-) WH = WL-C- E- (M - 
- X) 
and so: 
*'(D) w*'(D) -1 
(- 
(1 + r* (. )) + (M D) r*' (. ) 
d (cov * (. )) ) 
WH L (i 
- X) 
EE dD 
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ftom Lemma 3: 
which means: 
Consequently: 
d (cov* 
0 
dD 
*f (1 +rl 
w (D) = w*'(D) +E 
*1 (1 - X) */ (I + r* WL (D) WL (D) -E xx 
WL (D) + r* E 
Since r* G) < rD in Case 2(3), it follows that: E 
P*/ D) --2: rD - ri (-) > 0. L 
This ends the proof. m 
XU/ L Proposition 7 When p* > p* and - 
(P*) d'21L then D* = 0. HL (J-X)U/(P* dp* HL 
Proof. When p* > p* and HL 
XU'(P*L) 
Z 
dp;, 
(i - x) U, 
(p* ) 7ý dp* ' HL 
the only feasible solutions are given by Case 3(2) and Case 3(3). 
From. Lemmas 2 and 4 the solution for a social optimum must satisfy: 
*1 
PH (D) dp* H x (I - r*'(. ) (i - x) AR, ) E 
PL (D) 
_ dp* L x) + r*'(. ) xAll,,, ) E 
Firstly, consider the solution to Case 3(2) where from (3.104): 
dpý xu, H<- (PL*)_ < dp* (1 - x) uf (p* ) 
Consequently, Case3(2) only applies at a social optimum if: 
P*' (D) H< XU' (PL*) 
PL (D) X) ut (P* H 
R-om (3.130) in Case C if p*'(D) <0 this is the condition for a social optimum L 
where D* = 
94 
In Case 3(2) differentiating (3.84) with respect to D gives: 
*f 
PH (D) + rD 
since e* is determined by (3.37), which is independent of D, and, from (3.67) 
and (3.68) w* and w* are, therefore, also independent of D. It follows that LH 
the solution for Case 3(2) will only be feasible if p*' L (D) < 0. 
Secondly, consider the solution to Case 3(3) where from (3.105): 
dpý 
> XU'(P*L) dp* (I - X) U, (P* LH 
Consequently, Case3(3) only applies at a social optimum if: 
P*' (D) H> XU'(P*L) 
PL (D) (i - X) U/ 
(P* ) 
From (3.129) in Case C if p*'(D) >0 this the condition for a social optimum L 
where D* = 
In Case 3(3) differentiating (3.98) with respect to D gives: 
*1 
PL (D) ýI +rD > 07 
since e* is determined by (3.37), which is independent of D, and, from (3.67) 
and (3.68) uy* and w* are, therefore, also independent of D. LH 
This ends the proof. 
xul(p*) dp* Proposition 8 When p* > p* and -L 
ýL 
HL (1-x)ul(p* dp* HL 
then 0< D* <M if r* rD othenvise D* = M. E 
Proof. When P;, > P* and: L 
dpý XU(PL*) 
-H (1 - x) U, (p* ) dp* 
' 
H 
B-om (3.103) the only feasible solution is given by Case 3(1). 
In Case B the solution for a social optim-Lun where 0< D* <M satisfies: 
pH (D) XU'(PL 
pý'(D) (I - X) U, 
(P* 
H 
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Proposition 7 shows that Case 3(2) and Case 3(3) can only be a social optimum 
when Case C applies. As (3.103), (3-104) and (3.105) show that the solutions 
for Case 3(i), Case 3(2) and Case 3(3) are mutually exclusive it follows that a 
solution for a social optimum in Case B can only be feasible if Case 3(1) also 
applies, that is: 
dp* H P*/ (D) H xu, (PL*) x (i - r*'(. ) (I - x) AR, ) E 
dp* L p*'(D) L (I - X) U, (P* H (I - x) (I + r*'(. ) xAR, ) E 
In Case 3(l) if xc <, uo then r* (. ) < rD. However, if xc > uO then the price E 
difference determines whether profits are higher or lower when the firm's costs 
are low (and vice versa) and so whether r* (. ) ýýi rD. It is, therefore, possible E :; ý 
for Case B to apply when R* RýH , that is, when cov (Rý, R, ) =0 and EL 
, r* rD- In these circumstances the optimum for consumer prices is such E 
that the returns received by shareholders in both states of the world are the 
same as for lenders and so the overall cost of finance is the same as when 
D* = M. Consequently, a social optimum where 0< D* <M is only possible 
when r* (. ) =, 4 rD- E 
This ends the proof. m 
Proposition 9 When p* > p* and D- D* then r* (-) == rD+COV* 
(. ) r*'(. ). HLEE 
Proof. Since7r >0 at an optimum in Case 3 then, from (3.7), and (3.64), the 
shareholders' participation constraint (3.10) becomes the following: 
) (e -uo-V -*)-O+e-*-(I+rD)D=(I+r*(. 
))(M-D). + C)+(l - X) PH E (PL 
Differentiating with respect to D gives: 
XP*' (D) + (I - x) p*' (D) = rD - r* (r *f (-) 
d (cov* 
(M - D) LHE -) +E dD 
since e* is determined by (3.37), which is independent of D. 
From (3.67) and (3.68) at an optimum in Case 3: 
x (1 -x) UO AR, c 1» cov* MDx- 
(PH PL 
Differentiating cov* (. ) with respect to D gives: 
d (cov* x (I - X) (p*'(D) - p*' (D)) ARm + 
cov* (') 
dD M-D LH M-D 
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It follows that: 
xp 
*/ 
L (D) (I - x) AR,, ) + (I - x) p*' (D) 
(I + r*'(. ) xAR, ) EHE 
= rD - rýE 
0+ rE*'(') COV* G) - 
However, from Propositions 7 and 8 when D= D*: 
dIH P*' (D) H x (I - r*'(. ) (I - x) AR, ) E 
dp* P*'(D) - x) (1 + r*(. ) xAl?,,, ) * 
Consequently: 
r* (. ) = rD + r*' (. ) cov* EE 
This ends the proof m 
Proposition 10 When p* > p* and D= D* then there is a social HL 
optimum where D* =M if r*" 0. However, if r*" 0 then the social EE 
optimum satisfies D* =M for a set of parameter values that has measure zero 
in the parameter space. 
Proof. Fl-om Proposition 9 when p* > p* and D= D* then: HL 
rE* (-) -:: ý rD 
+ rV G) COV* G) - 
Differentiating r* E0 with respect to cov* (. ) gives: 
rE G) 7E G) COV* G) +rE 
that is: 
r 
*11 0 COV *0= 
Consequently, if r*" 0 then cov* 0 and so r* (. ) = rD. The EE 
overall cost of finance is then the same as when D* = M. Conversely, if 
r* (. ) 7ý ? 'D then cov* 0 and so r*" 0 and, from Proposition 8, EE 
0< D* < M. 
However if r*" 0 it is also possible that cov* 0 but, from Propo- IE 
sition 8, this can only be where Case 3(1) applies and, therefore: 
dp* H p*' (D) H XU(PL*) x (I - r*'(. ) (I - x) E 
dp* L 
_ 
p*'(D) L (I - X) U, (P* H x) (1 + r*'(. ) xAR.,,, ) E 
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p, ý'(D) Further if r` 0 then r*' (. )is a constant and so is the ratio I, . Since EE PL (D) 
it is assumed the consumer's utility function satisfies U' (p) , U" 
(p) <0 there 
can, therefore, be only one combination of consumer prices p* and p* at which HL 
there is a social optimum when r*'/ 0 and cov* 0. E 
This ends the proof. m 
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Appendix 3. F The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
According to the CAPM the cost of equity, ? 'E, is a linear function of the risk 
free return, rD , the equity beta, OE, and the equity risk premium associated 
with the expected rate of return on the market portfolio, E (R, ) - rD , that 
is: 
rE -, = rD + 
OE (E (R, ) - rD) - 
In addition7 ýE is the ratio of the covariance of the rate of return on equity 
with the return on the market portfolio, cov (RE, R,,, ), to the variance of the 
return on the market portfolio, o- 
2: 
M 
Consequently: 
cov (RE i R=) ýE 
2 am 
rE G) = 
(E (R, ) - rD) 
U2 m 
As it is assumed that rD is given exogenously and that E (1?, ) and a2 are M 
determined by the market equilibrium, then rE () is a constant and so: 
rE 
In the model considered in this chapter it follows from (?? ) that if the CAPM 
applies: 
rE rD +'ýD 
x (I X) (C - (WL - WH) - (PH - PL)), ARin) M-D 
where (D 
(E (R, ) - rD) 
2 O'm 
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Chapter 4 
The Capital Structure of 
Water Companies in England 
and Wales: An Empirical 
Study 
4.1 Introduction 
Background 
When the water industry in England and Wales was privatized in December 
1989 the water companies faced a continuing need for large amounts of ex- 
ternal finance. Substantial investment programmes were needed to make the 
improvements in drinking and waste water quality required by domestic and 
European Union (EU) legislation. However, a flotation with the prospect of 
relatively large rights issues to shareholders being required in the foreseeable 
future was not considered feasible, and so the UK government ensured that 
the opening balance sheets of the privatized water companies had the capac- 
ity to accommodate a significant increase in gearing (i. e. the ratio of a firm's 
debt to its capital value). In fact, all the previous public sector debt was writ- 
ten off and all but one of the privatized water companies received a so-called 
'green-dowry'. This was a cash injection which, according to the regulator in 
Ofwat (1992), amounted in total to some ýCI. 5 billion as compared with the 
companies' market capitalization of ýMl billion at the end of the first day's 
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trading. 
Ofwat (1991) shows that in 1989 the government had projected that aver- 
age gearing for the industry as a whole would rise from zero in 1990/91 to 25% 
by 1994/95 and then stay in the range 24-28% for the following five yearsi. 
In the first five years following privatization actual gearing increased broadly 
in line with these projections rising from an average of 4.0% in 1990/91 to 
20.9% in 1994/95. However, by the end of 1999/00 gearing had risen to 44.2% 
and then, following the regulator's review of price limits in 1999, it increased 
sharply reaching 59.5% by the end of 2002/03. The rapid increase after the 
1999 review was of particular significance because, in large part, it reflected 
the actions of a number of companies to implement major capital restructur- 
ings that would allow their gearing levels to rise above 75%. It would seem, 
therefore, that the increase in the water industry's gearing has been influenced 
by factors beyond a simple need to finance capital investment. 
4.1.2 Theories of capital structure 
The two main theories of capital structure decisions by firms viz. the 'trade- 
off ' theory and the 'pecking order' theory are described in chapter 1. However, 
neither of these theories has proved to be entirely satisfactory and, to varying 
degrees, empirical studies support both approaches. 
The trade-off theory says that as gearing increases there is a trade-off be- 
tween the increasing value of the tax shield on debt finance and increases 
in agency costs and/or the costs of financial distress and bankruptcy. This 
suggests, therefore, that firms have an optimal capital structure at which the 
marginal benefit of the tax shield equals the marginal increase in agency and 
other costs and that they move towards the optimum depending on the ad- 
justment costs 2. 
The pecking order theory argues, however, that firms do not have a target 
capital structure but, instead, adopt a financing hierarchy. It is argued that 
firms prefer to use internal finance before turning to sources of external finance 
and will then prefer to raise debt rather than issue new equity which would 
'The average gearing of the industry as a whole is defined for these purposes as the ratio 
of the total net debt of the regulated water companies to their total capital value at the 
relevant financial year end. Total capital value is calculated as the total of the net debt and 
share capital and reserves of the companies on a historical cost accounting basis. 
2 There are also agency cost models (e. g. Jensen and Meckling (1976)) which do not rely 
on the existence of a tax shield on debt finance to produce a trade-off. 
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only be used as a last resort. The rationale behind this theory is that a firm's 
managers and shareholders have asymmetric information about its prospects. 
This will lead shareholders, for example, to assume that the firm's shares are 
overpriced if it makes a rights issue and managers will not wish to issue new 
equity that is undervalued. As a result, the firm's managers will prefer to issue 
low risk debt, whose pricing is less sensitive to private information, placing 
debt finance higher in the pecking order than equity issues. Similarly, cash and 
marketable securities, are preferred to both debt and equity. A firm's capital 
structure will, therefore, simply reflect its cumulative earnings and investment 
requirements. 
In a regulated envirom-nent the position is further complicated by the po- 
tential interaction between decisions on gearing and the price limits that are 
set by the regulator. This 'price-influence effect' can arise in two ways and 
these can work in opposite directions. 
Firstly, if the regulator considers that there is an optimal level of gearing 
which nidnirnizes the overall cost of capital then price limits will be set to 
reflect the assessed optimum. Consequently, if the trade-off theory is correct, a 
price-cap system of regulation reinforces the incentive for the regulated firm to 
adjust gearing to the level that maximizes its financing efficiency. Shareholder 
value will clearly be enhanced if the firm can find ways to reduce its overall 
cost of capital below the regulator's assessment. Firms would not normally be 
expected to behave this way according to the pecking-order theory. 
Secondly, there is a moral hazard problem. If the regulated firm believes 
that the regulator will be influenced by the risk of financial distress and the 
associated risk of disruption to services then, as Taggart (1981) notes, the 
firm will have an incentive to increase gearing to obtain more favourable price 
limits. Consequently, a regulated firm might still have a target capital struc- 
ture even if it might otherwise behave in accordance with the pecking-order 
theory. This suggests that if there is evidence that regulated firms do have 
target capital structures then it would be important to consider whether there 
is any evidence of companies attempting to exert a price-influence effect be- 
fore drawing conclusions about which of the two competing theories provides 
a better explanation of events. 
The capital structure decisions of regulated firms have received little at- 
tention in the literature and there have been few empirical studies; a notable 
exception being Taggart's (1985) study of the response of electricity utilities 
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in the US to changes in the regulatory regime. Taggart concluded that the ev- 
idence was most consistent with the trade-off theory but that the evidence did 
not eliminate all ambiguity. The pecking order theory was supported by some, 
but not all, of the results and there was also some evidence of firms adopting 
price-influence financing strategies although these seemed to be short-lived as 
regulators took measures to combat them. 
No empirical studies have been undertaken to investigate the capital struc- 
ture decisions of regulated firms in the UK. However, Mayer's (2003) assess- 
ment of the water industry is that, while both the trade-off and pecking order 
theories provide a partial explanation of events, they do not explain the rapid 
increase in gearing after the review of price limits in 1999. He argues that this 
was a response to a much tighter regulat ory contract and reflected attempts 
by water companies both to minimize financing costs and to protect their fi- 
nancial positions by restricting the regulator's ability to tighten the contract 
further. If so the capital restructurings undertaken by some companies would 
reflect the operation of the trade-off theory in conjunction with a defensive 
price-influence effect, albeit in a rather extreme form. 
4.1.3 Outline of the study 
This chapter attempts to take an empirical approach to the question of whether 
the behaviour of regulated firms is consistent with the trade-off or pecking 
order theories by using the water industry over the period 1990/91 to 2002/03 
as a case study. A number of econometric models have been developed for this 
purpose and to address two specific questions: 
9 Did the water companies behave as though they had target gearing lev- 
els? 
o What effect did the regulatory reviews of price limits appear to have on 
the capital structure decisions of water companies? 
As there are two published measures of gearing an interesting associated 
question concerns which measure seems to have been more important to the 
water companies: the measure based on capital values derived from the compa- 
nies' published accounts or that based on the regulator's calculation of capital 
value and used to set price limits? 
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Section 4.2 explains how the water companies have been classified for the 
purpose of this study. The classification reflects both the structure of the 
water industry in England and Wales and the capital restructurings which 
occurred shortly after the review of price limits in 1999. The aim was to place 
the companies in categories where the behaviour of companies within each 
category is likely to be relatively homogeneous even though the various cat- 
egories might exhibit different patterns of behaviour. This enables separate 
models to be estimated for each category using pooled data as only a relatively 
short time series of data is available for individual companies. Possible con- 
nections between the capital restructurings that occurred after 1999/00 and 
the ownership of the water companies are then discussed in section 4.3. 
Section 4.4 describes the sources and definitions of the data on net debt 
and capital values that have been used in the study. Descriptive statistics are 
also provided including the means and standard deviations of the variables 
and the correlations between them. 
The models that have been developed to estimate the relationships between 
the variables and the methodology that has been applied are explained and dis- 
cussed in section 4.5. An unrestricted Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model 
(ADLM) is used as the starting point. This incorporates a number of model 
types according to the restrictions placed on the parameters. Of particular 
interest here are the Static Long Run Model (SLRM), the Partial Adjustment 
Model (PAM) and the Error Correction Model (ECM). The methodology used 
in this study has a number of novel features compared with other studies that 
use adjustment models, usually the PAM, to test whether firms move towards 
target gearing ratios. In particular: 
a general-to-specific model reduction process is applied to the estimated 
ADLM to determine which model, if any, provides the best explanation. 
* target gearing ratios are estimated directly instead of proxy numbers 
being calculated separately and used as input data. 
4D cointegration tests are used to assess whether the results reflect causal 
relationships, although the reliability of these tests is limited by the 
relatively short time period for which data is available. 
Section 4.6 presents the results of the model reduction process for each 
category of company and coinments on the tests that have been carried out. 
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The models derived in section 4.6 were also applied to the data on individual 
companies and these results are discussed in section 4.7. 
Section 4.8 provides an interpretation of the results taking into account 
policy statements about capital structure that have been made by the regulator 
at reviews of price limits. From this it possible to assess whether companies 
have tried to exert a price-influence effect. 
Finally, some overall conclusions on which theory of capital structure is 
consistent with the evidence in this case study are set out in section 4.9. In 
broad terms it is concluded that that the evidence from this case study is 
more consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure than the peck- 
ing order theory. The econometric models that have been estimated provide 
reasonable support for the proposition that water companies, at least when 
viewed collectively, have behaved as though they had target levels of gearing. 
Although such targets are predicted by the trade-off theory, it is important 
to emphasize that the evidence has been obtained from adjustment models 
and so does not necessarily demonstrate that a trade-off actually exists. This 
would require more extensive models to be developed where the target level of 
gearing is specified as a function of the explanatory variables that determine 
the costs and benefits of increasing gearing. Unfortunately, a number of those 
variables, for example, agency costs and the costs of financial distress, are 
extremely difficult to measure. 
Adjustment models can, however, provide evidence that the behaviour of 
firms is inconsistent with the pecking order theory since it predicts that firms 
do not have target gearing levels. Even so, as the water companies are highly 
regulated, it is also important to assess whether they have tried to use gearing 
levels to exert a price-influence effect because it possible that their behaviour 
might otherwise have reflected the pecking order theory. There appears to 
be little evidence that water companies have generally tried to manipulate 
their financial positions to that end and, therefore, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that their behaviour has not been consistent with the predictions of 
the pecking order theory. 
105 
4.2 Classification of Water Companies and Industry 
Structure 
4.2.1 Types of water company 
There are two main types of water company in England and Wales, viz: 
the 10 Water and Sewerage Companies (WaSC's) that were privatized 
in 1989. The WaSC's were created from the 10 publicly owned regional 
water authorities established by the Government in 1974 to rationalize 
the provision of water supplies and sewerage services. These services 
had previously been the responsibility of a large number of municipal 
authorities. 
the relatively small 'Water only' Companies (WoUs) that have been 
in private sector ownership for many years. These companies are only 
responsible for water supply in their areas; the sewerage services being 
supplied by the relevant WaSC. The relatively small size of the WoC's is 
illustrated by the capital value figures reported in the water companies' 
accounts for 2002/03 which show that the WoC's accounted for only 
4.7% of the industry's total capital value. 
4.2.2 Regulatory framework 
As part of the privatization arrangements a price-cap system of regulation 
was also introduced in 1989 and it was applied to both the WaSC's and the 
WoUs. The regulatory body established for this purpose was the Office of 
Water Services (Ofwat), headed by the Director General of Water Services 
(DGWS)3 
. The goverm-nent set the initial price limits for the water companies 
in 1989 and these were subsequently reviewed by Ofwat in 1994,1999 and 
2004 with the new price Emits coming into effect in 1995/96,2000/01 and 
2005/06 respectively. These 'Periodic Reviews' take place every five years and 
companies that are unwilling to accept the price limits set by the DGWS at a 
Periodic Review can seek a reference to the Competition Conu-nission whose 
decision is binding. 
3 The Water Industry Act 2003 replaces (after I April 2005) the office of the DGWS by a 
body corporate viz. the Water Services Regulation Authority. 
106 
Each water company has an Instrument of Appointment or 'Licence' which 
contains the detailed conditions that govern the company's activities and its 
relationship with the regulator. These include, for example, the controls on 
charges and tariffs, the submission of information to Ofwat, and various re- 
quirements relating to corporate governance. It also sets out the circumstances 
under which there can be an interim determination of price limits between Pe- 
riodic Reviews and the basis on which such adjustments to price limits are to 
be calculated. 
The water companies are usually subsidiary companies within a group 
structure and the Licence imposes strict 'ring-fencing' arrangements to protect 
the assets and the financial resources that the companies need to provide water 
services. These arrangements are intended to ensure each water subsidiary acts 
as a free-standing company. Any significant unregulated commercial activities 
are, therefore, normally undertaken by other subsidiary companies created 
for that purpose by the water subsidiary's parent company. In addition to 
the economic regulator there are two quality regulators; the Drinking Water 
Inspectorate (DWI) and the Environment Agency (EA). These monitor and 
enforce compliance with the standards for, respectively, drinking water and 
waste water quality specified by domestic and EU legislation. 
4.2.3 Rationalization since 1989 
Although there has been some rationalization within the water industry since 
1989 this has been limited by statutory controls over takeovers and mergers. 
The Competition Connnission has not been willing to approve mergers between 
large companies because of the potentially adverse effect on the regulator's 
ability to use 'comparative competition' to regulate the industry. Rationaliza- 
tion within the industry has, therefore, been confined to the smaller WoUs. In 
1989 there were 28 WoC's of which 11 were already owned by three French wa- 
ter groups 4. Formalization of these common ownership arrangements through 
mergers subsequently reduced the number of WoC's by six. In addition six 
WoC's were taken over by WaSC's and four by other WoC's so that by 2003 
the number had fallen to 12. The data on the WoUs that were merged or 
taken over have been combined with that of the current owner for the years 
prior to merger or takeover as the data for those years is not available for an 
4 This excludes Cholderton and District Water. Ofwat does not publish data for this WoC 
as it is exceptionally small and the figures are not material. 
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of the individual WoUs concerned. However, any effects on the results of this 
study from this procedure are not likely to be significant in view of the rela- 
tively small size of the WoUs and, in particular, the size of those W6C's that 
have been absorbed within other companies. This can be illustrated by using 
the turnover figures for 1990/91. In that year the WoUs accounted for some 
12% of total industry turnover while the turnover of the six WoUs eventually 
taken over by WaSC's was less than 10% of the total turnover of the WaSC's 
concerned. The turnover of the four W6C's taken over by other W6C's was 
about 30% of the total turnover of the WoUs concerned. 
4.2.4 Company categories 
For the purposes of this study the WaSC's and WoUs have both been di- 
vided into two categories in order to distinguish between companies that had 
implemented, or were in the process of implementing, a capital restructuring 
after the 1999 Periodic Review and those companies that had not done so by 
the end of 2002/03. The abbreviations CR and NCR respectively are used to 
distinguish between the companies in each of these categories. 
By the end of 2002/03 half of the WaSC's and half of the WoUs had 
implemented, or were in the process of implementing, a capital restructuring. 
Table 4.1 identifies the companies by type and by category. The company 
abbreviations are the same as those used by Ofwat. 
Table 4.1: Classification of water companies 
WaSC's WOC's 
Capital restructuring Anglian (ANH) Bristol (brl) 
post 1999/00 (CR) Dyr Cymru (WSH) Dee Valley (dvw) 
Northumbrian (NES) Mid Kent (mkt) 
Southern (SRN) Portsmouth (prt) 
Wessex (WSX) South Staffordshire (sst) 
Sutton and East Surrey (ses) 
No capital restructuring Severn Trent (SVT) Bournemouth and West Hampshire (bwh) 
(NCR) South West (SWT) Cambridge (cam) 
Thames (TMS) Folkestone and Dover (fik) 
United Utilities (UUW) South East (mse) 
Yorkshire (YKY) Tendring Hundred (thd) 
Three Valleys (tvn) 
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The capital restructurings that occurred after 1999/00 took two forms: 
9 Major financial restructurings that relied on 'enhanced financial struc- 
tures' using debt tranching techniques and tight covenant packages to 
permit gearing levels in excess of 75%. The companies that took this 
route were Anglian (2002/03), Southern (2003/04), Dee Valley (2002/03), 
Mid Kent (2002/03), Portsmouth (2002/03), and Sutton and East Sur- 
rey (2000/01). In addition, there was the special case of Dyr Cymru 
(Welsh) which was acquired in May 2001 by Glas Cymru, a 'not-for- 
profit' company limited by guarantee and with no equity interest. All of 
these arrangements, with the exception of Sutton and East Surrey, re- 
quired regulatory approval and Licence modifications to strengthen the 
financial ring-fence. 
9 Less complex refinancings that did not use enhanced financial struc- 
tures but where debt has been increased to permit special dividends or 
sharebuybacks. Wessex, Bristol, and South Staffordshire adopted this 
approach in 2002/03. In Northumbrian's case, however, the restructur- 
ing took place at parent company level. In January 2003 Northumbrian's 
parent company was offered for sale by its then owner, Suez, and in May 
2003 Suez sold 75% of its shareholding to a consortium of institutional 
investors. The parent company was subsequently listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. Although Northumbrian's gearing was not directly af- 
fected, the parent company's gearing increased to 77%5. As the parent 
company's debt is supported by the free cashflows from Northumbrian 
Ofwat took action to ensure Northumbrian protected its financial posi- 
tion. 
4.3 Capital Restructuring and Ownership 
Although this chapter is not primarily concerned with a possible relationship 
between capital structure decisions and the ownership of the companies, some 
observations can be made about tl-. Lis aspect of the capital restructurings that 
took place after 1999/00 which will be of assistance in interpreting the empir- 
'The ratio of net debt to net debt plus share capital and reserves in the unaudited interim 
results of Northumbrian Water Group ple as at 30 September 2003. The results also showed 
that gearing at 30 September 2002 was 51%. 
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ical results. These ownership characteristics also indicate why the behaviour 
of companies within each of the two categories is likely to be relatively homo- 
geneous while different categories may exhibit different patterns of behaviour. 
Only two of the five WaSC restructurings followed directly as a result of a 
change of ownership and in each case the sale was brought about by the finan- 
cial problems of the previous owner. The acquisition of Dyr Cymru in May 
2001 by Glas Cymru occurred after Hyder, the original owner of Dyr Cymru, 
encountered financial difficulties while the Wessex restructuring occurred after 
its acquisition by a Malaysian company, YTLPI in May 2002 following the col- 
lapse of its former owner, Enron. The restructurings of Anglian and Southern 
were both initiated by their parent companies both of which were listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. Anglian represented the most significant part of its 
parent company's activities but this was not the case for Southern. Indeed, 
shortly after obtaining Ofwat's approval for the restructuring, Southern was 
sold in April 2002 by its then owner, Scottish Power, to a trade buyer with the 
Royal Bank of Scotland taking a majority stake in April 2003. This delayed 
execution of the restructuring until 2003. As noted above, the restructuring of 
Northumbrian's parent company resulted fi-om the decision of its then owner 
to sell 75% of its shareholding with, it appears, the aim of securing benefits 
from such a restructuring. 
The restructurings of Dyr Cymru and Anglian also included proposals to 
separate ownership of the water company's assets from the provision of opera- 
tional services so that the latter could be contracted out. These arrangements 
prompted Ofwat to impose further Licence modifications to ensure the asset 
owner, who was still the Licence holder, remained accountable for the delivery 
of services and achievement of quality standards and that adequate internal 
control procedures were put in place. 
Similarly, among the WoUs, only two of the six restructurings were directly 
associated with a change of ownership. In both cases the parent was listed on 
the London Stock Exchange and was acquired by a special financial vehicle. 
Mid Kent was purchased in April 2001 by Swan Capital Investments, owned by 
the German bank West LB, and in December 2001 Portsmouth was acquired 
by South Downs, which was 45% owned by the Royal Bank of Scotland; the 
balance being owned by management and an employees' trust. The other four 
restructurings, viz. Bristol, Dee Valley, South Staffordshire and Sutton and 
East Surrey, were all initiated and implemented by their existing owners; all 
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of which were companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 6. 
The main features of the capital restructurings and company ownership 
described above are sunu-narized in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Capital restructuring and ownership 
WaSC's WOC's 
Restructuring proposed by new owner WSH, WSX mkt, prt 
Acquired by special financial vehicle WSH, NES, SRN mkt, prt 
Enhanced financial structure utilized ANH, WSH, SRN dvw, mkt, prt, ses 
Owner listed prior to restructuring ANH, WSH brl, dvw, mkt, prt, sst, ses 
Owner listed post restructuring ANH, NES brl, dvw, sst, ses 
Asset ownership separated from operations ANH, WSH 
Licence modified ANH, WSH, NES, SRN dvw, mkt, prt 
The characteristics of the parent companies of the WaSC's and the WoUs 
that did not implement a capital restructuring after 1999/00 are also inter- 
esting and, in some respects, are quite similar. Except for Thames, which 
was taken over by RWE, a large German utility company, the parents of the 
WaSC's were all listed on the London Stock Exchange at the end of 2000 and 
the WaSC subsidiary also represented a significant part of each group's ac- 
tivities. The managements of Severn Trent, South West, Thames and United 
Utilities indicated that they did not see benefits from a restructuring. Kelda, 
however, proposed in early 2000 to restructure its main subsidiary Yorkshire 
and establish a 'not-for-profit' mutual as owner of the assets. In many re- 
spects the proposal was similar to the restructuring of Dyr Cymru but Kelda 
withdrew the proposal when the then DGWS decided, in July 2000, that it 
could not proceed in its current form. The parents of the WoUs that did 
not implement a capital restucturing were all part of much larger European 
utility groups. Three Valleys, Tendring Hundred and Folkestones and Dover 
were owned by the French group, Vivendi. Another French group, Bouygues, 
owned South East until it was sold to Macquarie Bank, an Australian banking 
group, in October 2003. Cambridge was a listed company until its acquisition 
by Union Fenosa, a Spanish multi-utility, in December 1999. Union Fenosa 
subsequently sold Cambridge to CKI, a Hong Kong based multinational in- 
frastructure company, in April 2004. Bournemouth and West Hampshire was 
6Hovvever, the restructuring of South Staffordshire was followed by the water company's 
dernerger from its parent in April 2004. 
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owned by Biwater, a British multinational water engineering group until it 
became the principal part of a joint venture between Biwater and Nuon, a 
Dutch multi-utilty, in April 2000. 
TILis examination of the ownership of water companies gives added insight 
to Mayer's (2003) interpretation of events after the 1999 Periodic Review. 
Mayer argues that the restructurings were a response to a tighter regulatory 
contract and that companies increased gearing both to achieve a lower cost 
of capital and to obtain greater exit rights. Higher levels of gearing reduce 
the owner's cornmitment to the business and the resulting increase in exit 
rights then restricts the potential for further tightening of the contract by 
the regulator. He also points out that, even though increased gearing also 
increases the regulator's exit rights, there is a net gain for the owner if there 
are greater downside losses from regulatory intervention as a result of staying 
in the business. 
The above discussion of ownership patterns indicates that the value at- 
tached to the benefits of restructuring by the parent companies depended 
on the importance of the water company subsidiary to each group's strate- 
gic development. In most cases, the capital restructurings were undertaken 
by owners who seem to have perceived they had less scope to use the wa- 
ter company as a foundation for further growth either in the UK or globally. 
Such owners would attach a relatively high value to the option of being able 
to exit. Indeed, in some cases the owners were forced to exit because the 
whole group was in financial difficulty while others chose to exit in whole or 
in part; perhaps because the water company concerned was small or had a 
poor strategic fit with the group's other activities. Where this occurred the 
new owners were usually financial institutions. Such organizations would be 
likely to have a greater understanding of the scope for using debt finance to 
reduce the cost of capital and would be attracted by the release of equity in a 
restructuring. They would also be likely to attach a high value to the option to 
exit. In addition, it seems that they faced little competition in making these 
acquisitions from other water companies. This might have been because such 
acquisitions are constrained by the regulator and the competition authorities. 
Other water companies could, therefore, have been deterred from proposing 
mergers between water companies even if they considered that mergers provide 
opportunities to create added value. 
The companies that did not pursue a capital restructuring were, however, 
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all part of groups in which the water company was likely to be considered 
as strategically important for the group's future growth prospects. In these 
circumstances management would attach a relatively high value to having 
flexibility in its arrangements for the control of the water company. This flexi- 
bility is restricted at high levels of gearing and especially if enhanced financial 
structures are introduced. The covenant packages used in such structures place 
much tighter disciplines and controls on a company. For example, shareholder 
distributions are linked to meeting financial ratio tests and such tests are also 
used to define certain 'trigger events' and events of default. If trigger events 
occur bondholders generally have 'step-in' rights permitting the appointment 
of independent experts. The regulator has also imposed much tighter Licence 
conditions in these circumstances. As explained in Stones (2001) the aim of 
such structures is to change the underlying risk profile of the business so that 
investment grade credit ratings can be maintained at high levels of gearing and 
the overall cost of capital can be reduced. Consequently, for the companies 
that did not pursue a capital restructuring, the costs of reduced management 
flexibility would seem to have outweighed the potential benefits. 
4.4 Data and Key Statistics 
4.4.1 Definitions and sources 
The models have been estimated using data on two variables viz. the net debt 
and the capital value of each water company as at the end of each financial year 
i. e. 31st March. The data set covers all of the 22 regulated water companies 
in existence in 2003 and extends over the 13 year period from 1990/91 to 
2002/03; the latest year for which data was available at the time of this study. 
The net debt of each water company consists of its long and short term 
borrowings after deducting cash and short term investments. Each company's 
capital value is measured in two ways: 
Historical Cost Asset Value (HCAV) - the net assets of each company as 
reported in its Historical Cost Accounts (HCA) balance sheet (which, by 
definition, equals the total of its net debt and share capital and reserves) 
and 
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9 Regulatory Capital Value (RCV) - the capital value that Ofwat assigns 
to each company for the purpose of setting price limits 7. 
The data on net debt and HCAV were provided by Ofwat, from the regWa- 
tory accounting information included in the annual 'June Returns' submitted 
by each water company. 
To eliminate the effect of inflation the figures have been adjusted to a 
common price base of March 2003 using the Retail Price Index at the relevant 
financial year end. The data on RCV are published in Ofwat (2004a) and have 
been adjusted by Ofwat to the same price base and in the same way prior to 
publication. 
Ofwat specifies that the regulatory accounting information submitted by 
each company must only relate to the 'appointed business' of the company. 
The data, therefore, exclude the effect of any commercial activities that are 
not regulated unless those figures are not material. 
Appendix 4. A contains the data sets for net debt, HCAV and RCV. These 
are set out in Tables 4.23,4.24 and 4.25 respectively together with the Retail 
Price Index data in Table 4.29. The gearing ratios for each company using 
both the HCAV and RCV measures of capital value and the mean values for 
each type and category of company are given in Tables 4.26,4.27 and 4.28 
respectively. In addition, appendix 4. A provides graphical plots of the data 
for the WaSC's in Figure 4.6 and in Figure 4.7 for the WoUs. Grapl-. Lical plots 
of the means and standard deviations for each category of company are given 
in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 respectively. 
4.4.2 The pattern and trend of gearing 
There are two measures of gearing corresponding to the two measures of capital 
value: 
9 HCAV gearing - the ratio of net debt to HCAV 
e RCV gearing - the ratio of net debt to RCV 
In the first ten years or so following privatization the capital markets, the 
water companies and Ofwat focused on financial ratios calculated according 
'The financing costs that Ofwat allows within each company's price limits are calculated 
by multiplying the company's RCV by the regulator's assessment of the cost of capital. 
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to HCA conventions and so more attention was given to the HCAV gearing 
measure. However, the emphasis in the 2004 Periodic Review has moved to 
the RCV based measure. For example, Ofwat (2003b) (p. 62) states: 
" Our analysis has focused on the net debt/RCV measure of gearing 
which is now the most widely used measure of gearing for water 
companies". 
This measure is considered particularly important by the providers of debt 
finance who have become much larger investors in the industry as a result of 
the capital restructurings. For example, in Moody's (2002), the rating agency 
considers RCV gearing to be one of the two key ratios that should be used to 
assess and monitor the financial strength of water companieS8. It is also the 
measure of gearing that is used in the covenant packages for enhanced financial 
structures to determine trigger events and events of default. RCV gearing 
appears to have become the primary measure of gearing because it reflects the 
capital value on which Ofwat allows a return in setting price limits. For debt 
providers, therefore, it is a key determinant of a water company's capacity to 
pay interest charges. 
Graphical plots of the two measures of gearing are presented in Figure 4.1 
for the WaSC's and in Fig-Lire 4.2 for the WoUs. Separate plots are given for 
companies in the CR and the NCR categories. 
These plots show clear differences in pattern and trend of gearing between 
the WaSC's and the WoC's. They also illustrate the similarity between the two 
measures of capital value. It can be seen that the gearing of WaSC's increased 
over the whole of the 13 year period to 2002/03 with, as would be expected, 
a sharper increase for companies in the WaSC CR category in the three years 
after the 1999 Periodic Review. Although there was a wide variation in both 
measures of gearing for the WaSC's at the start of the period they quickly 
converged after the 1994 Periodic Review. This convergence was maintained 
by the WaSC NCR category after 1999 Periodic Review while there was a 
slight increase in variation for the WaSC CR category reflecting differences in 
the til-ning of individual capital restructurings. The picture for the WoC's is 
quite different. They appear to be less homogeneous than the WaSC's with a 
8 The other key ratio is the Adjusted Interest Cover Ratio which measures the cash interest 
cover after deducting the portion of capital expenditure required to maintain the company's 
asset base from the post-tax cash flows available to cover cash interest expenses. 
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Figure 4.1: Gearing based on Historical Cost Asset Value and Regulatory 
Capital Value - Water and Sewerage Companies 
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Figure 4.2: Gearing based on Historical Cost Asset Value and Regulatory 
Capital Value - Water only Companies 
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much wider variation in gearing throughout the latter half of the period and 
no clear pattern of convergence. However, in overall terms, the WoC's gearing 
declined over the ten years to 1999/00. In the following three years the gearing 
of the W6C NCR category seems to have stabilized while that of the WoC CR 
category, of course, increased. 
These patterns and trends in gearing can be seen more clearly in Figures 4.3 
and 4.4 which, respectively, contain plots of the means and standard deviations 
of both gearing measures for each type and category of company. Plots of the 
profiles of the means and standard deviations of net debt, HCAV and RCV 
are given in appendix 4-A in Figures 4.8 and 4.9. 
4.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Approach 
The above commentary on the general pattern and trend of gearing indicates 
that it is appropriate to divide the time series into three sub-periods each of 
which commences with the application of new price limits i. e. 
9 1990/91-1994/95: the five-year period in which the initial price limits 
set by the Government in 1989 applied, 
e 1995/96-1999/00: the five-year period in which the price limits set in 
the 1994 Periodic Review applied, and 
o 2000/01-2002/03: the three years foRowing the 1999 Periodic Review. 
It is then possible to calculate the means and standard deviations of net 
debt, HCAV, RCV, HCAV gearing and RCV gearing for each company cat- 
egory in each sub-period and test whether differences in the means between 
sub-periods and between the CR and NCR categories are statistically signifi- 
cant. A t-test that allows for heteroscedasticity has been used for this purpose; 
the t-statistic, t, being: 
t 
X1 - X2 (4.1) 
2 ý22 
M+ n 
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Figure 4.3: Mean Values of Gearing based on Historical Asset Value and 
Regulatory Capital Value 
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Figure 4.4: Standard Deviations of Gearing based on Historical Cost Asset 
Value and Regulatory Capital Value 
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with degrees of freedom, df, given by: 
(S2 2)2 
1+ S2 
df -- 
mn (4.2) 221 
M-1 
+ 
n-1 
where Tj and TX2 are the two means being compared, sl and 82 are the associ- 
ated standard deviations and m and n are the respective number of observa- 
tions. Critical values based on a one-tail test at the 5% significance level have 
been used. 
Net debt, HCAV and RCV 
The means and standard deviations of net debt, HCAV and RCV are set out 
in Table 4.3. 
The t-tests showed that in both WaSC categories there is a significant 
increase in the mean level of net debt in each sub-period compared with the 
previous sub-period. The difference between the mean level of net debt in the 
WaSC CR and NCR categories is only significant in the second sub-period. 
There is no significant increase between sub-periods in the mean level of net 
debt in the WoC NCR category but the increase in the third sub-period is 
significant for the WoC CR category. 
The mean HCAV of the WaSC NCR category is significantly greater than 
that of the WaSC CR category in all sub-periods. Mean HCAV increases 
significantly in each sub-period for the WaSC CR category but only in the 
second sub-period for the WaSC NCR category. The only significant difference 
between the WoC CR and the WoC NCR categories is in the second sub- 
period, when the mean HCAV of the WoC NCR category is significantly larger. 
The increase between consecutive sub-periods in the mean HCAV of both 
WoC categories is not significant but, in both cases, the third sub-period is 
significantly higher than the first. 
The differences in mean RCV between categories and sub-periods that are 
significant for WaSC's are the same as for mean HCAV. The mean RCV of 
the WoC NCR category is significantly larger than the WoC CR category in 
the first and second sub-periods. Mean RCV increases significantly in the 
second sub-period for the WoC CR category but not in the third. There is 
no significant increase in mean RCV between consecutive sub-periods for the 
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Table 4.3: Mean and Standard Deviation of Net Debt, Historical Cost Asset 
Value and Regulatory Capital Value 
Mean Standard Deviation 
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2003 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2003 
P-m Em Lm Lm Lm Lm 
Net Debt 
WaSCs 
CR 296.9 714.5 1455.2 211.0 329.5 674.1 
NCR 247.9 1076.7 1716.0 283.4 629.8 679.6 
All WaSCs 272.4 895.6 1585.6 248.5 530.0 678.2 
wocs 
CR 23.6 20.1 45.7 20.5 23.3 35.7 
NCR 43.7 47.9 59.7 47.5 53.5 67.8 
All WoCs 33.6 34.0 52.7 37.7 43.3 53.9 
Historical Cost Asset Value 
WaSCs 
CR 1291.0 1838.6 2368.9 540.1 715.4 998.7 
NCR 2248.3 3094.6 3441.0 858.9 1090.8 1106.0 
All WaSCs 1769.6 2466.6 2905.0 859.0 1111.7 1170.2 
wocs 
CR 68.7 73.9 94.1 30.7 39.1 46.9 
NCR 84.5 122.9 136.0 83.6 117.5 134.1 
All WoCs 76.6 98.4 115.1 62.9 90.2 101.3 
Regulatory Capital Value 
WaSCs 
CR 1094.3 1819.3 2371.1 562.2 755.4 869.5 
NCR 1850.5 3166.5 3656.0 851.2 1257.9 1338.1 
All WaSCs 1472.4 2492.9 3013.5 809.7 1231.9 1287.0 
wocs 
CR 76.5 97.3 117.8 25.9 33.4 45.6 
NCR 121.7 173.0 197.2 128.4 182.4 206.0 
All WoCs 99.1 135.2 157.5 94.6 135.5 152.5 
Note: Data as at 31 March each year and at March 2003 prices. 
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WoC NCR category but the third sub-period is significantly higher than the 
first. 
HCAV gearing and RCV gearing 
The means and standard deviations of HCAV gearing and RCV gearing are 
set out in Table 4.4. 
The t-tests showed that in both WaSC categories there is a significant in- 
crease in both mean HCAV gearing and RCV gearing in each sub-period. Mean 
HCAV gearing and RCV gearing are also both higher in the WaSC CR cate- 
gory in each sub-period. The standard deviations of both measures are lower 
in the second sub-period than in the first reflecting the convergence in gearing 
referred to above. They continue to decline for the WaSC NCR category in 
the third period with a slight increase in the WaSC CR category reflecting the 
shorter time period and the different timings of the capital restructurings. 
Mean HCAV gearing and RCV gearing both decline significantly in the 
second sub-period in both WoC categories and, on both measures, mean gear- 
ing is higher in the WoC NCR category in the first two sub-periods. The slight 
increase in HCAV gearing and RCV gearing in the third sub-period for the 
WoC NCR category is not significant. The increase in gearing in the third 
sub-period for the WoC CR category is only significant for the RCV gearing 
measure. There is, however, no significant difference in mean gearing on either 
measure between the WoC categories in the third sub-period. This seems to 
reflect the fact that the WoC capital restructurings were in companies with 
relatively low gearing and the restructurings largely impacted on gearing in 
2002/03, the last year of the third sub-period. This holds down the mean 
values of gearing for the WoC CR category in that sub-period and, as can be 
seen from Table 4.4, increases their standard deviations. As Figure 4.3 shows, 
average HCAV gearing in 2002/03 was, in fact, 69% for both the WaSC and 
the WoC CR categories. 
Comparing the gearing of the WaSC's and the WoC's there is no significant 
difference between the CR categories on both gearing measures in the first sub- 
period but the WaSC NCR category is significantly lower than the WoC NCR 
category. However, in the second and third sub-periods the gearing of the 
WaSC's is significantly higher than that of the WoC's on both measures and 
in both the CR and NCR categories except in the second sub-period where 
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Table 4.4: Mean and Standard Deviation of Gearing based on Historical 
Cost Asset Value and Regulatory Capital Value 
Mean Standard Deviation 
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2003 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2003 
HCAV Gearing 
WaSCs 
CR 23.3 38.6 61.0 17.5 7.9 9.3 
NCR 7.4 32.8 48.6 16.1 10.0 7.2 
All WaSCs 15.4 35.7 54.8 18.5 9.4 10.3 
wocs 
CR 27.9 14.4 28.2 20.5 31.0 65.2 
NCR 46.8 34.5 39.6 11.8 10.5 10.9 
AR WoCs 37.4 24.5 33.9 19.1 25.1 46.5 
RCV Gearing 
WaSCs 
CR 27.3 39.3 60.9 21.9 8.2 14.6 
NCR 6.4 32.4 46.8 27.9 9.0 5.5 
All WaSCs 16.9 35.8 53.8 27.0 9.2 13.0 
wocs 
CR 26.7 16.3 34.7 19.6 19.0 25.8 
NCR 34.5 25.9 27.6 14.1 8.8 6.3 
All WoCs 30.6 21.1 31.1 17.4 15.5 18.8 
Note: Data as at 31 Maxch each year. 
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there is no significant difference in HCAV gearing in the NCR category. 
Correlations 
The trends in gearing would seem to indicate a high degree of correlation be- 
tween net debt, HCAV and RCV. This is confirmed by the correlation matrix 
in Table 4.5. The Table shows that, over the whole 13 year period the cor- 
relation coefficient for net debt and HCAV varies across the four categories 
from 0.85 to 0.97 while the coefficient for net debt and RCV varies from 0.73 
and 0.97. The correlation coefficients in the two NCR categories are generally 
higher in each sub-period than the CR categories. The coefficients are gener- 
ally higher for the WoC's than the WaSC's. However, in the WaSC categories, 
the coefficients increase in each sub-period, while those in the WoC categories 
are more stable. The differences between the WaSC's and the WoC's could 
reflect the fact that the WaSC's were newly established and privatized in 1989 
with more varied capital structures than the WoC's which were already mature 
companies that had existed in the private sector for many years. This seems 
to be supported by the standard deviations of RCV gearing for the WaSC 
categories which are higher than the WoC's in the first sub-period, although 
this is only applies to the WaSC NCR category for HCAV gearing. 
The correlation coefficient between HCAV and RCV is consistently high 
in all company categories and in all sub-periods and is never lower than 0.94. 
Although the methodologies used to calculate HCAV and RCV are techni- 
cally different this high correlation reflects two factors. Firstly, both measures 
of capital value have increased as a result of the very large investment pro- 
grammes required to meet domestic and EU legislation and, secondly, both 
measures of capital value use the same data on capital investment. As noted 
above the regulatory accounts, from which this data is obtained, exclude any 
investment relating to unregulated commercial activities. 
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Implications 
The above analysis of the data and descriptive statistics indicates that, in 
addition to the obvious difference in their relative size, the WaSC's and the 
WoC's exhibit significant differences in the pattern and trend of gearing. It 
also appears that there are significant differences between companies in the CR 
and NCR categories and that there have been significant changes in gearing 
levels between Periodic Reviews of price limits. The models that have been 
developed to estimate the relationship between net debt and capital value have, 
therefore, been applied separately to each type and category of company and 
the parameters have been tested for significant differences. The models have 
also been designed to test for structural changes in the relationships following 
Periodic Reviews. 
4.5 The Models 
4.5.1 Unrestricted ADLM 
The starting point for the empirical analysis was an unrestricted ADLM of 
the following form: 
Dit ý)30 + 
ýlVit + ý2VA-l + ý3DU-l + ý4DU-2 + Uit) (4.3) 
where: 
Dit = the level of net debt reported by company i at the end of year t, 
Vit = the capital value of company i at the end of year t, 
uit = an error term. 
The general form of the ADLM in (4.3) incorporates a number of model 
types which can be obtained by placing various restrictions on the parameters. 
The SLRM, the PAM and the ECM are of particular interest for this study 
because, potentially, they provide plausible explanations of the data genera- 
tion process for capital structure decisions. These model types are, therefore, 
discussed in detail in subsections 4.5.2 to 4.5.5 below and the various restric- 
tions on the parameters of (4.3) relating to each model type are set out in 
Table 4.6 in subsection 4.5.6. 
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4.5.2 Static Long Run Model 
The SLRM simply assumes that, subject to an error term, Dit adjusts each 
period to maintain its long run equilibrium relationship with Vit: 
Dit = g*Vit + uit, (4.4) 
where g* represents the long-run equilibrium or target level of gearing. 
4.5.3 Partial Adjustment Model 
In the PAM Dit moves each period towards its target level, Di*t, by a constant 
proportion of the gap between Dit-1 and Dj*t: it 
Dit - Dit-, = a(Di*t - Dit-1). (4.5) 
If Di*t is itself determined by a target level of gearing, g*, that is: 
Di*t = g*Vit, (4.6) 
then substituting (4.6) into (4.5) and adding an error term gives the PAM: 
Dit = ag*Vit + (I - a) Dit-, + uit. (4.7) 
Gearing will converge to g* provided the adjustment factor, a, satisfies the 
condition 0<a<1. 
A possible rationale for the PAM was provided by Griliches (1967) using 
a very simplified example which assumed firstly, that the firm incurs costs 
both for deviating from and in moving towards Di*t and secondly, that these 
cost functions are quadratic. In this particular case, it means assuming that 
deviations from the target capital structure result in a higher cost of capital 
for the firm and that there are transactions costs in raising or repaying debt 
finance. As shown in appendix 4. B this produces a PAM in which a depends 
on the relative size of these two types of cost. 
However, as Waud (1966) points out, a relationship containing the variables 
in (4.7) can also be derived from an Adaptive Expectations Model (AEM) 
where the long run expected capital value of the firm Vj* is given by: t 
Vi*t - vit*-l ýA (Vit - vi*t-, ) 1 (4.8) 
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and 0<A<1. If it is then assumed that the level of net debt is determined 
by the firm's long run expected capital value, that is: 
Dit = g*Vit*) (4.9) 
combining (4.8) and (4.9) and adding an error term gives: 
Dit = Ag* Vit + (1 - A) Dit -, + uit. 
Fýrom an estimation perspective the two models in (4.7) and (4.10) cannot 
be distinguished although both will provide an estimate of the economically in- 
teresting parameter g*. However, even if the evidence is consistent with either 
model, the way in which capital investment is determined in the regulatory 
system would support the view that the PAM is the more likely description of 
the data generation process. 
4.5.4 Combined Partial Adjustment and Adaptive Expecta- 
tions Model 
Waud (1966) also shows that both the PAM and the AEM are special cases 
of a more general model in which they are both combined and where Di*t is no 
longer determined by Vit but by its unobserved expected value: 
*V* Dit g st, 
Combining (4.5), (4.8) with (4.11) and including an error term gives: 
Dit=aAg*Vit+(I-a+l-A)Dit-, -(I-a)(1-A)Dit-2+Uit) (4.12) 
adding the lagged variable Dit-2 to the simple partial adjustment model. The 
derivation of (4.12) is given in appendix 4.13- 
It should be noted that it is not possible to identify a and A separately 
from an estimate of (4.12) but only the values of aA and a+A. However, it 
is possible to obtain an estimate of g*. 
The formulation of the AEM in (4.8) adjusts expectations according to 
the difference between the actual capital value in the current period and the 
expected capital value in the previous period. However, the more conventional 
6error correction' version of the AEM uses the difference between the actual 
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and expected capital value in the previous period: 
v 
1* 
(4.13) -V* =A - vt t it-I 
(Vit-I i*-, ) - 
The difference between the two formulations depends on whether the dis- 
tributed lag model, from which the AEM can be derived, includes the actual 
capital value in the current period or not. The formulation in (4.8) is based 
on the distributed lag model: 
,t= bi V. 
* Vit + b2Vit-I + ... + 
bkVit-(k-1)5 (4.14) 
where bi are geometrically decreasing weights that reflect the adjustment factor 
A so that: 
bi = bi (I - A)'-' where b, = 
and the weights sum to unity, in which case: 
00 00 
Ebi = Ay 
The alternative formulation in (4.13) is derived by excluding the first term on 
the right hand side of (4.14). If this alternative is used then the capital value 
in the current period in (4.12) would be replaced by its lagged value, that is: 
Dit==aAg*Vit-, +(l-a+I-A)Dit-, -(I-a)(1-A)Dit-2+Uit- (4.17) 
4.5.5 Error Correction Model 
The ECM allows for both short-run and long-run effects by assuming that 
the change in Dit in each period reflects both the change in Vit and a partial 
adjustment towards its long run target so that: 
Dit - Dit-1 = -y (Vit - Vit-1) + a(Di*t-l - Dit-1), 
where 0< -ý <I and 0<a<1. As in the PAM, Di*t, is determined by (4.6) 
which, when substituted into (4.18) and adding an error term, gives the ECM 
relationship: 
ADit = -yAVit -a (Dit- I- g*Vit-1) + uit. (4.19) 
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This can also be expressed in distributed lag form as: 
Dit == -yVit + (ceg* - -ý) Vit- I+ (I - a) Dit- 1+ uit. (4.20) 
It follows that the PAM is a special case of the ECM in which y= ag*. 
The ECM is also of particular interest because, as Engle and Granger 
(1987) have shown, if two non-stationary variables are cointegrated then there 
must exist an ECM and vice versa. In terms of this model, Dit and Vit will 
be non-stationary if they contain stochastic trends and, in this case, they will 
both have unit roots if they are integrated of order 1, denoted 1 (1). According 
to Engle and Granger's (1987) definition of cointegration the two variables will 
be cointegrated of order Cl- (1,1) if the residuals fTom the regression of (4.4) 
are 1 (0) 9. 
A rationale for the ECM can be derived in a similar way to that described 
above for the PAM. As before it is assumed, firstly, that the firm incurs two 
types of cost; a higher cost of capital if it deviates from the optimal level of 
debt and transactions costs in moving towards the optimum. Secondly, it is 
assumed that these cost functions are quadratic. However, it is now assumed, 
in addition, that the cost of deviating from the optimum level of debt has two 
components; the cost of deviating from Dj*t-j and the effect on that cost of 
moving from Dj*t-1 to Di*t as a result of a change in Vit. Appendix 4.13 shows 
how an ECM can be derived on the basis of these assumptions. It is also 
shown that: 
9a depends on the relative size of the transactions costs and the cost of 
deviating from Di*t-l) 
4P 7 depends not only on these costs but also on the effect on the latter 
cost of moving fTom Di*t-l to Di*t because of a change in Vit, 
e the cost of deviating from the optimal level of debt is based on the 
deviation from the weighted average of D* and D* it it_, where the weight 
attached to Di*t is inversely related to g* and, conversely, the weight 
attached to Dj*t-1 varies directly with g*. Consequently, when g* is 
high, a change in the optimal level of debt following a change in Vt has 
a smaller effect on costs. This is consistent with an assumption that the 
9 More generally, if two variables are integrated of order a and the residuals are integrated 
of order a-b where b>0 then the two variables are cointegrated of order CI (a, b). 
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cost of debt rises with the target level of gearing and so the loss from 
not being at the optimum is lower. 
There is another model that produces a relationship containing the vari- 
ables in (4.20). If it is assumed, in addition, that Vit grows at a constant rate, 
I. L: 
Vit = (I + [I) Vit- 1, (4.21) 
and that Dit adjusts fully to the change in Vit , that is -y = g*, then: 
Dit - Dit-1 = g* (Vit - Vit-1) + a(Di*t-l - Dit-1). (4.22) 
Substituting (4.6) and (4.21) into (4.22) and adding an error term gives: 
Dit = ag*Vit + pg* (I - ce) Vit-1 + (1 - ce) Dit-, + uit. (4.23) 
Again (4.20) and (4.23) cannot be distinguished from an estimation perspective 
but, while both equations give consistent estimates of a, they imply different 
values for g*. However, the way in which capital investment is determined in 
the regulatory system suggests (4.21) would not be a reasonable assumption 
nor is there any obvious justification for assuming that -ý = g*. Consequently, 
even if the evidence is consistent with either model, the ECM would seem to 
be a more plausible description of the data generation process. 
4.5.6 Summary of model types 
The model types which are incorporated by the ADLM in (4.3) are summarized 
in Table 4.6 together with the associated restrictions on the parameters and 
the relationship between the parameters in (4.3) and those in each model type. 
Table 4.6: Sununary of Model Types 
Model type (Equation) Parameter restrictions Model parameters 
SLRM (4.4) 00= )32= ý3= 04= 0 31= g* 
PAM (4.7) 00= 02= 04= 0 01= ag*) 03= (I - 
Combined PAM and AEM (4.12) 00= 02= 0 01= 
134= 
oAg*1 03= (2 - ce + A), 
- (I - Ct) (I - A) 
Combined PAM and AEM (4.17) 00= 01= 0 ý2= 
134= 
aAg*) 03= (2 - ce + A) 
- (I - a) (1 - A) 
ECM (4.20) )30= 04= 0 ý1= -ý, ý2= (ag* -Y) 1 )33= 
(1 
- Cc) 
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4.5.7 Methodology 
The methodology used in this study has a number of features that should be 
noted. 
A single equation model of the kind decribed above can only indicate 
whether firms behave as though they have target levels of gearing. Evidence of 
target gearing ratios does not necessarily mean that a trade-off actually exists. 
This would require the target level of gearing to be specified as a function of 
the explanatory variables that determine the costs and benefits of increasing 
gearing. Unfortunately, a number of those variables, for example, agency costs 
and the costs of financial distress, are extremely difficult to measure. How- 
ever, adjustment models can provide evidence that the behaviour of firms is 
inconsistent with the pecking order theory since it predicts that firms do not 
have target gearing levels. Consequently, empirical studies often use single 
equation models and the PAM, in particular, has been used in several papers 
to test the trade-off theory e. g. Taggart (1977), Jalilvand and Harris (1984) 
and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)". 
Empirical studies which use the PAM generally start by making the im- 
plicit assumption that this is the most appropriate adjustment model to be 
tested although Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) recognize that the PAM is 
a very simplified model of adjustment and that more sophisticated models 
could be tested. However, this study follows a different approach and uses a 
'general-to-specific' model reduction procedure to identify which of the various 
models accommodated by the unrestricted ADLM in (4.3) provides the best 
explanation. 
A critical assumption in using a single equation model is that the vari- 
able Vit is at least weakly exogenous. Aside from the theoretical arguments 
that support the separation of investment and financing decisions, the regula- 
tory framework in the water industry operates in a way that makes such an 
assumption reasonable. Indeed, there are grounds for considering Vit to be 
strongly exogenous". Water companies have very little discretion over their 
investment programmes which, as noted above, are driven by the require- 
1013oth Taggart (1977) and Jalilvand and Harris (1984) estimate combined systems of 
partial adjustment equations relating to various balance sheet items using Zellner's seemingly 
unrelated regression technique. 
"In this context Vit would be weakly exogenous if it is not influenced by Dit but is 
influenced by lagged values of Dit. If Vit is not even influenced by lagged values of Dit it 
would be strongly exogenous. 
133 
ments of domestic and EU legislation. Indeed, following discussions with the 
DWI, the EA and Ofwat the government specifies at each Periodic Review the 
improvements in drinking and waste water quality that each company must 
achieve in the following five year period. When it sets price limits Ofwat then 
makes an explicit allowance for the investment it considers necessary to make 
these improvements and to maintain asset serviceability. Consequently, wa- 
ter companies only have discretion about the way they achieve the required 
improvements; giving them a strong incentive to maximize productive effi- 
ciency and keep costs below the amounts assumed in price limits. An effect of 
the regulatory system is, therefore, to reinforce the separation of each water 
company's investment and financing decisions. Fýirther, as noted above, the 
regulatory accounting information from which the data used in this study has 
been obtained excludes the effect of any discretionary investment relating to 
unregulated commercial activities even if this might be influenced by financing 
considerations. 
Another important implicit assumption in empirical studies which use ad- 
justment models is that the firms in the dataset all have the same adjustment 
coefficients, although Jalilvand and Harris (1984) allow for variations between 
firms according to factors such as firm size. As explained in sections 4.2 and 
4.4 this study allows for variations between companies by dividing each of the 
two types of water company into two categories within which it seems reason- 
able to assume the behaviour of companies is relatively homogeneous given 
the highly regulated nature of the water industry. It is assumed, therefore, 
that the coefficients are the same for all companies within each type and/or 
category. However, by estimating separate models, the adjustment and other 
coefficients are allowed to vary between each company type and/or category. 
The relatively short time period for which data on individual companies is 
available means that the results obtained by applying the models to each 
company separately are not very reliable as can be seen in section 4.7. 
This approach also makes it possible to estimate target gearing ratios for 
each category directly. In other empirical studies this is not possible because 
they use data from a cross-section of industries. Consequently, other studies 
separately calculate proxy numbers for each firm's target gearing ratio, for 
example as a moving average of its actual gearing ratio over a number of 
years, and then use these calculated numbers as input data. 
The possibility of structural changes in the model following the 1994 and 
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1999 Periodic Reviews has been tested by including dummy variables in (4.3) 
that allow for changes in the constant term and the slope coefficients between 
the three sub-periods. 
Empirical studies which use adjustment models to test the trade-off theory 
generally only apply the normal diagnostic tests to the estimates. A novel 
feature of this study is that it explicitly tests for cointegration between the 
variables to assess whether the results reflect a causal relationship and not 
merely stochastic trends in the data, although the reliability of these tests is 
limited by the relatively short time period for which data is available. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) argue that the empirical studies which 
support the trade-off theory do so by finding evidence of mean reversion in 
debt ratios or of firms appearing to follow partial adjustment mechanisms to- 
wards debt targets and do not test the explanatory power of other hypotheses. 
Using data on a 157 US firms over the period 1971 to 1989 they compare the 
explanatory power of the trade-off and pecking order theories using two single 
equation models. The simple PAM described above is used to test the trade- 
off theory while a model which relates changes in debt levels to a firm's funds 
flow deficit is used to test the pecking order theory 12 . They conclude that, 
while the PAM performs well, their pecking order model provides a better 
explanation of the debt-equity choice than the trade-off theory. It should be 
noted that their conclusions are not applicable to regulated utilities as such 
firms were specifically excluded from their data set. 
Although Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) make an important method- 
ological point about the advantage of comparing the explanatory power of 
different models there are a number of reasons it would be inappropriate to 
follow their approach in this study. Firstly, as noted in subsection 4.1.2, evi- 
dence of a target level of gearing for a regulated firm might not be inconsistent 
with the pecking order theory because of the possibility of firms seeking to ex- 
ert a price-influence effect. It is, therefore, also necessary to consider whether 
there is any evidence of such behaviour by water companies which requires a 
more judgmental approach. This issue is discussed in detail in section 4.8. Sec- 
ondly, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) accept that their pecking order model 
cannot be generally correct, especially at very low and very high gearing lev- 
12 Under the pecking order theory equity is issued as a last resort so the coefficient of the 
funds flow deficit variable should be equal or close to 1.0. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
obtain an estimate of 0.85. 
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els, and they consider it to be most applicable to companies with moderate 
debt ratios. This suggests it would not be appropriate to apply their model 
to water companies. As described in sections 4.1 and 4.2 the gearing of water 
companies has increased from very low levels following privatization in 1989 
to very high levels as a result of the capital restructurings that occurred after 
the 1999 Periodic Review. The data from water company June Returns also 
shows that only two WaSC's and five WoC's out of the 22 water companies 
have undertaken material share issues or buybacks prior to 2000/01 and only 
one WaSC and two WoC's have done so on more than one occasion. Conse- 
quently, it is likely that the absence of any equity transactions by most water 
companies would be interpreted by the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) model 
as supporting the pecking order theory even if water companies were actually 
moving towards a well-defined target level of gearing". Finally, Chirinko and 
Singha (2000) raise some serious questions about the pecking order model used 
by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and the conclusions they reach. 
4.6 The Results: Cross-section Panel Data 
4.6.1 Estimation procedure 
Initial equation 
The initial equation that has been estimated for each type and category of 
company is an unrestricted ADLM in the form of (4.3) but including dummy 
variables to allow for structural changes following the 1994 and 1999 Periodic 
Reviews. The equation can be written as follows. Firstly, stacking the data 
according to time for company z, where i=II... 22, gives an equation with 
15 parameters: 
Di = Xi, 30 + TliXiol + T2iXi)32 + Uii (4.24) 
13 Specifically Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) argue the funds flow deficit variable in 
their pecking order model is not an accounting identity because it excludes equity issues or 
repurchases. Consequently, the absence of such transactions for most water companies in 
the period being studied means it is likely that the pecking order coefficient would be close 
to 1.0. 
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where the vectors and matrices are: 
Di3 D i4 Dit DiM 
1 V13 Vi2 Di2 Dil 
1 V14 Vi 3 Di3 Di2 
xi 
1 Vi t Vit-l Dit- 1 
Dit-2 
LI 
Vi 13 Vi 12 Di12 Dill 
00 1)3 00 010 
020 ý30 
)340 
)91 
10 
01 
ý11 ý21 031 041 
021 [002 ý12 
)322 
032 042 
Uý % 
[Ui3 
Ui4 - Uit - Uil3 
The matrices Tji and T2i contain the durmny variables that allow for changes 
in the constant term and slope coefficients between the three sub-periods and 
are common to all companies. 
As the explanatory variables include the dependent variable with a two 
period lag, equation (4.24) has 11 observations from t=3,..., 13 (i. e. 1992/93 
- 2002/03). Consequently, Tjj and T2j are I1xI1 diagonal matrices where 
the diagonal elements are, respectively, the dummy variables TIt and T2t for 
t= 31 ... 13 which are determined as follows: 
Tlt =0 when t= 11 ..., 5 
(i. e. 1990/91-1994/95) and t 13 (i. e. 2000/01-2002/03) 
= lwhent=6, ... 1 10 
(i. e. 1995/96-1999/00), 
T2t =0 when t= 1,..., 10 (i. e. 1990/91-1999/00), 
=1 when t= Ill... ) 13 
(i. e. 2000/01-2002/03). 
Secondly, stacking all 22 companies together then gives the initial equation to 
be estimated as: 
D=X, 30 + T, X, 31 + T2X)32 +U5 (4.25) 
which can be written in the general form: 
D=W, 3+u, (4.26) 
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where: 
w= [X T1X T2X] 9 
11 
la 
[13' 
iß' J32 ' 
For these purposes each row of W is denoted by the vector wit. 
Estimation method and assumptions 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) has been used to estimate (4.26) for each type 
and category of company using the relevant pooled data. However, when the 
explanatory variables are not fixed but random, OLS will only provide a con- 
sistent estimate of 3 and the usual OLS statistics will only be valid if certain 
assumptions apply. In this case, where OLS is applied to the data pooled 
across i= 11 ... 5 22 and t= 31 ... 13, the assumptions can be summarized, 
following Wooldridge (2002), as: 
Assumption IE (wituit) = 
13 
Assumption 2 rank 1: E 
(witwit) 15. 
t=3 
Assumption 3(a): E 
(U2 
W 
'tW, 
t U2 E it i 
(Witwit) 
where a2=E (U2 ) for all i and all t. it 
Assumption 3(b): E (uitui, Witwi, 01 t =ý- S. 
Assumptions I and 2 are necessary for OLS to provide a consistent estimate 
of 0. Assumption I states that the error term uit is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables in wit. It also implies the error term has mean zero, 
that is E (ui) = 0, as wit includes a constant. Assumption 2 excludes linear 
dependencies amongst the explanatory variables. 
The usual OLS tests are only valid if Assumptions 3(a) and 3(b) apply. 
Assumption 3(a) means there is no heteroscedasticity in the error term while 
Assumption 3(b) excludes any autocorrelation in the error term. Together 
they imply E (Uiui )= U2111. In other words, it is assumed the the variance 
of the error term is the same for each firm and in each time period and that 
the error terms for each firm are independently and identically distributed 
over time. It should be noted that Assumption 3 is necessary for the usual 
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OLS tests to be valid asymptotically. However, the initial equation to be 
estimated for each type and category of company only has 11 observations for 
each company which leaves few degrees of freedom. Consequently, the test 
results might not be completely reliable. 
If the assumption of no heteroscedasticity in Assumption 3(a) fails the 
OLS estimator of 3 would still be consistent but it would be inefficient. In 
addition, the usual estimates of the variance would be biased but it is possible 
to correct for this problem by calculating heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors as described, for example, in White (1980). 
As the explanatory variables in (4.26) include lagged dependent variables, 
failure of Assumption 3(b) from autocorrelation in the error term would also 
lead to failure of Assumption 1. This is because the lagged dependent variable 
Dit-1 would then be correlated with the error term uit. In this case OLS 
would not even provide a consistent estimate of 0. 
Model reduction 
A stepwise procedure has been used for model reduction in which the least 
significant variable in the initial equation, as indicated by the t-value of its 
coefficient, is eliminated and the equation is then re-estimated. The proce- 
dure is repeated and the variables are eliminated in turn until an equation is 
obtained which only contains variables with significant t-values. Where diag- 
nostic tests indicate the presence of heteroscedasticity then t-tests based on 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for this purpose. 
As the initial equation contains a two period lag the reduction proce- 
dure uses equations based on 11 observations for each company. However, as 
the variable Dit-2 is eliminated by the procedure, the last equation in each 
category has been re-estimat6d to include an additional observation for each 
company and these are the final estimates that are described below. Table 4.7 
shows the number of observations used in the estimation process. 
Modelling package 
The modelling package PeGive 10.3 has been used to calculate the OLS esti- 
mate of (4.26) for each type and category of company and to carry out the 
model reduction procedure. The package carries out the usual diagnostic tests 
including tests for the presence of heteroscedasticity, based on White (1980), 
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Table 4.7: Number of observations 
Category No of companies Model reduction Final estimate 
WaSC CR 5 55 60 
WaSC NCR 5 55 60 
All WaSCIs 10 110 120 
WoC CR 6 66 72 
WoC NCR 6 66 72 
All WoC's 12 132 144 
and the Regression Specification Test (RESET) for specification error due to 
Ramsey (1969). 
Two tests against heteroscedasticity are provided. The 'Hetero test' uses 
an auxilliary regression of the squares of the residuals on the original re- 
gressors and all their squares to test the null of homoscedasticity while the 
'Hetero-X' tests uses a regression of the squares of the residuals on the all 
squares and cross-products of the original regressors. PcGive also provides 
the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors described in White (1980) and 
MacKinnon and White (1985) and the associated t-statistics. 
The RESET in PcGive tests the null that the model is correctly specified 
against the alternative that the square of the predicted value of the dependent 
variable has been omitted. Although the RESET is often used as a test for a 
wide range of specification problems, Wooldridge (2002) argues that it should 
be viewed as a test of whether the relationship between the dependent and 
the explanatory variables in the regression is linear. 
The PcGive software package incorporates a module, DPD v1.22, which 
estimates panel data models. This module has also been used in the com- 
putation of the final estimates following model reduction because it provides 
additional diagnostic tests which recognize the panel nature of the data. These 
include tests for serial correlation, as described in Arellano, and Bond (1991), 
and a Wald test of the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero. The 
estimates of the parameters are, of course, unaffected. The t-statistics that 
are calculated by this module, and which are given in the Tables of results 
below, correct for heteroscedasticity by using the robust variance estimator in 
Arellano (1987) which is similar, but not identical, to that in White (1980). As 
before the RESET and the tests for heteroscedasticity on the final estimates 
were obtained from the OLS estimates using the pooled data. 
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4.6.2 Results based on HC" 
Initial equation 
The PcGive outputs containing the OLS estimates of (4.26) for each type and 
category of company when HCAV is used as the measure of capital value are 
given in appendix 4. C. 1. 
The initial equations for 'All WaSCV, 'All WoUs' and for the WaSC CR 
and NCR categories accept the test against heteroscedasticity and the RE- 
SET. However, the initial equation for the WoC CR category fails the RESET 
while that for the WoC NCR category shows evidence of heteroscedasticity. 
The t-statistics in all six equations are low indicating that model reduction is 
required. Although the RESET indicates the initial equation for the WoC CR 
category is misspecified the model reduction procedure has still been applied 
for information purposes. 
The model reduction procedure described above is only valid if the initial 
equation provides consistent estimates of 0. As explained above the presence 
of lagged dependent variables among the regressors means that this will not be 
the case when there is serial correlation in the error term. Three tests for first 
order serial correlation have, therefore, been applied to the initial estimates of 
(4.26), the first two of which are suggested in Wooldridge (2002). Writing the 
serial correlation model as: 
Uit = puit- i+ Cit) 
where Eit is an error term, the three tests are as follows: 
The residuals U-it- I from the initial equations are included in (4.26) as 
an additional explanatory variable. The coefficient of U-it-I from this 
regression then provides an estimate of p to which a t-test can be applied. 
2. An estimate of p is obtained from the regression of iiit on u-it-I using the 
pooled data and a t-test is applied to the coefficient of u-it-114 - 
3. Separate estimates of p are calculated for each company from regressions 
14 Wooldridge (2002) points out that, unlike the first test, the second test is only valid 
if it is assumed that the explanatory variables in equation (4-26) are strictly exogenous. 
This is effectively the same as assuming fixed regressors. Assumption 1 only requires con- 
temporaneous exogenity and says nothing about the relationship between wit and uj, for 
t j4 s. 
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of U-it on u'it- 1 based on the residuals relating to each company obtained 
from the initial equations - 
The results of the tests for serial correlation are given in appendix 4. C. 2. 
The first two tests show no evidence of significant serial correlation in any of 
the six initial equations. Although the third test provides some evidence of se- 
rial correlation the extent of the problem is quite limited. Just two companies 
show evidence of serial correlation using the residuals from the All WaSC's 
equation and there is no evidence of serial correlation for any of the WaSC's 
when the residuals from the equations for the CR and NCR categories are 
used. The All WoC's equation exhibits serial correlation in the residuals for 
only one company while the residuals from the WoC NCR equation show serial 
correlation for a different company. However, the residuals from the W6C CR 
equation indicate there is no serial correlation for companies in that category. 
These results suggest it is reasonable to conclude that the initial equations 
do provide consistent estimates of )3 and that the model reduction procedure 
is acceptable. 
Form of final equation 
The results of the model reduction procedure when HCAV is used as the mea- 
sure of Vit are given in appendix 4. C. 3. It shows the effects of the eliminating 
each variable on three information criteria viz. the Schwarz criterion (SC), the 
Hanna-Quinn criterion (HQC) and the Akaike information criterion (AIC). 
When applied to the initial equation for All WaSC's the model reduction 
procedure is relatively straightforward. At each stage in the procedure the 
elimination of the least significant variable produces an improvement in the 
SC while last equation produces no improvement in the HQC and a small 
deterioration in the AIC. The final equation has the following form: 
Dit =, 3, OHCAVit+ý,, HCAVitTlt+012HCAVitT2t+1320HCAVit-, +)33ODit-l+Uýit7 
(4.27) 
which can be regarded as an ECM in distributed lag form comparable to (4.20). 
However, when the procedure is applied to the CR and the NCR categories 
it seems that having to use a much smaller number of observations makes 
the elimination of variables more sensitive to collinearity problems. In the 
WaSC CR category the variable HCAVitTit is eliminated and HCAVit-, Tlt 
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retained. These two variables are highly collinear; the correlation coefficient 
being 0.997. Similarly, the variable HCAVitT2t is eliminated in the WaSC 
NCR category while Dit-2T2t is retained. Again there is high collinearity 
between these variables; the correlation coefficient being 0.980. These high 
collinearities and the results for All WaSC's indicate that it is reasonable to 
reinstate the variables HCAVitTlt and HCAVitT2t in their respective cate- 
gories in place of those selected by the model reduction procedure. There is, 
however, a slight deterioriation in the three information criteria following the 
re-instatement. The procedure also produces a relatively large deterioration 
in all three criteria following the elimination of Dit-2T2t in the WaSC CR cat- 
egory on the basis of a t-statistic adjusted for heteroscedasticity. There is also 
a small deterioration following the elimination of TIt WaSC NCR category. 
The final estimates for the CR and the NCR categories are, therefore, based 
on an equation with the same form as that derived for All WaSC's in (4.27). 
Unlike the WaSC's, HCAVitTIt is not a significant variable when the pro- 
cedure is applied to All WoC's. Again, the procedure is relatively straightfor- 
ward and produces an improvement in all three information criteria after the 
elimination of each variable, but also indicates that the variable HCAVit_1T2t 
should be retained. However, HCAVit_1T2t has been eliminated from the fi- 
nal estimate because it is not significant when the last equation is re-estimated 
using the larger number of observations available at this stage. When applied 
to the WoC CR category the procedure is also relatively straightforward and 
similarly produces an improvement in all three information criteria after the 
elimination of each variable. The final equations for All WoC's and for the 
WoC CR category, therefore, have the following form: 
Ui Dit=ý, OHCAVit+012HCAVitT2t+ý20HCAVit-, +ý3ODit-, +iit, (4.28) 
that is, equation (4.27) with 311 = 0. 
Applying the model reduction procedure to the WoC NCR category pro- 
duces an estimated equation in the form of a simple PAM with only the vari- 
ables HCAVit and Dit-1 being retained. However, there is a relatively large 
deterioration in all three information criteria after the elimination of Dit-2TIt 
using a t-statistic adjusted for heteroscedasticity. The elimination of the con- 
stant term at the last stage in the procedure also produces a small deterioration 
in the AIC but small improvements in the other two criteria. It is possible that 
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the elimination of HCAVit-, occurs because it is highly collinear with Dit-1. 
The correlation coefficient is 0.971. Consequently, an equation in the form of 
(4-28) has been estimated instead and shows, as would be expected for this 
category, that HCAVjtT2t is not significant but that the three other variables, 
HCAVit, HCAVit-1 and Dit-1, are all significant. Eliminating HCAVitT2t 
from this equation, however, produces a small deterioration in the information 
criteria. The outcome of the reduction procedure for the WoC NCR category 
is, therefore, less clear than for other categories but, based on the results for 
All WoC's and the WoC CR category, a final equation of the following form 
has been selected: 
Dit = ý10HCAVit+ ý20HCAVjt-, + ý30Djt-j + U-it, (4.29) 
which is equation (4.27) with ý11 = ý12 = 0. A model in the form of an 
ECM also has the benefit noted above that, according to Engle and Granger 
(1987), such a model must exist if it can be shown that Dit and HCAVit are 
cointegrated. 
The final estimates of (4.27), (4.28) and (4.29), therefore, provide estimates 
of the parameters of the corresponding ECM. However, the form of these 
equations also imposes a number of restrictions on the parameters. 
Firstly, in all equations the constant term is elirriinated'5. This is consistent 
with empirical findings for the PAM in other studies, such as Jalilvand and 
Harris (1984) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and with the form of the 
ECM derived in (4.20). 
Secondly, in all equations 030 >0 and 031 = ý32 =0 (i. e. the slope 
dummies are not significant). Consequently, the coefficient of Dit-I does not 
vary between sub-periods which implies that the long-run adjustment factor in 
(4.20), does not change following Periodic Reviews. In terms of the notation 
used in (4.20) the long-run adjustment factor is, therefore, estimated by: 
ý30- (4.30) 
Thirdly, in all equations ý10 > 0. In (4.27) both the associated slope 
dummies are significant as ý11,012 >0 implying that the short-run adjustment 
factor in (4.20) varies between sub-periods for both WaSC categories and for 
"The calculation of the Adjusted R2 statistic has been amended accordingly. 
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All WaSC's. Again, following the notation used in (4.20), the estimates of the 
short-run adjustment factor for each sub-period are denoted by: 
ý101 (4.31) 
'Yi ý10 + 0115 (4.32) 
ýY2 010+1312- (4.33) 
However, since, 311 =0 and ý12> 0 in (4.28), the short-run adjustment factors 
only vary between the second and third sub-periods in the WoC CR category 
and for All WoC's (i. e. ^to = -yl). Further, there are no changes in the short 
run adjustment factors in any of the sub-periods for the WoC NCR category 
taken on its own asOll = 012 =0 in (4.29) (i. e. "YO = 'Y1 = 7Y2)- 
Finally, in all equations ý20> 0 but021 = )322= 0 which implies that the 
parameter (ag* - -y) in (4.20) is unchanged between sub-periods and, there- 
fore, that the following relationship holds: 
(4.34) ý20 --":: a90 - 70 ý agl* - "Yl ýa2- ýy23 
where go*, gl* and g; are the estimates of the target levels of HCAV gearing in 2 
each sub-period. The target level of HCAV gearing, therefore, varies between 
sub-periods for the WaSC categories. In addition, it follows from (4.34) that 
increases in the target gearing level are proportional to the change in the 
short-run adustment factor. However, from (4.28), the target gearing level 
only varies between the second and third sub-periods in the WoC CR category 
and for All WoC's (i. e. go* = gl* since -yo == -yl) while (4.29) indicates target 
gearing does not change in any of the sub-periods for the WoC NCR category 
(i. e. g* = g* = g* since -yo = 71 = ýY2)- 012 
Final estimates 
The results of the model reduction procedure where HCAV is used as the 
measure of capital value are set out in Table 4.8. The outputs from PcGive 
are given in appendix 4. C. 4. 
145 
Table 4.8: Distributed lag ECM results based on HCAV 
Uriit Dagnostic 
Equation Variable Adi Listed ADF root tests 
HCAV, HCAV,, Tlt HCAV,, T2t HCAV,., D, 
-, 
le t-test t-test re*ted 
WaSCs 
CR Coefficient 0.717 0.045 0.118 -0.696 0.850 0.992 -6.67 [11 -2.59 N [1], H [1], EX [5ý 
t-statistic 8.61 4.95 4.14 -6.70 14.70 
NCR Coefficient 0.419 0.058 0,061 -0.386 0.861 0.990 -7.40 [11 -5.52 [51 N [11 
t-statistic 17.60 8.18 9.59 -13.60 34.30 
All WaSCs Coefficient 0.640 0.051 0.083 -0.627 0.894 0.990 -10.00 [1) -3.67 [10] N [1], HX [5) 
t-statistic 6.87 5.38 6.40 -6.09 31.00 
WOCS 
CR Coefficient 0.894 - 0.114 -0.873 0.864 0.948 -6.42 [1] -6.16 [11 N [1], R [5] 
t-statistic 8.08 3.35 -7.87 39.20 
NCR Coefficient 0.391 - -0.306 0.821 0.987 -4.54 [1] -1.68 N [1], H [11, HX [11 
t-statigtic 4.00 -4.40 7.71 
A] I WoCs Coefficient 0.806 0.070 -0.758 0.810 0.977 -9.01 [1] -2.48 N (1), H [51, HX [1) 
t-statistic 8.01 3.19 -7.05 10.50 
NOTES 
t-statistic Calculated Lising robust standard errors from panel data models. 
Adjusted R2 2 Calculated from 1- Adi1e =(1- If) (n-1)/(n-k) where 1- Fe RSS / ED , 
RSS is the Residual Sum of Squares, n is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. 
ADF t-test Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on t-statistic for the coefficient of residual, -, with 
Aresidualý as the regressand. 
Critical values (for test including a constant) are from Nbr+ýinnon (1991) . 
Unit root t-test, Test on t-statistic for the coefficient of D, -, with 
AD, as the regressand instead of D, 
Critical values (for test with no deterministic components) are from Ericsson and NbdGmon (1999) 
Diagnostic tests 
Abbrvn 
OLS models Norrnality N Tests the null that the distribution of the residuals is normal. 
pooled data Hetero H Tests the null of horrioscedasticity using squares of regressors. 
lietero-X HK Tests the null of I-iorroscedasticity using squares and cross-products of regressors. 
RESEr R Tests the null that the model is correctly speci6ed against omitting the square of the 
predicted value of the dependent variable. 
Pariel data models Wald Uoint) W All the rriodels reject the null that all the coefficients are zero at the 1% significance level. 
A14 1) Al Tests the null of no first order serial correlation All the models accept these tests. 
ARý2) A2 Tests the mill of no second order serial correlation 
gignificance levels 1% Ill 
5% [5] 
10% 1101 
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Diagnostic tests 
The diagnostic tests that have been applied to the final estimates are shown 
in Table 4.8. They indicate the most serious problem is heteroscedasticity 
with three of the six equations failing the test using the squares of the regres- 
sors and four equations failing the test based on the squares and the cross- 
products of the regressors. The t-statistics that are given in the Table correct 
for this problem by using robust standard errors 16 . All equations except those 
for the WaSC NCR and the WoC CR categories fail the heteroscedasticity 
tests. The results for the individual companies discussed below indicate that 
the heteroscedasticity problem has arisen because of the different sizes of the 
companies in each category. However, only the WoC CR equation fails the 
RESET as did the initial equation for that category. There is no evidence of 
serial correlation in any of the equations and in all cases a Wald test decisively 
rejects the mill hypothesis that all of the coefficients are zero. 
Tests for cointegration 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests have been carried out on the variables 
Dit and HCAVit and the form of the tests and the results are shown in ap- 
pendix 4. D. The results indicate the presence of unit roots in both variables, 
that is, both variables are non-stationary and, therefore, contain stochastic 
trends. The tests were applied to the pooled data for each type and category 
of company and also to individual companies. 
In order to determine whether the estimated equations in Table 4.8 reflect 
a causal relationship and are not spurious, in the sense that they are simply the 
result of stochastic trends, it is necessary to test whether Dit and HCAVit are 
cointegrated. Three approaches to testing for cointegration have been used. 
However, the reliability of these tests is limited by the relatively short time 
period for which data is available and so the results should only be regarded 
as indicative. 
16 Studies based on adjustment models generally try to eliminate the heteroscedasticity 
problem by normalizing the data using a scalar variable such as asset value (i. e. converting 
the data to ratios). Test checks were carried out on the final estimates using this approach 
and, while the heteroscedasticity problem was reduced, there was very little change in the 
estimated coefficients. 
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1. ADF tests on the residuals from the final estimates. 
2. The Engle-Granger procedure. 
3. Unit root t-test on the coefficient of Dit-, in the ECM 
The first approach simply applies ADF tests to the residuals, U-it, of the 
equations in Table 4.8 using the pooled data17. Although this is not strictly 
a test for cointegration it is suggestive as it tests whether the residuals are 
stationary and, therefore, indicates whether it would be worthwhile to conduct 
more sophisticated tests. As shown in the colunm headed'ADF t-test'in Table 
4.8 these tests reject the null hypothesis that the residuals from all equations 
are non-stationary at the 1% significance level. As the residuals are, therefore, 
almost certainly stationary two further tests for cointegration were carried out. 
The second approach uses Stage I of the two-stage procedure in Engle 
and Granger (1987) by estimating the long-run relationship between Dit and 
HCAVit and then testing whether the residuals are stationary. The results in 
Table 4.8 indicate the long-run relationship for all the WaSC equations should 
be estimated in the following form: 
Dit = b, HCAVit + b2HCAVitTIt + b3HCAVitT2t + -eit, (4.35) 
where -eit are the residuals. Similarly, for All WoC's and the WoC CR category 
the long-run relationship should be (4.35) with b2 =0 while that for WoC NCR 
category should be (4.35) with b2 = b3 = 0- 
The Engle-Granger Stage I results are set out in Table 4.9. As no lagged 
variables are included in these equations it is possible to add another obser- 
vation and all 13 observations for each company have been used. 
The ADF tests on the residuals of the equations in Table 4.9 show that 
only two of the equations reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration viz. 
the equations for All WaSC's and for the WaSC NCR category. The equation 
for All WaSC's was only significant at the 10% level. The critical values are 
derived from the response surfaces in MacKinnon (1991). The critical values 
are given in appendix 4. E and they are from the response surface for an ADF 
17 The form of an ADF test is explained in Appendix 4.1). None of the equations in Table 
4.8 contain a constant term and so the residuals have a non-zero means. The ADF test 
regressions, therefore, include a constant term. 
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Table 4.9: Engle-Granger Stage I results based on HCAV 
Variable A4 usted ADF tests 
Equation HCAV,, HCAV,, Tlt HCAVJ2, If t-test rejected 
WaSCs 
CR Coefficient 0.225 0.167 0.392 0.963 -2.49 H [1], FIX [1] 
týstatistic 5-38 5.13 6.58 
NCR Coefficient 0.129 0.238 0.37 9 0.950 -10.00 [1] Al [51, H [1], HX [1], R [1] 
t-statistic 5.90 8.56 22.40 
All %SCI Coefficient 0.152 0.220 0.392 0.947 -4.90 [10) Al [1], H [1], HX [1) 
t, statistic 6.68 8-97 18.00 
WOCS 
CR Coefficient 0-353 0.162 0.855 -3.04 Al [51, N [1], H [5], HX [51, R [1] 
t-statistic 5.14 2.00 
NCR Cbefficient 0.460 - 0.967 -2.16 N [51, H [1), FIX [1] 
t-statistic 26.00 
All WoCh Coefficient 0.433 0.046 0.936 -3.56 Al J5], A2 [5], N [1], H Ill, HX [11, R [11 
t-sbatistic 18.10 1.47 
NOTES 
t-statistic Calculated usirg iobust staridard enors from pwrl data ri-Ddels. 
Adjusted R? Calculated from 1- Adjlf =(1- Fe) (n-1)/(n-k) Arýre 1- If = RSS t2' 
RSS is the Residual Sum of Squar'es, n is the nunter of ol: Bervations and k is tf ic number of regressors. 
ADF t- test Augnp-nted Dickey-Fuller test on t-statistic for the coefficient of the residuak, with Aresidu4t as the regressý 
Critical values (for test includirig a constant) are from Nb)dGnrrn (1991). 
Diagnostic tests 
Al±iL vn 
OLS nDdels 1\bnTality N Tests tl-e ral th3t the distribution of the residuals is n=E? l. 
pooled data 17ý H Tests the rull of hormscedasticity usirig squu-es of regressDrs. 
Fktero-X HX Tests the null of hormscedasticity using squares and cross-products of regressors. 
RE= R Tests tlýe null th# the niodel is correctly specified against orrittirig the square of the 
predicted value of tl-e deFendent variable. 
PbM data niodels ýWd (joint) W All the m)dels reject the null that all the coefficients are zero at the 1% significance level. 
AR(l) Al Tests the ail of nD first orcler serial correlation. 
AR(2) A2 Tests tl-e null of no second orck-z serial correlation. 
Sgrificance levels 1% Ill 
5% 151 
lro [101 
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test including a constant '8. 
A problem with the Engle-Granger approach, as Ericsson and MacKin- 
non (1999) point out, is that it imposes a common factor restriction on the 
dynamics of the relationship. In this particular case, the common factor is 
[1 - (I - a) L] where L is the lag operator and, as shown in appendix 4. F, this 
restriction has the effect of imposing the condition in (4.19) that: 
ýy ý9*1 (4.36) 
that is, the short-run adjustment factor is the same as the long run effect 
in equilibrium. It is likely that this assumption is invalid, in which case as 
Ericsson and MacKinnon (1999) note, the Engle-Granger approach will have a 
loss of power relative to the test based on the ECM which is considered below 
(i. e. it is less likely to reject the null of no cointegration when it is false). 
It should also be noted, in small samples such as in this study, the estimates 
of the parameters are likely to be biased and the standard significance tests will 
be invalid because the terms describing the short-run dynamics are omitted in 
Stage I equations. This effect is illustrated in Table 4.9 by the relatively large 
number of failures in the diagnostic tests. 
The third approach to testing for cointegration is based on the ECM. 
When the ECM is transformed by using ADit as the regressand instead of 
Dit, a direct estimate of the long-run adjustment factor can obtained together 
with a t-statistic which can be tested for significance. For example, the final 
equation for the WaSC's (4.27) can also be estimated as: 
ADit O, OHCAVit + ý11HCAVjtTlt + 1312HCAVitT2t + 020HCAVit-I 
+ ý30) Dit-, + uit, (4.37) 
which, using (4.30), gives a directly as the coefficient of Dit-1. It is, there- 
fore, possible to test for the presence of a unit root because the condition 
0<a<I must hold if the model is to converge to a long-run equilibrium. If 
the significance test indicates a=0 then the null hypothesis of no cointegra- 
tion between the variables Dit and HCAVit should be accepted, while a>0 
18 The form of an ADF test is explained in Appendix 4.1). As there is no constant term 
in the equations for the Engle-Granger Stage I models, the residuals have non-zero means. 
The ADF test regressions, therefore, include a constant term. 
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implies it should be rejected and that the variables are cointegrated19. This is 
the 'Unit root t-test' in PcGive. The t-values of the coefficients of Dit-, are 
compared with critical values derived from the response surfaces in Ericsson 
and MacKinnon (1999). The critical values are given in appendix 4-E and 
are calculated from the response surface for an ECM with no deterministic 
components as there is no constant in the estimated equation. The results are 
given in the colunm headed 'Unit root t-test' in Table 4.8 and show that, in 
addition to the equations identified by the Engle-Granger approach, the equa- 
tion for the WoC CR category rejects the null of no cointegration. However, 
the equation for All WaSC's is again only significant at the 10% level. Accord- 
ing to this test, therefore, half of the equations tested demonstrate evidence 
of cointegration between Dit and HCAVit. 
A final point worth noting is that the significance of the dummy variables 
in the estimated equations indicates the presence of structural breaks in the 
time series data and, therefore, in the residuals. Perron (1989) has shown that 
structural breaks can result in a loss of power in testing for unit roots making 
such tests more likely to accept the null of no cointegration. 
Adjustment factors 
Direct estimates of the short-run adjustment factors and the long run adjust- 
ment factor can be obtained from the estimated equations for the ECM in 
Table 4.8 by using (4.31), (4.32), (4.33) and (4.30). The estimates are set out 
in Table 4.10. 
As noted earlier the long-run adjustment factor is constant throughout the 
period in all equations while the short-run adjustment factors vary between 
sub-periods depending on the significance of the dummy variables in each _ 
equation. 
19 Appendix 4. F illustrates how this tests for cointegration when (4.36) applies. 
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Table 4.10: Estimated adjustment factors based on HCAV 
Equation Short run adjustment 
70 Y1 Y2 
Long run 
adjustment 
(X 
WaSCs 
CR 0.717 0.762 0.835 0.150 
NCR 0.419 0.476 0.480 0.139 
All WaSCs 0.640 0.690 0.722 0.106 
wocs 
CR 0.894 0.894 1.008 0.136 
NCR 0.391 0.391 0.391 0.179 
All WoCs 0.806 0.806 0.876 0.190 
The significance of the differences between the CR and the NCR categories 
was tested by re-estimating the equations for All WaSC's and All WoC's with 
the addition of slope dummy variables to distinguish companies in the CR 
category. The results are shown in Table 4.11. The coefficients and t-statistics 
of the variables without the CR dummy are shown in the 'No CR dununy' 
lines while those of the variables with the CR dummy applied are shown in 
the 'CR dumnky' lines. The coefficients and t-statistics of the former variables 
are therefore the same as those in the equations for the WaSC NCR and the 
NV6C NCR categories in Table 4.8. For comparison purposes Table 4.11 also 
gives the coefficients and t-statistics of the equations for the WaSC CR and 
the WoC CR categories in Table 4.8. This confirms that the sum of the two 
coefficients for each variable (i. e. with and without the CR dummy) in the re- 
estimated All WaSC's and All WoC's equations equals the coefficient of that 
variable in the respective equations for the CR categories. 
Table 4.11 shows that there is no significant difference between the coef- 
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Table 4.11: Differences between CR and NCR categories based on HCAV 
Equation HCAVit HCAVitTIt HCAVjtT2t HCAVit-1 Dit-1 
All WaSCs 
No CR dummy Coefficient 0.419 0.058 0.061 -0.386 0.861 
t-statistic 17.60 8.18 9.59 -13.60 34.30 
CR dummy Coefficient 0.299 -0.013 0.057 -0.310 -0.011 
t-statistic 3.45 -1.10 1.94 -2.88 -0.18 
WaSC CR Coefficient 0.717 0.045 0.118 -0.696 0.850 
t-statistic 8.61 4.95 4.14 -6-70 14-70 
All WoCs 
No CR dummy Coefficient 0.391 - - -0.306 0.821 
t-statistic 4.00 - - -4.40 7.71 
CR dummy Coefficient 0.502 - 0.114 -0.567 0.043 
t-statistic 3.40 - 3.35 -4.33 0.39 
WoC CR Coefficient 0.894 - 0.114 -0.873 0.864 
t-statistic 8.08 - 3.35 -7.87 39.20 
ficients of Dit-1 in the CR and the NCR categories indicating no significant 
difference in the long-run adjustment factors. Indeed, the long-run factors 
for both the WaSC and the WoC CR and NCR categories are all within the 
relatively narrow range of 0.14-0.18; the average being 0.15. 
The short-run adjustment factors are higher than those for the long run 
in all categories indicating a more rapid response to short-run movements 
in HCAVit. The short-run factors for the WaSC NCR and the WoC NCR 
categories are close in the first sub-period; being respectively 0.42 and 0.39. 
The difference in the first sub-period is wider in the CR category where the 
factor for the WaSC's is 0.72 while that for the WoUs is 0.89. 
The short-run factors for the two CR categories are significantly higher 
than for the comparable NCR categories in all three sub-periods indicating 
that companies which have undertaken a capital restructuring since 1999/00 
have consistently exhibited a faster response to short-run changes in HCAVit 
over the whole period. 
The WaSC CR category shows a rising short-run factor that increases 
significantly after each Periodic Review and reaches 0.84 in the third sub- 
period. In the WaSC NCR category the short-run factors only increase from 
0.42 to 0.48 in both the second and third sub-periods but the increase over the 
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first sub-period is still significant20. As the CR slope dummy on HCAVitTlt 
in the WaSC equation is not significant, the increase in the short-run factor 
between the first and second sub-periods is not significantly different between 
the two categories. However, the increase in the short-run factor appears to 
21 be significantly greater in the third-sub period for the CR category 
The short-run factor for WoC CR category remains at 0.89 in the second 
sub-period as the variable HCAVitTlt is not significant but it rises to 1.0 in 
the third sub-period when Dit is, therefore, moving in step with HCAVit. The 
short-run factor for the WoC NCR category remains stable at 0.39 in all three 
sub-periods as the variables HCAVitTlt and HCAVjtT2t are not significant. 
Target HCAV gearing levels 
The parameters of the SLRM can be obtained from the estimated ECM's in 
Table 4.8. In the three WaSC equations the coefficients of HCAVit- 1 and 
Dit-, are constant in all sub-periods and the only significant dununy variables 
are the slope dummies applied to HCAVitTIt and HCAVitT2t. Consequently, 
from (4.27), (4.30), (4.31), (4.32), (4.33) and (4.34), the estimated target levels 
of HCAV gearing for each sub-period, denoted go*, gl* and g;, are: 2 
ý310 + 020 (4.38) 90 1-030 
ý10 + Oll + 020 
91 - (4.39) 1-030 
010 + 012 + 020 
92 - (4.40) ý30 
20 The CR slope dummy on HCAVjtT2t gives the difference between the short-run factors 
in the first and third sub-periods. The difference between the short-run factors in the second 
and third sub-periods was tested by reconfiguring the TIt dummy so that the coefficient 
on HCAVjtT2t represented the marginal increase over that on HCAVitTlt. The relevant 
t-statistic for the WaSC CR category was 2.78. The comparable t-statistic for the WaSC 
NCR category was 0.90 and so the small increase in this category was not significant. 
2 'Although the t-statistic for the CR slope dummy on HCAVjtT2t for the WaSCs is only 
borderline significant the t-statistic is significant if the insignificant CR slope dummies on 
HCAVitTlt and Dit-1 are omitted from the re-estimated All WaSCs equation. 
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and the long-run solution to the estimated ECM is: 
ý10 + ý20 ý12 
D HCAVit+ HCAVitT2t. 
(1-030) 
HCAVitTlt+ 
(1-030) 
1- 
1330 
) 
Similar solutions can be derived from the three WoC equations. In addition, 
PcGive uses an algorithm to derive standard errors for the long-run parameters 
from which t-statistics can be obtained to test their significance. The solutions 
for each of the equations in Table 4.8 are set out in Table 4.12. 
Table 4.12: SLRM results based on HCAV 
Variable HCAV Gearing 
Equation HCAVA HCAVj, T1, HCAVj, T2, go* gl* 92* 
WaSCs 
CR Coefficient 0.143 0.301 0.785 14.3 44.4 92.8 
t-statistic 1.53 2.36 5.49 
NCR Coefficient 0.236 0.418 0.441 23.6 65.4 67.7 
t-statistic 9.65 9.63 10.13 
All WaSCs Coefficient 0.120 0.478 0.781 12.0 59.8 90.1 
t-statistic 1.53 5.82 4.01 
wocs 
CR Coefficient 0.154 - 0.837 15.4 15.4 99.1 
t-statistic 2.91 4.33 
NCR Coefficient 0.478 - 47.8 47.8 47.8 
t-statistic 12.13 
All WoCs Coefficient 0,252 0.368 25.2 25.2 61.9 
t-statistic 2.99 1.55 
The estimates of the target level of HCAV gearing for the WaSC CR cat- 
egory increase significantly after each Periodic Review while for the NCR 
category there is only a significant increase in the second sub-period". The 
22 Similarly to the test for the short-run adjustment factors the difference between the 
target level of gearing in the second and third sub-periods was tested by reconfiguring the 
Tlt dummy so that the coefficient on HCAVjtT2t represented the marginal increase over 
that on HCAVitTlt. The relevant t-statistic for the WaSC CR category was 20.68. The 
comparable t-statistic for the WaSC NCR category was 0.88 and so the small increase in 
this category was not significant. 
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estimated target of 14.3% for the WaSC CR category in the first sub-period is 
not significant and is relatively low compared with the figure of 23.6% for the 
WaSC NCR category. This might reflect the fact that, unlike the NCR cate- 
gory, average HCAV gearing in the CR category actually declined in 1994/95; 
the last year of the sub-period. The target for the WaSC CR category is also 
lower than that for the WaSC NCR category in the second sub-period. 
In the the third period the estimated targets for both the WaSC and WoC 
CR categories increase to more than 90%. While the capital restructurings 
were intended to acl-iieve gearing levels in excess of 75% these estimates should 
be treated with caution. They could be distorted because the third sub-period 
only covers three years and many of the companies in these categories only 
implemented the restructuring in 2002/03; the last year of the sub-period. 
The estimate of target HCAV gearing for the WoC CR category in the 
first two sub-periods is unchanged at 15.4% as the variable HCAVitTlt is 
not significant. This is considerably lower than the estimated target for the 
WoC NCR category which is constant at 47.8% in all three sub-periods as the 
variables HCAVitTIt and HCAVitT2t are not significant. 
Supplementary results 
The predicted values of the long-run equilibrium level of debt obtained from 
the SLRM results can also be used to estimate an ECM similar in form to 
(4.19), that is: 
ADit = 010AHCAVit + ý11A (HCAVitTIt)+ ý121A(HCAVjtT2t) 
(4.42) ý30) Clil-1 + Uit) 
where: 
-5- CIit = Dit - D* (4.43) 
and D*it is calculated from (4.41). 
The variables A(HCAVitTIt) and A(HCAVitT2t) are included in the es- 
timates of (4.42) when HCAVitTIt and HCAVitT2t are present in the cor- 
responding ECM equation for each category. The estimated parameters of 
(4.42), therefore, provide further estimates of the short-run and long-run ad- 
justment factors. 
Stage II of the Engle-Granger procedure follows a similar approach by 
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using the predicted values from the long-run model in Stage I to estimate the 
ECM. The form of the Stage II equation in this instance is, therefore: 
ADit = ý, OAHCAVjt + ý11A (HCAVitTIt) + ý12A (HCAVitT2t) 
ii (4.44) ý30) 'ý't-l + Uit, 
where Rt are the residuals (= -eit) calculated from (4.35). 
The results for both (4.42) and (4.44) are presented in appendix 4. G. As 
both equations use predicted values from other estimated equations the results 
are less satisfactory than the results in Table 4.8. There are more failures in 
the diagnostic tests and, in some equations, the t-statistics are not significant. 
However, the values of the estimated adjustment factors are very similar in 
absolute terms to those in Table 4.10. 
4.6.3 Results based on RCV 
Initial equation 
RCV's were introduced by Ofwat for the 1994 Periodic Review and the original 
method of calculation is described in Ofwat (1993). Briefly, an initial value for 
each WaSC was established using their market values following privatization 
and a broadly similar measure was devised for each of the WoC's since they 
were already in the private sector. This initial value was then adjusted to 
take account of new capital expenditure allowed in setting price limits net of 
current cost depreciation. At the 1999 Periodic Review the methodology was 
amended and a rolling annual adjustment was introduced under which RCV's 
were reduced to reflect past c apital efficiencies. This allowed the benefit of 
capital efficiencies to be passed to customers through lower prices after being 
retained by the companies for five years. It also avoided a growing divergence 
between the increase in RCV and the actual change in asset values recorded 
in the companies' regulatory accounts. 
The methodology and the estimation procedure used to produce the initial 
equations when RCV is used as the measure of capital value are the same as 
described above for the HCAV measure. The PcGive outputs containing the 
OLS estimates of (4.26) for each type and category of company are given in 
appendix 4.11.1. 
The initial equations for All WaSC's, and for the WaSC NCR, WoC CR 
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and NCR categories accept the test against heteroscedasticity and the RESET. 
However, the initial equations for All WoC's and the WaSC CR category fail 
both the RESET and the heteroscedasticity test. The t-statistics in all six 
equations are low indicating that model reduction is required. 
As before three tests for first order serial correlation have been applied 
and the results of the tests are given in appendix 4. H. 2. Only the WaSC CR 
equation fails test 1 while none of the six initial equations fail test 2. Very 
limited evidence of serial correlation is provided by test 3. Just two companies 
exhibit evidence of serial correlation using the residuals from the All WoUs 
equation and there is no evidence of serial correlation for any of the companies 
when the residuals from the All WaSC's equation and any of the equations for 
the CR and NCR categories are used. 
It seems reasonable to conclude from these results that the initial equations 
provide consistent estimates of )3. 
Model reduction 
The results of the model reduction procedure are much less satisfactory when 
RCV is used as the measure of capital value. The variables that are retained 
as significant vary considerably between equations as can be seen in Table 
4.13. 
Table 4.13: Model reduction based on RCV 
Equation Significant variables after model reduction 
WaSC CR RCIý-t-, Tlt, Dit-1, Djt-jT1t. 
WaSC NCR RCVit, RCVitTIt, RCVit-, Tlt, Dit -1, 
Djt-2T2t. 
All WaSCs RCVitT2t, RCVit-, Tlt, Dit-1, Djt- jT1t, Dit-2, Djt-2TIt. 
WOC CR RCVit- I T2t, Dit- 1, Dit- 2T2t. 
WoC NCR RCVit, RCVit- 1, RCVitTlt, RCVit - 
Tit, RCVitT2t, RCVit- 1T2t, Dit- 1. 
All WoCs RCVit, RCVit-,, RCVjt-jT2t, Dit- 1, Djt-2T2t. 
As the reduction procedure does not produce plausible models a different 
approach has been adopted. In view of the high correlation between HCAV 
and RCV shown in Table 4.5, models corresponding to those derived using 
HCAV data have been tested and, as might be expected, these are more suc- 
cessful. However, the lagged variable RCVit-l is not significant in the any of 
the resulting equations and its coefficient, ý20, also has the lowest t-statistic 
in the equations for All WaSC's, All WoC's and the WoC NCR category. Con- 
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sequently, the final estimated equations take the form of a PAM as follows: 
Dit = ý310RCVjt +, 31, RCVitTlt + 012RCVitT2t + ý30Djt- 1+ U-it. (4.45) 
with the variables RCVitTIt and RCVitT2t being eliminated if the coefficients 
of either or both are not significant. 
As in the equations based on HCAV, 010ADO12 >0 in all the WaSC 
equations, ý10 > 0, ý11 =0 in all the WoC equations while 012 >0 for the 
W6C CR category and ý12 =0 for the WoC NCR category. However, unlike 
the HCAV results 1 ý312 =0 in the equation for All WoC's. 
Estimates of the parameters of the PAM can, therefore, be obtained from 
the final equations and the form of these equations imposes a number of re- 
strictions on the parameters. 
Firstly, in all equations the constant term is eliminated. This is consistent 
with the form of the PAM derived in (4.7). 
Secondly, in all equations ý30 >0 and 031 --::::: ý32 -":::: 0 (i. e. the associated 
slope dummies are not significant). Consequently, the coefficient of Dit-I 
does not vary between sub-periods which implies that the adjustment factor 
in (4.7), does not change following Periodic Reviews as it is estimated by: 
ý30- (4.46) 
Thirdly, in all equations ý10 > 0. As 0111 ý12 >0 in the WaSC equations 
(i. e. the associated slope dummies are significant), this implies that, g*, the 
target level of RCV gearing in (4.7) varies between sub-periods. In terms of 
the notation used in (4.7) the estimated target level of RCV gearing for each 
sub-period is given by: 
ý10 
go - (4.47) 1-030 
ý10 + ý11 
91 - (4.48) 
1- ý30 
)3io + ý12 
92 -- (4.49) 1-030 
However, in the WoC CR category, since 0 and 012 > 0, the target 
level of RCV gearing only varies between the second and third sub-periods 
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(i. e. g* = *). Further, the equations for All WoC's and for the WoC NCR 0 91 
category indicate the target level of RCV gearing is the same in all three 
sub-periods since ý11 = ý12 =0 (i. e. go* = gl* = g2*). 
Final estimates 
The final estimates are set out in Table 4.14 and the PeGive outputs are given 
in appendix 4. H. 3. 
Diagnostic tests 
The diagnostic tests applied to the final estimates are also shown in Table 
4.14 and reveal more problems than the corresponding HCAV results. Again 
the most serious problem is heteroscedasticity but in these results the WoC 
CR category also fails both tests so that four of the six equations fail the test 
using the squares of the regressors and five equations fail the test based on the 
squares and the cross-products of the regressors. As before the t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors to correct for this problem. Only the WaSC 
NCR equation accepts the heteroscedasticity tests. The equation for the WaSC 
CR category also fails the RESET. There was no evidence of serial correlation 
in the HCAV results but here the tests are rejected in the All WaSC's and 
WoC CR equations indicating the estimated coefficients in these equations are 
biased since the lagged dependent variable, Dit-1, is an explanatory variable. 
However, a Wald test decisively rejects the null hypothesis that all of the 
coefficients are zero in all equations. 
Tests for cointegration 
As before three approaches to testing for cointegration have been used. 
The first simply applies ADF tests to the residuals, U-it, of the equations 
in Table 4.14 using the pooled data. As before a constant is included in the 
tests as none of the original equations contain a constant. Table 4.14 shows 
these tests reject the null hypothesis that the residuals from all equations are 
non-stationary at the 1% significance level. This suggests that it would be 
worthwhile conducting more sophisticated tests for cointegration. 
The second approach uses Stage I of the two-stage procedure in Engle 
and Granger (1987) which estimates the long-run relationship between Dit 
and RCVit and then tests whether the residuals are stationary. The results 
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Table 4.14: PAM results based on RCV 
A4LStmm Urit Diagmstic 
Variable factor A4usted ADF root tests 
Equation RCVý RCVTlt RC-VT2, D, cc t4est t4est rejected 
WaSG3 
GR Ccefficient 0.068 0.030 0.106 0.898 0.102 0 -9 74 -5.28 
[1] -1.02 N [1], H [11, HX [1], R ý5) 
t-statistic 2.38 2.87 4.62 8.93 
NCR Cceffident 0.088 0.065 0.060 0.715 0.285 0-988 -6.99 [1] -11.1 [1) Nil] 
t-statistic 9.86 7.59 4.83 27.80 
All WaSa Cbeffident 0.076 0.044 0.052 0.832 0.168 0.977 -6.09 (1] -2.93 Al [5], N [1], HX [5] 
t-statistic 6.64 4.87 4.77 14.50 
Wocs 
GR Coefficient 0.045 - 0.136 0.835 0.165 0.872 -5-79 [1) -4.72 [5] A2 15], N 11], H [1], HX [11 
t-statistic 2.40 2.49 23.90 
NCR Coeffident 0.069 - 0.817 0.183 0-985 -7.61 [1] -6.30 11] N [I], H [11, HX [1] 
t-statistic 6.29 28.10 
All Wba Coefficient 0.074 0.818 0.182 0.954 5.90 [11 4.24 [1] N [1], H [5], HX 
t-statistic 5.28 19.00 
NOTES 
t-statistic Cb1culated using robust standard errors from panel data rrodels. 
Adjusted Rý Calculated from I- AdJRý =(I- Iro) n-1)/(n-k) where 1- Rý R' SS / ED, 2 
RSS is the Residual Surn of Squares, n is the nuniDer of obsexvations and k is the nun-hEx of regressors. 
ADF t-test Augrrented Dckey-Fuller test an t-statistic for the ooefficient of residualt., with Aresidual, as the regressand. 
Critical values (for test irrJLdr-g a oorstant) are from MaCKMon (1991). 
Unit root t-test Test on t-statistic for the o-effident of D, -1 with 
AD, as the regressand instead of D, 
Critical values (for test with no deterninistic cornponents) are froniFricsson and NbzKInnon (1999). 
Diagnostic tests 
Abbrvn 
OLS nudds Nomiality N Tests the null that the distribution of the residuals is Mrrnal. 
poolod data Fletero H Tests the null of hornzscedasticity using squaxes of regressors. 
Hetero-X lix Tests the null of harrrsoedastidty using squares and crCss-pro±y-fz of regressors. 
RESEI' R Tests the null that the mDd-J is correctly specified against ornitting the square of the 
predicted value of the deperKlant variable. 
Panel data mxlels VVaJd (joint) W All the nDdels rýject the null that all the oceffidents are zero at the 1% sigrfficance. level. 
AR(l) Al Tests the null of no first order serial correlation. 
AR(2) A2 Tests the null of no second order serial oorrelation. 
Signtificance levels f 1% ill 
5% [5) 
1 OC/0 [101 
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in Table 4.14 indicate the long-run relationship for all the WaSC categories 
should be estimated in the following form: 
Dit = bIRCVit + b2RCVitTlt + b3RCVitT2t + -eit, (4.50) 
where Fit are the residuals. Similarly, for the WoC CR category the long-run 
relationship should be (4.50) with ý2 =0 while that for All WoC's and the 
WoC NCR category should be (4.50) with ý2 = ý3 = 0. The Engle-Granger 
Stage I results are set out in Table 4.15. Again it is possible to add another 
observation and use all 13 observations for each company. 
The ADF tests on the residuals of the equations in Table 4.15 have been 
applied in the same way as previously and again show that only the equations 
for All WaSC's and for the WaSC NCR category reject the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration but, in both cases, only at the 10% level. 
As noted earlier the Engle-Granger approach imposes a common factor 
restriction on the dynamics of the relationship. Appendix 4. F, shows that in 
the case of the PAM this restriction has the effect of imposing the condition 
that: 
a=1. (4.51) 
This is the limiting case of the PAM in which there is full adjustment to 
the long-run equilibrium in each period. In other words, applying the Engle- 
Granger procedure to a PAM assumes the SLRM applies. Clearly, this as- 
sumption is likely to be invalid. 
The relatively large number of failures in the diagnostic tests shown in 
Table 4.15 again demonstrate that the estimates of the parameters obtained 
in the Stage I equations are likely to be biased. 
The third approach uses a 'Unit root t-test' to test for cointegration. The 
PAM is transformed by using ADit as the regressand instead of Dit which pro- 
vides a direct estimate of the adjustment factor a together with a t-statistic 
which can be tested for significance and, thereby, for cointegration between 
the variables Dit and RCVit. The test is applied in the same way as before 
and the results are given in Table 4.14. This shows that, unlike the results 
from the Engle-Granger approach, the equations for all of the WoC categories 
reject the null of no cointegration and it is not rejected by the All WaSC's 
equation. Only the WaSC NCR category rejects the null for both tests. Conse- 
quently, according to this test, four of the six equations demonstrate evidence 
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Table 4.15: Engle-Granger Stage I results based on RCV 
Diagnostic 
Variable Adj usted ADF tests 
Equation RCV. RCVJI, RCV,, T2t R2 t-test rejected 
W4SCE; 
CR Coefficient 0.260 0.134 0.355 0.938 -4.26 N [1], H ý11, HX [11 
t-statistic 5.75 3. D6 5.01 
NCR Coefficient 0.155 0.198 0.317 0.960 -4.78 [10] Al [5], H [1], HX [1], R [1] 
t-statistic 7.02 7.53 11.60 
All WaSC s Coefficient 0.183 0.180 0.331 0.940 -4.54 [10] Al [5], N 11), H [5], HX [5] 
t-statistic 7.80 7.48 11.30 
Wocs 
CR Coefficient 0.276 - 0.134 0.745 -2.93 N [1], H [5], HX [5], R [1] 
t-statistic 3.48 1.61 
NCR Coefficient 0.309 - 0.963 -2.86 H [11, HX [1], R [1] 
t-statistic 17.50 
All WoC s Coefficient 0.311 0.910 -2.92 Al [5], A2 [5], N [1], H [11, HX [1) 
t-statistic 17.70 
NOTES 
t-statistic Calculated us ing robust sta ndard errors from panel data models. 
Adjusted R2 Calculated from I- AdJR 2 =( 1_R2) (n- 1) /(n-k)wherel-R 
2 RSS D 21 
, 
RSS is the Residual Sum of Squares, n is the number of observations and k is the nurnber of regressors. 
ADF t-test Augmented Dckey-Fufler test on t-statistic for the coefficient of residual, -, with 
Aresidual, as the regressand. 
Critical value s (for test inc luding a constant) are from MacKinnon (1991). 
Diagnostic tests 
Abbrvn 
OLS models Normality N Tests the null that the distribution of the residuals is normal. 
pooled data Hetero H Tests the null of homoscedasticity using squares of regessors. 
Hetero-X HX Tests the null of homoscedasticity using squares and cross-products of regressors. 
RE= R Tests the null that the model is correctly specified against on-iitting the square of the 
predicted value of the dependent variable. 
Panel data models Wald (joint) W All the models reject the null that all the coefficients are zero at the 1% significance level. 
AR(l) Al Tests the null of no first order serial correlation. 
AR(2) A2 Tests the null of no second order serial correlation. 
Significance levels 1% [11 
5% [5] 
10% pj 
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of cointegration between Dit and RCVit- 
Adjustment factors 
Direct estimates of the adjustment factors can be obtained from the estimated 
equations in Table 4.14 by using (4.46). They are constant throughout the 
period and the estimated factors for each category are set out in Table 4.14. 
Differences between the CR and the NCR categories have been tested for 
significance in the same way as for the HCAV results, that is, by applying 
slope dummy variables to the data for companies in the CR category and 
re-estimating the equations for All WaSC's and All WoC's. The results are 
shown in Table 4.16 (using the same format as Table 4.11). 
Table 4.16: Differences between CR and NCR categories based on RCV 
Equation RCVit RCVjtTI RCVitT2 Dit-1 
All WaSCs 
No CR dummy Coefficient 0.088 0.065 0.060 0.715 
t-statistic 9.86 7.59 4.83 27.80 
CR dummy Coefficient -0.020 -0.035 0.046 0.183 
t-statistic -0.67 -2.64 1.75 1.76 
WaSC CR Coefficient 0.068 0.030 0.106 0.898 
t-statistic 2.38 2.87 4.62 8.93 
All WoCs 
No CR dummy Coefficient 0.069 - - 0.817 
t-statistic 6.29 - - 28.10 
CR dummy Coefficient -0.024 - 0.136 0.018 
t-statistic -1.09 - 2.49 0.41 
WoC CR Coefficient 0.045 - 0.136 0.835 
t-statistic 2.40 - 2.49 23.90 
Table 4.16 shows that there is no significant difference between the coeffi- 
cients of Dit-1 and, therefore, in the adjustment factors for the CR and the 
NCR categories. 
The adjustment factors for both the WaSCs and the WoCs are all within 
the range 0.10-0.29; the average being 0.18. As they are all constant through- 
out the period, differences between the other coefficients reflect differences in 
target gearing levels and these are considered next. 
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Target RCV gearing levels 
The parameters of the SLRM can be obtained from the estimated equations in 
Table 4.14. In the three WaSC equations the coefficient of Dit-1 is constant in 
all sub-periods and the only significant dummy variables are the slope dununies 
applied to HCAVitTIt and HCAVitT2t. Consequently, from (4.45), (4-46), 
(4.47), (4.48) and (4.49), the long-run solution to the estimated PAM is: 
D*it - 
ý10 
Rcvit + 
ý11 
RCVitTIt + 
ý12 
RCVitT2t. 
ý30) ý30 ý30 
) 
(4.52) 
S -I imilar solutions can be derived for the three WoC equations. 
The results for the equations in Table 4.14 are set out in Table 4.17. 
Table 4.17: SLRM results based on RCV 
Variable Gearing 
Equation RCVj, RCV,, TI, RCVjtT2, go* 91 92* 
WaSCs 
CR Coefficient 0.665 0.289 1.039 66.5 95.4 170.4 
t-statistic 1.75 1.40 1.16 
NCR Coefficient 0.309 0.227 0.212 30.9 53.7 52.1 
t-statistic 10.45 8.31 6.61 
All WaSC s Coefficient 0.454 0.260 0.311 45.4 71.3 76.4 
t-statistic 4.59 4.81 2.56 
wocs 
CR Coefficient 0.275 - 0.827 27.5 27.5 110.3 
t-statistic 2.52 2.11 
NCR Coefficient 0.377 - 37.7 37.7 37.7 
t-statistic 35.48 
All WoC s Coefficient 0.406 40.6 40.6 40.6 
t-statistic 10.99 
The t-statistics for the WaSC CR equation are not significant and so the 
SLRM does not provide reliable estimates of the target levels of RCV gearing 
for this category. Indeed, the targets calculated from the estimated parameter 
values do not look plausible. However, the t-statistics are significant in the 
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other equations. The estimates of the target level of RCV gearing for the 
WaSC NCR category increase significantly from 30.9% to 53.7% in the second 
sub-period but not in the third 23 The estimate of target RCV gearing for 
the WoC CR category in the first two sub-periods is unchanged at 27.5% as 
the variable RCVitTIt is not significant. This is considerably lower than the 
estimated target for the WoC NCR category which is constant at 37.7% in an 
three sub-periods as the variables RCVitTIt and RCVitT2t are not significant. 
In the the third period the estimated target for the WoC CR category increases 
to much more 100% which is not plausible. Again this result is likely to be 
distorted because the third sub-period only covers three years and many of the 
companies in these categories only implemented the restructuring in 2002/03; 
the last year of the sub-period. 
Supplementary results 
The predicted values of the long-run equilibrium level of debt obtained from 
the SLRM results can also be used to estimate a PAM in the alternative form: 
ý30 
It+ - ADit Ci Vit, (4.53) 
)330 
where: 
Clit =- Dit -D ttj (4.54) 
and D*it is calculated from (4.52). The estimated parameters of (4.53), there- 
fore, provide further estimates of the adjustment factors. This approach is 
similar to Stage II of the Engle-Granger procedure which uses the predicted 
values from the long-run model in Stage I to estimate the PAM. The estimated 
form of the Stage II equation in this instance is, therefore: 
ý30Rjt 
+- ADit Vit, 
/330 
(4.55) 
where 1ý-t are the residuals (= -eit) calculated from (4.50). 
The derivation of (4.53) and (4.55) and the results from estimating both 
equations are presented in appendix 4.1. As might be expected the results 
23 As before the difference between the target level of gearing in the second and third 
sub-periods was tested by reconfiguring the Tlt dummy so that the coefficient on RCVitT2t 
represented the marginal increase over that on RCVjtT1t. The relevant t-statistic for the 
WaSC NCR category was -0.64 which is not significant. 
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are less satisfactory than those in Table 4.14. There are more failures in 
the diagnostic tests and in some equations the t-statistics are not significant. 
However, the adjustment factors estimated using (4.53) are very sirnilar in 
absolute terms to those in Table 4.14 apart from the equation for All WoUs 
where the coefficient has the wrong sign and is not significant. The coefficients 
in the estimates of (4.55) all have the wrong sign. 
4.6.4 Comparison of results based on HCAV and RCV 
The previous discussion has already indicated that in many respects the es- 
timated PAM's based on RCV data are less satisfactory than the estimated 
ECM's based on HCAV data. However, the two sets of models can be com- 
pared more formally by using encompassing tests. Three tests have been 
applied: 
1. the Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) J-test, 
2. a test based on the optimum combination of forecasts of Dit from each 
ECM and the corresponding PAM and 
3. F-tests on a comprehensive model incorporating all the variables from 
each ECM and the corresponding PAM. 
All three tests are concerned with testing the two non-nested hypotheses: 
Ho : Dit = ý, HCAVjt + 132HCAVitTlt+ ý3HCAVjtT2t 
+ ý4HCAVjt-j + ý5Djt-j + uoit, (4.56) 
H, : Dit = OIRCVit + 02 RCVitTlt + 03RCVitT2t + 0.5Dit-, + ulit. 
(4.57) 
With the appropriate restrictions on the parameters these hypotheses can be 
applied to each of the equations for the WaSC's and the WoUs. For simplicity 
the two hypotheses are written as: 
Ho : 
Hi 
Dit =D 
HCAV + Uo, tý it 
Dit = D"", + UITtl it 
-HCAV I bRCV and the predicted values are respectively Dit anc it 
(4.58) 
(4.59) 
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The Davidson and MacKinnon J-test is a variance encompassing test wl-lich 
involves estimating the two equations: 
nHCAV +A -RCV Dit 
-, --, it 
Dit + Eoit, (4.60) 
nRCV -HCAV Dit I-,, it + ODit + Elit, (4.61) 
and then testing the two null hypotheses A=0 and 0 == 0. If the former is not 
rejected then HO is not rejected by H, and if the latter is not rejected then H1 
is not rejected by HO. It is, however, also possible for both HO and H1 to be 
accepted or rejected by this test. The results of the test are set out in Table 
24 4.18 
Table 4.18: Davidson and MacKinnon J-test 
HO: A=0 Hj: 0=0 
A t-statistic 0 t-statistic 
WaSC CR -1.584 -3.12 1.056 11.20 
WaSC NCR 1.153 7.99 0.821 3.91 
All WaSCs 0.084 0.20 0.997 11.70 
woc CR 0.523 0.88 0.986 10.00 
WoC NCR 0.760 1.46 0.851 2.22 
All WoCs 0.247 0.86 0.985 7.21 
The Table shows that H1 is rejected by HO and HO is not rejected by H, in 
the equations for All WaSC's, All WoC's and for the WoC CR and WoC NCR 
categories. The t-statistics for 0 in these equations are all significant at the 
1% level except for the WoC NCR equation where it is significant at the 5% 
level. This indicates that, in these categories the ECM's based on HCAV data 
are superior. However, the t-statistics for A are also significant at the 1% level 
in the WaSC CR and WaSC NCR equations and so the test is inconclusive for 
these two categories as both HO and H1 are rejected. 
The second test uses the results from the two models to determine the 
optimum combination of forecasts by estimating: 
-HCAV +6 - RCV Dit = (1 - 6) Dit Dit + vit, (4.62) 
24 Where appropriate the t-statistics in this Table and the next have been adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity. 
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which can also be written as the two equations: 
-HCAV Dit - Dit 
RCV 6 (Dit -. ff CAV Dst + vit, (4.63) 
- RCV Dit - Dit 
RCV (bit i- 
CAV Dlt + vit. (4.64) 
Estimating (4-63) and (4.64) makes it possible to test the two hypotheses 6=0 
and - (1 - 6) = 0. If the former is rejected then H, explains Dit over and 
above HO and if the latter is rejected HO explains Dit over and above H1. 
Again it is possible for both HO and H, to make a significant contribution to 
the explanation of Dit. The results of this test are given Table 4.19. 
Table 4.19: Optimum combination of forecasts test 
HO: 6=0 HI: -(1-6) =0 
6 t-statistic - (I - J) t-statistic 
WaSC CR -0.048 -0.52 -1.048 -11.50 
WaSC NCR 0.192 0.96 -0.807 -4.00 
All WaSCs 0.004 0.02 -0.996 -5.63 
WOC CR 0.014 0.15 -0.986 -10.20 
WoC NCR 0.227 0.98 -0.773 -3.33 
All WoCs 0.016 0.21 -0.984 -12.30 
The Table shows that in all the equations HO explains Dit over and above 
H, and that H, does not add anything to explaining Dit over HO. The t- 
statistics for - (I - 6) are all significant at the 1% level. Consequently, ac- 
cording to this test, the ECM's based on HCAV data are superior to the PAM's 
based on RCV data in all cases. 
In the third test the comprehensive model: 
ýHCAV RCV Dit = Lit + Dit + cit) (4.65) 
is estimated and F-tests, which are mean encompassing, are applied to the pa- 
rameters of the variables in D HCAV and D RCV that are not common to both. it it 
In this instance Dit-1 is the only common variable. Consequently, testing 
whether the coefficients of the non-overlapping variables in Drt CAV are signif- it 
icantly different from zero is a test of Hi and, conversely, testing whether the 
coefficients of the non-overlapping variables in D RCV are significantly different it 
from zero is a test of Ho. Again it is possible for the tests to be inconclusive. 
The results of the tests are set out in Table 4.20 with the significance levels 
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given in parentheses. 
Table 4.20: F- test 
HO : F-test 
on D RCV (exc Dit-1) it 
H, : F-test 
on DHCAV (exc Dit- it 1) 
WaSC CR F(3,52)=5.206 [1] F(4,52)= 41.261 [1] 
WaSC NCR F(3,52)= 1.534 F(4,52) =4.715 [1] 
All WaSCs F(3,112)= 2.068 F(4,112)= 36.954 [1] 
W6C CR F(2,66)= 0.535 F(3,66)= 33.324 [1] 
WoC NCR F(1,68)= 3.156 F(2,68) =6.577 [11 
All WoCs F(1,139)= 0.618 F(3,139)= 49.256 [1] 
According to this test, therefore, the ECM's based on HCAV data are 
superior to the PAM's based on RCV data except in the WaSC CR category 
where the result is inconclusive. 
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the three sets of test results 
is that, generally, the ECM's based on HCAV data are superior to the PAM's 
based on RCV data although the results for the WaSC CR category are incon- 
clusive for two of the three tests. The implication is that in the period under 
consideration the water companies considered HCAV gearing a more impor- 
tant measure of capital structure than that based on Ofwat's calculation of 
RCV. 
4.7 The Results: Individual Companies 
4.7.1 Approach 
The ECM's based on HCAV data and the PAM's based on RCV data de- 
scribed in the previous section were also applied to the data on each of the 22 
companies. The form of the equation that was estimated for each company 
corresponds to the model for the relevant category. As before the associated 
SLRM's were derived from the estimated equations. The detailed results are 
set out in appendix 4. J. As there are only 12 observations for each company 
the results are generally less satisfactory than those for the pooled data. 
4.7.2 Results based on HCAV 
In only six of the 22 estimated ECM equations based on HCAV data are all 
of the variables significant and there are no equations with no significant vari- 
170 
ables. Also there are ECM equations for two companies that do not converge to 
a long-run solution because the long-run adjustment factor, a, exceeds unity. 
Diagnostic checks show that four of the ECM equations fail the RESET 
of which three are in CR categories. One equation fails a test for first order 
autocorrelation and one fails the AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedastic- 
ity (ARCH) test. The small number of observations prevent use of the test 
for heteroscedasticity based on the squares and cross-products of the regres- 
sors and the test for heteroscedasticity based on the squares of the regressors 
is limited to companies in the WoC NCR category but there are no failures. 
This suggests that the failures of the heteroscedasticity tests in the cross- 
section models were caused by the different sizes of the companies. The unit 
root t-test for cointegration between the variables is significant in only one 
equation. 
4.7.3 Results based on RCV 
The PAM equations based on RCV data again performed less well. In only 
one equation are all the variables significant and there are two equations in 
which no variables are significant. There are four companies where the PAM 
does not converge to a long-run solution and these include the two companies 
where the ECM does not have a long-run solution. 
Diagnostic checks show that seven of the PAM equations fail the RESET, 
five of which are in the WoC CR category, and two of these also fail the ARCH 
test. Again the only available test for heteroscedasticity is that based on the 
squares of the regressors but it can be applied to all the W6C equations. The 
test is rejected in three cases also in the WoC CR category. In most cases 
where the ECM equation fails diagnostic tests then the PAM equation also 
fails. Again there is limited evidence of cointegration with the Unit root t-test 
being significant in two equations. 
4.7.4 Adjustment factors 
The estimated adjustment factors derived from the equations for each company 
are summarized in Table 4.21. Ranges are given, where possible, for each 
category of company and they are derived from parameter values which are 
significant in the estimated equations. Six ECM equations and seven PAM 
equations have been excluded because the parameter values are above unity 
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and/or the equation fails the RESET 
Table 4.21: Adiustment factors - individual com-Danv estimates 
ECM PAM 
^/o 'Yi ýY2 a 
WaSC CR 
WaSC NCR 
0.54-0.89 
0.39-0.64 
0.53-0.94 
0.46-0.69 
0.64-0-78 
0.46-0.76 
0.36-0.41 
0.09-0.32 
0.26-0.40 
0.26-0.35 
WOC CR 
WoC NCR 
0.51-0.97 
0.54-0.76 
0.69-0.96 0.34-0.39 
0.24-0.49 
0.45 
0.20-0.44 
The ranges for the adjustment factors are generally in line with those 
estimated in the models using pooled data although the long-run adjustment 
factors, oz, are somewhat higher. 
4.7.5 Target gearing levels 
As in the previous section estimates of target gearing levels can be obtained 
from the parameters of the SLRM's derived from the estimated ECM's and 
PAM's. The estimates are given in Table 4.22. Ranges are given, where 
possible, for each category of company and are based on parameter values 
which are significant in the SLRM's. Two equations from the ECM's do not 
have long-run solutions and the results from two other equations that fail the 
RESET are also excluded. Similarly, four of the PAM's do not have long-run 
solutions and three others that fail the RESET are excluded. 
Table 4.22: Tarizet j4earinv, - individual com-panv estimates 
SLRM from ECM SLRM from PAM 
90 91 92 A gi A 
WaSC CR 13-45 27-44 63-86 41-54 54-56 37-104 
WaSC NCR 23 24-60 46-61 25-30 49-56 48-53 
WoC CR 22-41 22-41 24-57 52 52 42 
WoC NCR 22-50 22-50 22-50 19-37 19-37 19-37 
The ranges for the targets derived from the ECM's are generally in line 
with those estimated in the cross-section and panel data models apart from the 
WoC CR category where the range for g* is quite low. The ranges derived from 2 
the PAM's for the WaSC CR and WoC CR categories are lower than those for 
the cross-section and panel data models but this reflects the weakness of the 
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SLRM relating to the WaSC CR category where none of the parameters are 
significant and, as noted above, the diagnostic tests revealed major problems 
with five of the six equations in the WoC CR category. 
4.8 Interpretation of Results 
4.8.1 Comparing the theories of capital structure 
Although the available data only covers a relatively short period of time, the 
results set out above provide reasonable evidence that water companies have 
behaved, at least when viewed collectively, as though they managed their 
finances with a target capital structure in mind. As explained in section 4.1, 
while this is consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure, in a 
regulated envirom-nent it is also important to assess whether the companies 
have tried to exert a price-influence effect since it possible that their behaviour 
might otherwise have reflected the pecking order theory. 
A price-influence effect might occur if a firm considers there is a benefit 
from increased gearing because it believes that the regulator is influenced by 
the risk of financial distress, and the associated risk of disruption to services, 
and would wish to reduce this risk by setting more favourable price limits. 
A regulated firm, therefore, might perceive that the costs of departing from 
the hierarchical approach to financing decisions inherent in the pecking-order 
theory are outweighed by the benefits of increasing gearing to a level that 
would induce the regulator to set higher price limits. 
To reach a conclusion on which of the two theories is supported by re- 
sults described above it is, therefore, important to assess whether there is 
any evidence of a price-influence effect in operation during the period under 
consideration. To make such an assessment it is necessary to consider: 
the principles used to set price limits in the water industry and, in partic- 
ular, to understand the effect that gearing levels have on the regulator's 
decisions, 
whether there are indications that water companies have increased gear- 
ing in advance of a Periodic Review to levels that could be regarded as 
an attempt to put pressure on the regulator to set more favourable price 
limits. 
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4.8.2 Principles of setting price limits 
The principles and methodologies that have been developed to set price lin-Lits 
in the water industry originate in the statutory duties of the regulator. Under 
the legislation that established the current regulatory framework the DGWS 
has a primary duty 
" to secure that companies holding appointments ... as relevant 
undertakers are able (in particular, by securing reasonable returns 
on their capital) to finance the proper carrying out of the functions 
of such undertakers. 1125 
As can be seen from Ofwat (1993), Ofwat (1999) and Ofwat (2004b) this 
duty has led the DGWS to set price limits on the basis of two sets of financial 
considerations: 
9 an economic approach which is intended to ensure that an efficient com- 
pany can expect to earn its cost of capital on the capital value of the 
business. 
a financial approach which aims to ensure that an efficient company has 
a projected financial profile that is acceptable to the capital markets, and 
especially the debt markets, so that it is able in practice to raise finance 
for new investment. These considerations are referred to as 'bankability' 
in Ofwat (1999) and 'financeability' in Ofwat (2004b). 
Gearing and interest cover, which is inversely related to gearing, are two 
of the key financial indicators that Ofwat considers to be important in the 
financial approach. A consequence of this approach might, therefore, be to 
give companies an incentive to manipulate their finances and increase gearing 
in order to bring about a price-influence effect. 
However, gearing is also a factor in the economic approach because it is 
explicitly taken into account in the regulator's assessment of the weighted 
average cost of capital. Indeed, as noted in section 4.1, there is a potential 
regulatory price-influence effect that could work in the opposite direction to 
the financial approach as the regulator will wish to ensure the assessed cost 
25 Water Industry Act 1991, Section 2. The Water Act 2003 retains this duty but also 
adds a new duty by giving the Authority a consumer objective to protect the interests Of 
customers. 
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of capital is no higher than necessary. This suggests the regulator will have 
an incentive to support, at least implicitly, the trade-off theory and assume a 
level of gearing that will enable customers to receive the maximimum benefit 
from the tax shield on debt through lower prices. 
It follows that a company would only succeed in exerting a price-influence 
effect if it could convince the regulator that its actual financial position at the 
time of a Periodic Review would make the price limits implied by the economic 
approach unacceptable from a financial perspective. This means the regulator 
would have to accept that: 
9 the actual financial position of the company at the time a review takes 
place is reasonable and, 
the economic approach produces projected levels of gearing that would 
be too high and/or projections of interest cover that would be too low. 
In other words, a successful price-influence effect requires the financial 
approach to dominate the economic approach. To assess whether this has 
happened in practice, the actions of water companies and the position taken 
by Ofwat on these issues need to be examined. 
4.8.3 Initial setting of price limits in 1989 
Ofwat (1991) makes clear that, compared with the financial approach, the 
econon-Lic approach had a relatively small impact on the initial price lirnits set 
by the government prior to flotation in 1989. The reason for this was that the 
methodology for calculating RCV's was only introduced in the 1994 Periodic 
Review. As explained in subsection 4.6.3 each company's RCV is, in part, 
determined by its initial market value in 1989. The government, therefore, 
did not have capital value figures for each company which could be projected 
on an annual basis so that price limits could be calculated for each of the 
ten years to 1999/00 in accordance with the economic approach. Instead 
the initial price Emits were determined by evaluating the projected financial 
profiles of the companies. The most important key financial indicators at 
that time were considered to be interest cover, dividend cover, gearing and 
the return on capital; all calculated on an historical cost accounting basis. 
Ofwat (1991) states that the general criteria for an acceptable financial profile 
which were adopted by the government included a minimum interest cover of 
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four times and gearing peaking at between 30% and 35% after a transitional 
period. As shown in section 4.4 the starting point for the WaSC's and the 
WoUs was very different. Nearly all the WaSC's started with positive net 
cash resources but with gearing projected to rise while the WoUs started with tn- 
high gearing which was projected to decline progressively. Figure 4.5 shows 
the government's projections of HCAV gearing for the industry as a whole over 
the ten-year period to 1999/00 as set out in Ofwat (1991) and compares them 
with the actual level of industry gearing over the same period. The figures 
are, of course, dominated by the, WaSC's as the WoUs only accounted for 4% 
of the industry's total HCAV over the five years to 1994/95. 
Figure 4.5: Water industry HCAV gearing 
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Although actual gearing exceeded the goverm-nent's projections for the first 
three years it coincides with the projection for 1993/94 and falls below the 
projection for the following year. The average HCAV gearing of the WaSC's 
had risen to 21.8% by 1994/95 while that of the WoUs had fallen from 42.9% to 
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26.9% over the five year period 26 . This pattern does not seem to be consistent 
with the companies generally trying to manipulate their financial positions to 
bring about a price-influence effect at the 1994 Periodic Review. 
However, it does provide, at least in part, an explanation of why the esti- 
mate of the WaSC's target level of HCAV gearing for the period to 1994/95 
shown in section 4.6 is relatively low compared to their subsequent targets 
and to that of the WoOs. The targets for both the WaSC's and the W6C's 
reflect their starting positions and were probably influenced by the outcome 
of the lengthy discussions with the govermnent on the financial criteria that 
were to be used in setting the initial price limits. In addition, it was not 
clear at that time how the capital markets would assess the performance of 
the newly privatized companies and it is likely that their managements would 
have pursued cautious financial strategies in the early years. For example, in 
WSA/WCA (1991), the industry's response to Ofwat (1991), it was argued 
that in the 1994 Periodic Review Ofwat should not depart significantly from 
the financial profiles assumed by the government. It was also noted that the 
average gearing of quoted UK companies was, at that time, about 17% while 
other utilities and highly rated companies had gearing levels of around 30%. 
It seems, therefore, that the companies were more concerned with protecting 
their financial positions against a regulatory price-influence effect aimed at 
reducing the price limits on the assumption that companies could operate at 
higher gearing levels. However, as will be seen below, the companies were not 
successful in achieving this aim. 
4.8.4 The 1994 Periodic Review 
Although the government set initial price limits covering the ten year period 
to 1999/00 the DGWS decided there should be a review of the price limits 
covering the second half of the period. The financial criteria to be applied in 
the 1994 Periodic Review were set out in Ofwat (1993) which states: 
"The financial indicators of most relevance to lenders are interest 
cover (profits before interest and tax divided by interest payments) 
and, supporting this, gearing. " 
26 The figures for the actual average HCAV gearing given in this and the following sub- 
sections are the unweighted mean values of HCAV gearing for the relevant type or category 
of company. 
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"There is clear evidence that the markets will accept minimum in- 
terest covers well below the level of four assumed before flotation. " 
"For individual companies, the maximum acceptable level of gear- 
ing will depend on interest cover. But there is certainly no reason 
why gearing levels could not substantially exceed current levels; 
the Director still considers that... levels of gearing (debt divided 
by debt plus equity) of 50% or more are unlikely to lead to financ- 
ing difficulties. " (p. 38) 
However, it also states that: 
"The main purpose of making detailed financial projections would 
be as a cross-check that the return on capital ensured viability. " 
Consequently, where the financial approach indicated that a company's 
ability to raise finance would be limited, the DGWS accepted some adjustment 
to the profile of price limits might be appropriate. However, he made it clear 
that if an adjustment was to be made: 
"... it would be necessary to take account of this at a subsequent 
Periodic Review; clearly charges to customers should only provide 
a reasonable return over the life of the assets. If higher retained 
profits are needed in the short term to meet financial ratio consid- 
erations, then charges in the longer term need only provide a lower 
return on the assets financed in that way. " (p. 39) 
The DGWS appears to have been well aware that the financial approach 
might encourage companies to try and exert a price-influence effect. He took 
steps, therefore, to combat this by saying that even if the financial approach 
produced more favourable price limits in the short term a compensating ad- 
justment would be made later. 
The DGWS maintained this position in his final determination of price 
limits when the financial approach did result in the 'front-loading' of price 
limits for some companies. Ofwat (1994) attributes this to the fact that the 
expenditure allowed in price lirnits for these companies was projected to be 
higher in the first five years following the Periodic Review than subsequently; 
a factor which had adversely affected their financial profiles. 
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The 1994 Periodic Review clearly had a major impact on water company 
finances. As shown in subsection 4.4.3 and Figure 4.5, average HCAV gear- 
ing increased significantly after the 1994 Periodic Review. However, even by 
1999/00 it was still below the figure of 50% that Ofwat had assumed in 1994. 
The average for the WaSC's had risen to 43.8% while the figure for the WoC's 
had fallen slightly to 22.2%. 
The results in section 4.6 show there is an increase in the estimated target 
gearing levels of the WaSC's for the five year period to 1999/00 but only the 
WaSC NCR category has a target that was higher than Ofwat's assumption. 
The target for the WaSC NCR category is 65.4% as compared with 44.4% 
for the WaSC CR category although actual HCAV gearing in 1999/00 was 
similar in both categories. This reflects the faster rate of increase over the five 
years for the WaSC NCR category; average HCAV gearing in 1994/95 for this 
category being 16.3% compared with 27.3% for the WaSC CR category. It 
seems likely, therefore, that the financial criteria applied by Ofwat in the 1994 
Periodic Review influenced both the increase in the actual HCAV gearing of 
the WaSC's and their target gearing levels. 
The estimate of target gearing for the WoC NCR category in the period to 
1999/00 remains stable at 47.8% which is also close to the Ofwat assumption. 
The relatively low figure of 15.4% for the WoC CR category reflects the lower 
starting figure of 34.0% in 1990/91 and a general downward trend over the 
ten year period to 11.7% in 1999/00. However, it should be noted, as shown 
in Table 4.4, that the 'A76C CR category has the highest variation in HCAV 
gearing and contains some small companies with positive net cash positions. 
It seems reasonable to conclude there is little evidence of companies sys- 
tematically attempting to exert a price-influence effect in the lead up to the 
1999 Periodic Review. 
4.8.5 The 1999 Periodic Review 
The DGWS used tighter parameters for the economic approach in the 1999 
Periodic Review. Price limits were based on a real, post-tax cost of capital for 
water companies of 4.75%, plus a premium to allow for the cost of companies' 
embedded debt which averaged around 0.25%. The real, post-tax cost of 
capital used in the 1994 review was in the range of 5-6%27. However, the 
27 In both reviews a 'small company' premium was also added to the cost of capital applied 
to the WoUs. 
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criteria applied in the financial approach were similar to those used in 1994. 
Ofwat (1999) states that: 
"The financial projections underpinning price Emits assume that 
companies will achieve, on average, gearing levels of about 50% 
(measured as debt to total capital) over the period of the price 
limits. " (p. 130). 
" Consultation indicated that levels of gearing of about 50% (debt: debt 
plus equity) and accounting historic cost interest (EBIT) covers of 
about 2.0 times are consistent with maintaining a solid investment 
grade rating if coupled with acceptable cashflow profiles and ra- 
tios. " (p. 156) 
However, as in 1994, the DGWS was concerned about the potential for 
price-influence effects from companies gearing up balance sheets. In particular, 
some parent companies had increased debt in their water subsidiaries to pay 
the windfall tax of 1997. Ofwat (1999) states: 
"The Director does not consider it appropriate for such actions to 
result in higher bills for customers than would otherwise be the case 
because of the impact on financial projections. Consequently, be- 
fore considering the critical financial indicators, some adjustments 
have been made for a few companies ... 
[including] 
... to write back 
special dividends (or other debt for equity swaps) into companies' 
balance sheets. " (p. 134) 
Consequently, in the few cases where a price-influence effect might have 
occurred the DGWS took pre-emptive action to prevent this happening in 
accordance with his stated intentions during the consultation process for the 
review. The regulator's stance, therefore, seems to have provided a disincentive 
to the pursuit of price-influencing strategies by most companies, at least prior 
to the review. 
However, at the time many commentators considered the 1999 Periodic Re- 
view to have been a very tough one for the water companies and, as explained 
in section 4.2, within three years half of the water companies had implemented 
some form of capital restructuring. Two-thirds of the companies that did so 
adopted enhanced financial structures that would enable their gearing to ex- 
ceed 75%. The result was that average HCAV gearing in both the WaSC CR 
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and the WoC CR categories reached 68.5% by 2002/03 while the WaSC INCR 
and WoC NCR categories had only increased to 52.2% and 42.3% respectively. 
As Mayer (2003) observes, such restructurings hardly reflect the kind of 
mechanical funding response that is implied by the pecking order theory of 
capital structure. He suggests a better explanation is that companies increased 
gearing both to achieve a lower cost of capital and to obtain greater exit rights 
which would restrict the potential for further tightening of the regulatory 
contract. In other words, the rapid increase in gearing for some companies 
can be explained by the trade-off theory in conjunction with an intended 
price-influence effect at future Periodic Reviews that was motivated more by 
defensive considerations. 
The attractions of restructuring might have been reinforced by the changes 
to capital allowances against corporation tax announced in 1996 and the abo- 
lition of the imputation system of taxation with the ending of the Advance 
Corporation Tax credits on dividends from 1999/00. These changes resulted in 
higher levels of business taxation which might have been regarded as increasing 
the attractiveness of debt finance 28 . 
Ln the case of companies which did not carry out capital restructurings, the 
analysis of the changes in ownership set out in section 4.3 indicates that such 
companies were unlikely to have attached a high value to the potential benefits 
of restructuring. In particular, the value of the benefits would be relatively low 
where the water subsidiary is considered strategically important to its parent's 
future growth prospects and the opportunity cost of reduced management 
flexibility is relatively high. The results in section 4.6 are consistent both with 
this interpretation and the trade-off theory as the estimated target HCAV 
gearing levels for the WaSC NCR and WoC NCR categories do not change 
materially after the 1999 Periodic Review. The estimated target levels of 
HCAV gearing for the WaSC CR and WoC CR categories are, of course, much 
higher and exceed 90%. However, for the reasons stated earlier, these high 
figures should be treated with caution. 
28 Group tax relief arrangements meant that the Advance Corporation Tax on dividend 
payments was only paid by parent companies. Consequently, it was the parent companies 
who had to decide whether to bring about an increase in the gearing of their water subsidiaries 
as a result of the abolition of the imputation system. 
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4.8.6 The 2004 Periodic Review 
In the first two Periodic Reviews Ofwat and the companies focused on the 
HCAV gearing measure. However, as explained in section 4.4, attention moved 
to the RCV gearing measure in the 2004 Periodic Review. In 1999/00 actual 
RCV gearing for the industry as a whole was 43.2% and, following the capital 
restructurings, it increased to 56.9% in 2002/03. The restructurings led Ofwat 
to change its position on the level of gearing to be assumed in setting price 
limits. Ofwat (2003b) states that: 
"We have said that we do not believe that it would be appropriate 
to be guided simply by the most highly geared companies. How- 
ever, we believe there may be some scope for assuming a slightly 
higher level of gearing than in 1999 without companies being forced 
into adopting capital structures that may carry more risk. This 
points to a range of 55-65% [for RCV gearing] as being sustain- 
able over the period 2005-10 and beyond. This level of gearing 
is consistent with a credit rating that lies comfortably within the 
investment grade category. " (p. 67) 
Although this range is below the RCV gearing of the companies that re- 
structured their finances it is higher than the average of the companies which 
had not. In 2002/03 average RCV gearing in the WaSC and WoC NCR cat- 
egories was 48.4% and 29.2% respectively. However, it does not appear that 
Ofwat's revised assumptions will result in a regulatory price-influence effect. 
Ofwat (2004b), which sets out the draft determinations of price limits for the 
review, states that they were based on a real, post-tax cost of capital of 5.1% 
with no embedded debt premium being allowed and this is slightly higher than 
the figure used in 199929. 
The potential price-influence effects of the capital restructurings were still 
a matter of concern and Ofwat reinforced its price-setting methodology ac- 
cordingly. Ofwat (2004b) also states that: 
" As in 1999, in our financial projections we have assumed an open- 
ing gearing level in 2005-06 consistent with the gearing assumption 
in the WACC [weighted average cost of capital], i. e. 55%, (gearing 
29 At the time of writing only the draft determinations of price limits had been published. 
The final determinations are due to be published on 2 December 2004. 
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measured as the ratio of net debt to RCV for all companies). We 
refer to this as the company's notional gearing. ... For a large 
number of companies we have therefore had to adjust their open- 
ing balance sheet position in 2002-03 by varying degress to reach 
this starting point. " (p. 195) 
The only recognition of the capital restructurings that have taken place 
since 1999/00 was in the calculation of each company's expected tax liabilities 
because Ofwat (2004b) goes on to say: 
" Our approach assumes that price limits should only include a 
forecast of companies' expected tax liablilities rather than a no- 
tional liability linked to our assumptions on capital structure i. e. 
customers should only pay in their bills the actual level of tax 
faced by a company. Generally highly geared companies pay less 
tax because interest payments are deductible from taxable profits. 
(p. 20 1) 
Consequently, while Ofwat made a generic assumption about capital struc- 
ture that was applied to all companies a different and rather inconsistent ap- 
proach was taken in relation to tax. The reason for using a company-specific 
approach rather than assuming a generic tax wedge was given in Ofwat (2003a) 
where it says that to do so: 
11 ... would also be over-generous to those companies with highly 
geared structures which in practice will pay very little tax. " (p. 114) 
The impact of these statements on any further capital restructurings in the 
water industry remains to be seen. Since Ofwat's approach effectively transfers 
the benefit of the tax shield on debt to consumers at Periodic Reviews then, 
according to the trade-off theory, this should create an incentive for companies 
to implement a restructuring immediately after a Periodic Review in order to 
maximize the period over which shareholders benefit. However, as the benefits 
can only be retained for at most five years it is possible that Ofwat's approach 
could deter many more restructurings. 
Ofwat's position on gearing and tax issues also indicates that restructurings 
are unlikely to have much value as a defensive price-influence effect. The 
DGWS made this clear in a public letter to all water companies in January 
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2001 when the restructuring of Dyr Cymru, the first and most extreme example 
of the restructurings, was approved. The letter states, firstly, that: 
"Companies that choose to structure their business in ways other 
the equity-owned, vertically-integrated structure established at pri- 
vatisation will receive no special or preferential treatment from 
Ofwat. " 
and, secondly, that in the event of a Special Adminstration Order being 
implemented, for example as result of insolvency, and the assets being trans- 
ferred to a new owner: 
"There can be no assurance that the transfer .. could be achieved 
on terms that enabled creditors of the Appointee to recover amounts 
due to them in fL, ]II130 
This policy was subsequently confirmed on a number of occasions including 
in Ofwat (2004b) which states: 
"The actual capital structure that companies choose is a matter 
for their management and the markets. This should not be at the 
expense of customers, however. ... We have not made any special 
allowances for companies' actual structures. " (p. 196) 
Given these statements and Ofwat's approach to the prevention of price- 
influence effects at price reviews it is difficult to see why any management 
would expect to gain a significant benefit from trying to exert a price-influence 
effect, even of a defensive kind, from a capital restructuring. As observed in 
Stones (2001) this suggests the principal benefit of a capital restructuring 
from the perspective of management and shareholders was that predicted by 
the trade-off theory of capital structure. It provides the opportunity to obtain 
a substantial release of value to shareholders following the injection of a large 
amount of new debt finance and a reduction in the cost of capital to a level 
well below that assumed in price limits. Consequently, it seems probable that 
the companies concerned only regarded the potential price-influence effect of 
the restructuring as a second order benefit. 
30Letter to Managing Directors, No. MD166 - The Regulatory Framework, 31 January 
2001. 
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4.9 Conclusions 
For the purposes of analysis the WaSC's and the WoUs have each been divided 
into two categories according to whether or not companies implemented a 
capital restructuring after 1999/00. The aim was to establish categories within 
which the behaviour of the companies is likely to be relatively homogeneous 
enabling separate models to be estimated for each category using pooled data. 
Econometric models of the relationship between debt and capital value have 
been estimated for each category of company and provide reasonable support 
for the proposition that water companies, at least when viewed collectively, 
have behaved as though they had target levels of gearing. 
The models have been developed using a 'general-to-specific' model reduc- 
tion procedure that starts with an unrestricted ADLM as the initial equation. 
When HCAV is used to measure capital value, the procedure shows that an 
ECM provides the best explanation and plausible estimates of the parameters 
viz. the target levels of HCAV gearing and the speed of response to both 
short-run changes in capital value and deviations from the long-run target. 
The models satisfy a range of diagnostic tests, although in many cases 
there is evidence of heteroscedasticity. In the significance tests robust stan- 
dard errors have, therefore, been used to adjust for this problem. A particular 
feature of this study is that it tests for cointegration between the variables 
to assess whether the results reflect a causal relationship and not merely sto- 
chastic time trends in the data. Although the available data only covers the 
13 year period to 2002/03, which is a relatively short time period, half of the 
models accept one or more of these tests. This represents at least indicative 
evidence that the two variables are cointegrated and that the target gearing 
levels derived from the models are not the spurious result of stochastic time 
trends. 
Models that use RCV as the measure of capital value have also been es- 
timated. In these models the PAM provides the best explanation. However, 
the results of the diagnostic tests are less satisfactory and encompassing tests 
show that the ECM's based on HCAV are superior. This is to be expected 
as the water companies, Ofwat and, indeed, the capital markets all focused 
on the HCAV measure of gearing until attention moved to the RCV measure 
after the 1999 Periodic Review. 
The overall conclusion of this case study is that the empirical evidence is 
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more consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure than the peck- 
ing order theory. It should be emphasized that the presence of target levels 
of gearing does not necessarily mean that a trade-off actually exists. The 
adjustment models on which this study has been based simply indicate that 
water companies appear to have behaved as though there is a trade-off. In 
order to validate the trade-off model it would be necessary to develop more 
extensive models where the target level of gearing is specified as a function of 
the explanatory variables that determine the costs and benefits of increasing 
gearing. Unfortunately, a number of those variables, for example, agency costs 
and the costs of financial distress, are extremely difficult to measure. How- 
ever, adjustment models can provide evidence that the behaviour of firms is 
inconsistent with the pecking order theory since it predicts that firms do not 
have target gearing levels. 
As the water companies are higl-Ay regulated it is important to assess 
whether they have increased gearing in order to exert a price-influence ef- 
fect on regulatory decisions because it possible that their behaviour might 
otherwise have reflected the pecking order theory. There is, however, little 
indication that the water companies have generally tried to manipulate their 
financial positions to that end. Consequently, their behaviour does not appear 
to have been consistent with the pecking order theory. 
There could be several reasons for the apparent absence of attempts to 
exert a price-influence effect. The potential for this kind of 'hidden action' or 
moral hazard problem is inherent in a regulatory envirom-nent and this was 
recognized by Ofwat from the outset. Ofwat, therefore, put mechanisms in 
place that would act as a deterrent to such behaviour. In addition, to be 
successful, a price-influence effect depends on increasing the risk of financial 
distress and a company which puts itself in such a position runs the risk of 
an adverse reaction from the capital markets. This would provide a further 
deterrent and especially for a company acting in isolation as, by definition, 
the adoption of such a strategy must remain hidden if it is to succeed. These 
considerations are likely to have been particularly important for the WaSC's 
in the early years following privatization. 
The finding that water companies appear to have target levels of gearing 
should not be surprising. Each review of price limits is preceded by an ex- 
tensive public consultation process lasting around two to three years during 
which all the operational and financial issues affecting the future prospects of 
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the companies are examined in great detail. On each occasion large amounts 
of research and evidence on the cost of capital, the capital structure and the 
financial profile of water companies have been commissioned by the companies 
and by Ofwat. Further, such debates have not been confined to the water com- 
panies and similar debates have taken place during the reviews of price limits 
for other utilities in the UK. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the financial 
strategies of water companies have been influenced by the detailed discussion 
of these issues that has taken place. 
When the initial price limits were set in 1989 the government needed to 
ensure that the financial profiles of the companies would be acceptable to 
the capital markets and, in particular, that the companies had the capacity 
to accommodate a significant increase in gearing. While this could have en- 
couraged behaviour in line with the pecking order theory, this study indicates 
that, in the early years, the companies generally moved towards targets which 
are broadly consistent with the government's projection of the longer term 
position following the transitional period of the first five years. 
In the 1994 and 1999 Periodic Reviews Ofwat decided that companies could 
operate at much higher levels of gearing than the government had assumed 
in 1989 and concluded that 50% gearing would represent an efficient capital 
structure. The evidence from this study indicates that after the 1994 Periodic 
Review the WaSC's target levels of gearing increased accordingly. However, 
the targets for the WoUs appear to have remained stable which probably 
reflects the fact they were mature companies that had been in private sector 
ownership for many years. 
In addition, the pecking order theory does not appear to be compatible 
with the capital restructurings which followed so rapidly after the 1999 review. 
These restructurings seem to be more readily explainable in terms of the trade- 
off theory with some companies being driven to take a quite radical approach 
to reducing the cost of capital after a tight regulatory review. As would be ex- 
pected the results of the study indicate that the target gearing levels for these 
companies have increased to well over 75%. Although the restructurings might 
also have reflected a defensive price-influence effect to protect the companies 
concerned against further tightening of the regulatory contract at the 2004 Pe- 
riodic Review, this was probably a second order consideration. Ofwat already 
had a track record of putting mechanisms in place to avoid such effects and 
made its policy position quite clear when it approved the first restructuring in 
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early 2001. The mechanisms have been reinforced for the 2004 review and this 
might act as a deterrent to many more restructurings. Further, many water 
companies did not implement a capital restructuring and the estimated target 
levels of gearing for these companies do not appear to have changed materially 
after the 1999 review. This is again consistent with the trade-off theory. These 
companies also seem to have certain common ownership characterstics which 
suggest the reduced management flexibility required by a restructuring n-. Light 
have been perceived as a costly limitation on their strategic options for future 
growth. 
Ofwat has stated that it considers RCV gearing in the range 55-65% is 
sustainable over the period 2005-10 and beyond. It will be interesting to see 
what effect, if any, this has on the actual and target gearing ratios of water 
companies after the 2004 Periodic Review. 
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Appendix 4. A Data Sets 
The data for net debt, HCAV and RCV are given in Tables 4.23,4.24 and 
4.25. The gearing ratios calculated from this data are given in Tables 4.26 and 
4.27. The mean values of gearing for each type and category of company are 
given in Table 4.28. Graphical plots of the data for the WaSC's are given in 
Figure 4.6 and for the WoUs in Figure 4.7. The mean values of the data for 
each catepory and their standard deviations are given in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 
repsectively. 
To assist with this study Ofwat supplied the data contained in Table 19 
of each water company's annual 'June Return' for each of the 13 years from 
1990/91 to 2002/03. These Tables contain the HCA balance sheets for each 
company from which the data on net debt and HCAV have been obtained. By 
definition a company's HCAV is equal to the sum of its net debt and share 
capital and reserves and for convenience the data on HCAV was obtained by 
using this identity. 
The Table 19 figures for net debt are generally consistent with those re- 
ported by Ofwat in its annual publication on the 'Financial performance and 
expenditure of the water companies in England and Wales'. Where there are 
inconsistencies the Table 19 data have been used in preference, except for 
NES in 1990/91 and 2000/01. Ofwat accepted that the 1990/91 data on net 
debt in Table 19 for NES was unreliable and so the total net debt of its three 
constituent companies (Northumbrian, North East and Essex and Suffolk) as 
reported in Ofwat's publication for 1994/95 has been used instead. The Table 
19 figure for NES net debt in 2000/01 was adjusted by Ofwat in its publica- 
tion for 2000/01 to exclude a loan note of ýC176m. relating to the acquisition 
of Essex and Suffolk Water on 1 April 2000 and so the published figure has 
been used. 
The Table 19 data on share capital and reserves for ANH in 2001/02 and 
2002/03 have been adjusted to add back the capital restructuring dividend of 
086m. which was declared in 2000/01. This dividend was not paid and was 
eventually waived in 2002/03 when the capital restructuring was implemented 
by other means. 
For these reasons the HCAV gearing ratios in Table 4.26 that have been 
calculated from this data are not always consistent with those published by 
Ofwat. In addition, Ofwat does not publish a figure for HCAV gearing when 
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a company has positive net cash resources (i. e. negative net debt). 
The Retail Price Index as at each financial year end has been used to adjust 
the data to a common price base and is given in Table 4.29. These are the 
figures that are used by Ofwat for such purposes. 
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Table 4.29: Retail Price Index - Financial Year End 
Year end RPI 
31-Mar-91 131.4 
31-Mar-92 136.7 
31-Mar-93 139.3 
31-Mar-94 142.5 
31-Mar-95 147.5 
31-Mar-96 151.5 
31-Mar-97 155.4 
31-Mar-98 160.8 
31-Mar-99 164.1 
31-Mar-00 168.4 
31-Mar-Ol 172.2 
31-Mar-02 174.5 
31-Mar-03 179.9 
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Figure 4.6: Net Debt, Historical Cost Asset Value and Regulatory Capital 
Value - Water and Sewerage Companies 
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Figure 4.7: Net Debt, Historical Cost Asset Value and Regulatory Capital 
Value - Water only Companies 
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Figure 4.8: Mean Values of Net Debt, Historical Cost Asset Value and 
Regulatory Capital Value 
Water and Sewerage Compnies 
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Figure 4.9: Standard Deviations of Net Debt, Historical Cost Asset Value 
and Regulatory Capital Value 
Water and Sewerage Comparfies 
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Appendix 4. B Derivation of the Models 
4.13.1 Partial Adjustment Model 
An economic rationale for the PAM based on the highly simplified example in 
Griliches (1967) can be illustrated as follows. It is assumed that: 
the firm incurs two types of cost viz. a higher cost of capital if the firm 
deviates from D; the level of debt at its its optimal capital structure, tý 
and transactions costs in raising or repaying debt finance; 
o both of these costs are quadratic; 
o the firm's capital value is determined exogenously. 
The firm's total costs can then be represented as: 
Ct a (D* - 
Dt)2 +b (Dt - Dt-1 
)2 (4.66) t 
with cost parameters a>0 and b>0. 
The problem is then to choose Dt to minimize Ct given D* and Dt- 1. t 
Differentiating (4.66) with respect to Dt gives: 
act 
o9Dt 
= -2a (Dt - Dt) + 2b (Dt - Dt-1) = 07 
and so: 
+ b) Dt 
+ b) (Dt - Dt- 1) 
which then gives the PAM: 
- aD* + bDt-1, t 
aD* + bDt- 1- (a + b) Dt- 1, t 
a Dt - Dt-I =_ (D Dt a+b t -1)' 
The adjustment factor, a, is, therefore: 
Cf 
a+ 
which depends on the relative size of the two tYpes of cost. 
(4.67) 
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4. B. 2 Combined Partial Adjustment and Adaptive Expecta- 
tions Model 
The derivation of (4.12) can be shown as follows. This model is based on the 
three relationships in (4.5), (4.8) and (4.11) i. e.: 
Dit - Dit-1 
*-V V* it it-1 
D* it 
(Di*t - Dit- 1) 
,\ (Vit - vi*t-, ) 
9 
*v* 
it 
Substituting (4.11) and (4.8) into (4.5) gives: 
Dit = ag* [Wit + (I - A) Vit- 1] + (I - a) Dit-1. 
However, substituting (4.11) into (4.5) and lagging by one period gives: 
Dit- 1 Vit*- i OT * 
ce) Dit-2 
ag* 
Consequently, substituting for Vi*-, and adding an error term gives (4.12), t 
that is: 
Dit = ceg*AVit + (I -a+I -A) Dit-1 - (1 - ce) (I - A) Dit-2 + Uit- 
4. B. 3 Error Correction Model 
An economic rationale for the ECM can be derived as follows. It is assumed 
that: 
41 the firm incurs two types of cost viz. a higher cost of capital if the firm 
deviates from its optimal level of debt and transactions costs in raising 
or repaying debt finance; 
* both of these costs are quadratic; 
the cost of deviating from the optimal level of debt has two components; 
the cost of deviating from Dt*-, and the effect on that cost of moving 
from D; to D; because of a change in the firm's capital value Vt; t-I t 
o the firm's capital value is determined exogenously. 
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The firm's total costs can then be represented as: 
Ct =a [c(Vt - Vt-l) + (D; Dt) 
2+b (Dt - Dt-1 )2 (4.68) t- 
with cost parameters a>0, b>0 and c>0. 
The problem is then to choose Dt to minimize Ct given D* and Dt-1. t 
Differentiating (4.68) with respect to Dt gives: 
act 
= -2a [c (Vt - Vt-l) + 
(Dt* 
I- Dt aDt t- 
)] + 2b (Dt - Dt-1) = Oý 
and so: 
ac(Vt-Vt-, )+aDt*. -l 
ac (Vt - Vt- 1) +a (D; Dt- 1) t- 
+ b) Dt - bDt-1, 
+ b) Dt - (a + b) Dt-1, 
which then gives the ECM: 
t- t-1) + 
ac (V a I Dt - Dt-I =- VI 
(D* 
1- Dt- 1) a+ba+b t- 
The adjustment factors a and -y are, therefore: 
a (4.69) 
a+ b' 
ac (4.70) 
a+ b' 
which shows that a depends on the relative size of a and b, and -y on the 
relative sizes of a, b and c. 
It should also be noted that in the first part of the cost function: 
c (Vt - Vt- 1) + (D; Dt) - (D* - D* 1) + (Dt* t- 9*t t- 
Dt) (4.71) 
c 
-D* +1- 
C) D* Dt. 
9*t9* t- 
This shows that the cost of deviating from the optimal level of debt is based 
on the deviation from the weighted average of D* and Dt* t -1 where 
the weight 
attached to D* is inversely related to the target level of gearing g*and, con- t 
versely, the weight attached to Dt*-j varies directly with g*. Consequently, 
when the target level of gearing is high, a change in the optimal level of debt 
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following a change in Vt has a smaller effect on costs. This is consistent with 
an assumption that the cost of debt rises with the target level of gearing and 
the loss from not being at the optimum capital structure is lower because the 
cost of debt is closer to the cost of equity. 
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Appendix 4. C Detailed Results based on HCAV 
4. C. 1 Initial equations 
The OLS estimates of the initial equations for each type and category of 
company are numbered in this appendix as: 
Equation (HCAV1-1): WaSC CR 
Equation (HCAV2-1): WaSC NCR 
Equation (HCAV3-1): All WaSC's 
Equation (HCAV4-I): WoC CR 
Equation (HCAV5-1): WoC NCR 
Equation (HCAV6-I): All WoC's. 
The outputs from PcGive for each equation are set out on the following 
three pages. 
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EQ(HCAV1-I) Modelling DEBT by OLS-CS (using WaSC CR data) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part. R^2 
Constant -18.4259 84.24 -0.219 0.828 0.0012 
Tl -24.7028 97.89 -0.252 0.802 0.0016 
T2 197.954 116.4 1.70 0.097 0.0674 
HCAV 0.607709 0.6200 0.980 0.333 0.0235 
HCAVTl -0.0449099 0.6413 -0.0700 0.945 0.0001 
HCAVT2 0.405112 0.6287 0.644 0.523 0.0103 
HC, P: v'-l -0.623252 0.6607 -0.943 0.351 0.0218 
HCAV-lT1 0.171235 0.6844 0.250 0.804 0.0016 
HCAV-1T2 -0.148615 0.6770 -0.220 0.827 0.0012 
DEBT-1 1.37040 0.7312 1.87 0.068 0.0807 
DEBT-lT1 -0.578247 0.7588 -0.762 0.451 0.0143 
DEBT-lT2 -0.267338 0.7508 -0.356 0.724 0.0032 
DEBT-2 -0.395601 0.6615 -0.598 0.553 0.0089 
DEBT-2T1 0.438416 0.6887 0.637 0.528 0.0100 
DEBT-2T2 -0.339072 0.7208 -0.470 0.641 0.0055 
sigma 87.134 RSS 303693.668 
R^2 0.983806 F(14,40) 173.6 [0.000]- 
log-likelihood -314.994 DW 2.34 
no. of observat ions 55 no. of par ameters 15 
mean(DEBT) 822.731 var(DEBT) 340976 
Normality test: Ch 
iA 2(2) = 13.182 [0. 001411, * 
hetero test: F(26,13) = 0.49689 [0. 93741 
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RESET test: F(1,39) = 3.3108 [0. 07651 
EQ(HCAV2-I) Modelling DEBT by OLS-CS (using WaSC NCR data) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part. R, ^12 
Constant -15.7990 119.3 -0.132 0.895 0.0004 
T1 -140.171 150.9 -0.929 0.359 0.0211 
T2 110.773 191.2 0.579 0.566 0.0083 
HCAV 0.202690 0.3872 0.524 0.603 0.0068 
HCAVT1 0.464757 0.4369 1.06 0.294 0.0275 
HCAVT2 0.109889 0.4232 0.260 0.796 0.0017 
HCAV-1 -0.156250 0.3754 -0.416 0.679 0.0043 
HCAV-1T1 -0.367282 0.4336 -0.847 0.402 0.0176 
HCAV-1T2 -0.160631 0.4496 -0.357 0.723 0.0032 
DEBT-1 1.03743 0.7463 1.39 0.172 0.0461 
DEBT-1T1 -0.220856 0.7597 -0.291 0.773 0.0021 
DEJ3T-1T2 -0.00631225 0.9844 -0.00641 0.995 0.0000 
DEBT-2 -0.330679 0.6409 -0.516 0.609 0.0066 
DEBT-2T1 0.312325 0.6715 0.465 0.644 0.0054 
DEBT-2T2 0.308777 0.7785 0.397 0.694 0.0039 
sigma 134.958 RSS 728551.623 
Rý2 0.975683 F(14,40) 114.6 [0.000]++ 
log-likelihood -339.057 DW 2.15 
no. of observat ions 55 no. of par ameters 15 
mean(DEBT) 1062.55 var(DEBT) 544742 
Normality test: Chiý2(2) = 33.725 
[0. 0000]4,, k 
hetero test: F(26,13) = 0.22194 [0- 99951 
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RESET test: F(1,39) =0.00031279 [0 . 98601 
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EQ(HCAV3-I) Modelling DEBT by OLS-CS (using All WaSCs data) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part. R^2 
Constant 20.4790 54.14 0.378 0.706 0.0015 
Tl -94.4589 68.48 -1.38 0.171 0.0196 
T2 38.1442 82.00 0.465 0.643 0.0023 
HCAV 0.254540 0.2787 0.913 0.363 0.0087 
HCAVT1 0.370169 0.3104 1.19 0.236 0.0148 
HCAVT2 0.474102 0.2906 1.63 0.106 0.0272 
HCAV-1 -0.243092 0.2742 -0.886 0.378 0.0082 
HCAV-1T1 -0.272711 0.3110 -0.877 0.383 0.0080 
HCAV-1T2 -0.440888 0.2902 -1.52 0.132 0.0237 
DEBT-1 1.17353 0.4875 2.41 0.018 0.0575 
DEBT-1Tl -0.355751 0.4998 -0.712 0.478 0.0053 
DEBT-1T2 -0.00269857 0.5142 -0.00525 0.996 0.0000 
DEBT-2 -0.321269 0.4411 -0.728 0.468 0.0056 
DEBT-2T1 0.362110 0.4612 0.785 0.434 0.0064 
DEBT-2T2 0.0893698 0.4726 0.189 0.850 0.0004 
sigma 118.207 RSS 1327425.77 
R", 2 0.973608 F. (14,95) 250.3 [0.0001** 
log-likelihood -672.988 DW 2.18 
no. of observati ons 110 no. of parameters 15 
mean(DEBT) 942.641 var(DEBT) 457237 
Normality test: ChiA2(2) = 36.146 [0.00001** 
hetero test: F(26,68) = 0.86254 [0.65431 
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RESET test: F(1,94) = 1.3505 [0.24811 
EQ(HCAV4-I) Modelling DEBT by OLS-CS (using WoC CR data) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part. R^2 
Constant -4.69755 7.543 -0.623 0.536 0.0075 
TI 2.23573 9.471 0.236 0.814 0.0011 
T2 0.274732 9.997 0.0275 0.978 0.0000 
HCAV 0.951309 0.6127 1.55 0.127 0.0451 
HCAVT1 -0.376674 0.6640 -0.567 0.573 0.0063 
HCAVT2 0.110151 0.6246 0.176 0.861 0.0006 
HCAV-1 -0.874098 0.6858 -1.27 0.208 0.0309 
HCAV-1T1 0.378323 0.7455 0.507 0.614 0.0050 
HCAV-1T2 0.0324065 0.7109 0.0456 0.964 0.0000 
DEBT-1 0.634351 0.4867 1.30 0.198 0.0322 
DEBT-1T1 0.219863 0.5624 0.391 0.697 0.0030 
DEBT-1T2 0.363788 0.5700 0.638 0.526 0.0079 
DEBT-2 0.139184 0.4508 0.420 0.677 0.0034 
DEBT-2T1 -0.230234 0.5365 -0.429 0.670 0.0036 
DEBT-2T2 -0.492422 0.5003 -0.984 0.330 0.0186 
sigma 9.79317 RSS 4891.21767 
R"'2 0.907916 F(14,51) 35.92 [0.0001** 
log-likelihood -235.733 DW 2.13 
no. of observat ions 66 no. of par ameters 15 
mean(DEBT) 27-9329 var(DEBT) 804.8 
Normality test: Chi^2(2) = 63.533 [0. 0000]** 
hetero test: F(26,24) = 0.51901 [0. 94741 
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RESET test: F(1,50) = 4.6984 [0. 03503* 
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EQ(HCAV5-I) Modelling DEBT by OLS-CS (using WoC NCR data) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part. R^2 
Constant -1.84682 3.784 -0.488 0.628 0.0046 
T1 -1.05227 4.453 -0.236 0.814 0.0011 
T2 0.643652 4.873 0.132 0.895 0.0003 
HCAV 0.481494 0.2022 2.38 0.021 0.1000 
HC'AVT1 -0.367915 0.3022 -1.22 0.229 0.0282 
HCAVT2 -0.477840 0.3999 -1.20 0.238 0.0272 
HCAV-1 -0.432644 0.6361 -0.680 0.499 0.0090 
HCRV-lTl 0.488649 0.6757 0.723 0.473 0.0102 
HCAV-1T2 0.509545 0.7237 0.704 0.485 0.0096 
DEBT-1 1.13409 0.4578 2.48 0.017 0.1074 
DEBT-1T1 -0.573753 0.4951 -1.16 0.252 0.0257 
DEBT-1T2 0.130719 0.5393 0.242 0.809 0.0012 
DEBT-2 -0.311111 0.4466 -0.697 0.489 0.0094 
DEBT-2T1 0.429884 0.4757 0.904 0.370 0.0158 
DEBT-2T2 -0.0755224 0.5647 -0.134 0.894 0.0004 
sigma 7.83895 RSS 3133.90984 
Rý2 0.984823 F(14,51) 236.4 [0.0001-k* 
log-likelihood -221.043 DW 2.28 
no. of observations 66 no. of parameters 15 
mean(DEBT) 50-4458 var(DEBT) 3128.57 
Normality test: Chiý2(2) = 40.254 [0.00001** 
hetero test: F(26,24) = 3.2659 [0.00241** 
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RESET test: F(1,50) = 0.65899 [0.42081 
EQ(HCAV6-I) Modelling DEBT by OLS-CS (using All WoCs data) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part. R^2 
Constant -2.22241 2.970 -0.748 0.456 0.0048 
T1 -1.00312 3.693 -0.272 0.786 0.0006 
T2 1.75790 4.073 0.432 0.667 0.0016 
HCAV 0.557183 0.1673 3.33 0.001 0.0866 
HCAVTI -0.179991 0.2341 -0.769 0.443 0.0050 
HCAVT2 0.435448 0.1945 2.24 0.027 0.0411 
HCAV-1 -0.506306 0.2002 -2.53 0.013 0.0518 
HCAV-1T1 0.248699 0.2656 0.936 0.351 0.0074 
HCAV-1T2 -0.326994 0.2378 -1.37 0.172 0.0159 
DEBT-1 1.03530 0.1878 5.51 0.000 0.2062 
DEBT-1T1 -0.326399 0.2452 -1.33 0.186 0.0149 
DEBT-1T2 -0.000736656 0.2623 -0.00281 0.998 0.0000 
DEBT-2 -0.208244 0.1851 -1.13 0.263 0.0107 
DEBT-2Tl 0.249532 0.2382 1.05 0.297 0.0093 
DEBT-2T2 -0.135920 0.2523 -0.539 0.591 0.0025 
sigma 8.90484 RSS 9277.66193 
R^2 0.966425 F(14,117) 240.6 [0.0001 " 
log-likelihood -467.969 DW 2.05 
no. of observat ions 132 no. of parameters 15 
mean(DEBT) 39.1994 var(DEBT) 2093.39 
Normality test: Chi/2(2) = 55.650 [0 . 0000]-k4, hetero test: F(26,90) = 1.2569 [0 . 21321 
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RESET test: F(1,116) = 0.90603 [0 . 34321 
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4. C. 2 Tests for serial correlation 
Table 4.30 sets out the results of the first two tests for serial correlation based 
on the residuals U-it from the six initial equations as described in subsection 
4.6.2. Each test calculates an estimate p, the coefficient of u-it-1; the first by 
including u-it- 1 as an additional regressor in the initial equation and the second 
by regressing U-it on u-it-1. The t-statistics marked * are heteroscedasticity- 
robust t-statistics based on White (1980). None of the t-statistics are signifi- 
cant at the 5% level. 
Table 4.30: Tests for serial correlation 
Equation 
Include u-it-1 as an 
additional regressor 
Regression of u'it on u-it-1 
p t-statistic p t-statistic 
HCAVI-I: WaSC CR -0.387883 -1.65 -0.211750 -1.44 
HCAV2-1: WaSC NCR -0.206623 -0.697 -0.0682388 -0.481 
HCAV3-1: All WaSC's -0.134548 -0.793 -0.0670618 -0.631 
HCAV4-1: WoC CR -0.435777 -1.07 -0.134411 -0.41438* 
HCAV5-1: WoC NCR -0.721456 -1.4157* -0.145376 -0.69663* 
HCAV6-1: All WoC's -0.230694 -1.01 -0.0917538 -0.57645* 
Table 4.31 gives the results of the third test for serial correlation described 
in subsection 4.6.2. This uses the residuals U-it from the six initial equations 
to test for serial correlation by estimating p for each company separately. The 
t-statistics marked * are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics based on White 
(1980). The critical values of the t-test are 2.262 at the 5% level and 3.250 
at the 1% level. Where the coefficient is significantly different from zero the 
significance level for the t-statistic is given in parentheses i. e. [5] or [1]. 
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Table 4.31: Tests for serial correlation 
E) - Itusiduals U-it from Residuals U-it from 
Category Company HCAV3-1 & 6-1 HCAVI-1,2-1,4-1 & 5-1 
P t-statistic P t-statistic 
ANH -0.481550 -0.871 -0.118627 -0.317 
WSH -0.0229722 -0.0661 -0.326865 -1.02 
WaSC CR NES -0.182230 -0.537 0.405146 1.29 
SRN 0.042014 0.114 -0.334939 -1.06 
wSx 0.126591 0.252 0.0693758 0.171 
SVT -0.638350 -2.50 [5] -0.665724 -1.6111* 
SWT 0.0772960 0.223 0.330765 1.05 
WaSC NCR TMS 0.0107160 0.0321 0.00964509 0.0290 
UUw -0.218319 -0.673 -0.357898 -1.11 
YKY 0.588700 3.3465* [1] 0.106432 0.375 
brl 0.0585079 0.178 -0.339937 -0.111 
dvw -0.604096 -2.22 -0.374417 -1.22 
WoC CR mkt 0.176661 0.371 -0.015584 -0.0372 
prt -0.144748 -0.438 -0.295637 -0.882 
sst -0.835291 -0.818 -0.892552 -0.986 
ses 0.437521 1.57 0.417120 1.30 
bwh 0.580751 1.81 0.641137 2.51 [5] 
cam -0.220368 -1.0143* -0.574619 -2.20 
WoC NCR flk 0.600759 2.31 [5] 0.394486 1.32 
mse -0.279793 -0.830 -0.289309 -0.909 
thd 0.465946 1.76 -0-0825832 -0.257 
tvn -0-188 0.622 -0.235752 -0.789 
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4. C. 3 Model reduction 
In the following Tables N is the number of observations and p is the number 
of parameters in the relevant equation. Variables deleted (or added) in the 
model reduction procedure are shown next to the first equation from which 
they have been eliminated (or to which they have been added). 
Table 4.32: Model reduction - All WaSC's 
Equation N Variable 
delete/add (-/+) 
p log-likelihood SC HQC AIC 
EQ( 1) 110 _ 15 -672.98818 12-877 12.658 12.509 
EQ( 2) 110 -Djt_jT2t 14 -672.98820 12.834 12.630 12.491 
EQ( 3) 110 -constant 13 -673.07468 12.793 12.604 12.474 
EQ( 4) 110 -Dit-2T2t 12 -673.22215 12.753 12.578 12.459 
EQ( 5) 110 -HCAVjt_jT1t 11 -673.66058 12.718 12.558 12.448 
EQ( 6) 110 -T2t 10 -674.20712 12.686 12.540 12.440 
EQ( 7) 110 -Dit-2TIt 9 -675.55519 12.667 12.536 12.446 
EQ( 8) 110 -Dit-2 8 -676.16229 12.636 12.519 12.439 
EQ( 9) 110 -Dit-, Tlt 7 -676.63931 12.602 12.500 12.430 
EQ(10) 110 -HCAVjt_jT2t 6 -677.83786 12.581 12.493 12.433 
EQ (11) 110 -Tlt 5 -679.37934 12.566 12.493 12.443 
Table 4.33: Model reduction - WaSC CR 
Equation N Variable 
delete/add (-/+) 
p log-likelihood SC HQC AIC 
EQ( 1) 55 15 -314.99376 12.547 12.211 12.000 
EQ( 2) 55 -HCAVitTIt 14 -314-99714 12.474 12.161 11.964 
EQ( 3) 55 -constant 13 -314.99714 12.474 12.161 11-964 
EQ( 4) 55 -Djt_jT2t 12 -315.11113 12.333 12.064 11.895 
EQ( 5) 55 -HCAVjt_jT2t 11 -315.61290 12.278 12.032 11.877 
EQ( 6) 55 -Djt-2T1t 10 -316.06952 12.222 11.998 11.857 
EQ( 7) 55 -Dit-2 9 -316.28247 12.157 11.955 11.828 
EQ( 8) 55 -Djt_jTIt 8 -317.05466 12.112 11.933 11.820 EQ( 9) 55 -TIt 7 -317.76515 12.065 11.908 11.810 
EQ(10) 55 -T2t 6 -319.91966 12.071 11.936 11.852 
EQ (11) 55 -Djt-2T2t 5 -323-15389 12.115 12.003 11.933 
EQ(12) 55 -HCAVit_1TIt 5 -323.60403 12.132 12.020 11.949 
+HCAVitTIt 
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Table 4.34: Model reduction - WaSC NCR 
Equation N Variable 
delete/add (-/+) 
p log-likelihood SC HQC AIC 
EQ( 1) 55 15 -339.05734 13.422 13.087 12.875 
EQ( 2) 55 -Djt_jT2t 14 -339.05736 13.349 13.036 12.838 
EQ( 3) 55 -constant 13 -339.07018 13.277 12.986 12.803 
EQ( 4) 55 -HCAVjtT2t 12 -339.12907 13.206 12.938 12.768 
EQ( 5) 55 -HCAVjt_jT2t 11 -339.18511 13.135 12.889 12.734 
EQ( 6) 55 -Dit-lTlt 10 -339.22882 13.064 12.840 12.699 
EQ( 7) 55 -Dit-2TIt 9 -339.37675 12.997 12.795 12.668 
EQ( 8) 55 -Dit-2 8 -339.60814 12.932 12.753 12.640 
EQ( 9) 55 -T2t 7 -340.03048 12.875 12.718 12.619 
EQ(10) 55 -HCAVjt_jTIt 6 -340.51858 12.820 12.685 12.601 
EQ (11) 55 -Tlt 5 -342.57588 12.822 12.710 12.639 
EQ(12) 55 -Djt-2T2t 5 -342.74656 12.828 12.716 12.645 
+HCAVitTIt 
Table 4.35: Model reduction - All WoC's 
Equation N Variable 
delete/add (-/+)_ 
p log-likelihood SC HQC AIC 
EQ( 1) 132 15 -467-96904 7.6453 7.4508 7.3177 
EQ( 2) 132 -Djt_jT2t 14 -467.96904 7.6083 7.4268 7.3026 
EQ( 3) 132 -TIt 13 -468.01248 7.5720 7.4034 7.2881 
EQ( 4) 132 -Djt-2T2t 12 -468.23640 7.5384 7.3828 7.2763 
EQ( 5) 132 -HCAVitTIt 11 -468.53769 7.5060 7.3633 7.2657 
EQ( 6) 132 -HCAVit-, Tlt 10 -468.56672 7.4694 7.3398 7.2510 
EQ( 7) 132 -T2t 9 -469.20125 7.4420 7.3253 7.2455 
EQ( 8) 132 -constant 8 -470.32755 7.4221 7.3184 7.2474 
EQ( 9) 132 -Djt_jTIt 7 -471.80894 7.4076 7.3168 7.2547 
EQ(10) 132 -Dit-2TIt 6 -472.61334 7.3828 7.3050 7.2517 
EQ (11) 132 -Dit-2 5 -474.06264 7.3677 7.3029 7.2585 
EQ (11) 144 5 -514.97832 7.3250 7.2638 7.2219 
EQ (12) 144 -HCAVjt_jT2t 4 -518.68906 7.3421 7.2931 7.2596 
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Table 4.36: Model reduction - WoC CR 
Equation N Variable 
delete/add (-/+) 
p log-likelihood SC HQC AIC 
EQ( 1) 66 _ 15 -235.73282 8.0956 7.7946 7.5980 
EQ( 2) 66 -T2t 14 -235.73331 8.0321 7.7512 7.5677 
EQ( 3) 66 -HCAVit-IT2t 13 -235.73574 7.9687 7.7079 7.5374 
EQ( 4) 66 -TIt 12 -235.78849 7.9069 7.6661 7.5087 
EQ( 5) 66 -Djt_jTIt 11 -235.86121 7.8456 7.6248 7.4806 
EQ( 6) 66 -Dit-2 10 -235.89542 7.7831 7.5825 7.4514 
EQ( 7) 66 -Dit-2TIt 9 -235.91966 7.7204 7.5398 7.4218 
EQ( 8) 66 -Dit-IT2t 8 -236.27971 7.6678 7.5073 7.4024 
EQ( 9) 66 -constant 7 -236.84425 7.6215 7.4810 7.3892 
EQ(10) 66 -HCAVitTlt 6 -237.40057 7.5748 7.4544 7.3758 
EQ (11) 66 -HCAVjt_jTIt 5 -237.69631 7.5203 7.4200 7.3544 
EQ(12) 66 -Djt-2T2t 4 -238.91354 7.4937 7.4135 7.3610 
Table 4.37: Model reduction - WoC NCR 
Equation N Variable 
delete/add (-/+)_ 
p log-likelihood SC HQC AIC 
EQ( 1) 66 15 -221.04255 7.6505 7.3494 7.1528 
EQ( 2) 66 -Djt-2T2t 14 -221.05412 7.5873 7.3064 7.1229 
EQ( 3) 66 -TIt 13 -221.07962 7.5246 7.2637 7.0933 
EQ( 4) 66 -Dit-IT2t 12 -221.18760 7.4644 7.2236 7.0663 
EQ( 5) 66 -T2t 11 -221.25962 7.4031 7.1824 7.0382 
EQ( 6) 66 -HCAVitTIt 10 -222.44693 7.3756 7.1749 7.0438 
EQ( 7) 66 -HCAVjtT2t 9 -222.92446 7.3266 7.1460 7.0280 
EQ( 8) 66 -HCAVit-ITIt 8 -223.19989 7.2715 7.1109 7.0061 
EQ( 9) 66 -HCAVit-, 7 -224.11682 7.2358 7.0953 7.0035 
EQ(10) 66 -HCAVjt_jT2t 6 -224.58448 7.1865 7.0661 6.9874 
EQ(11) 66 -Dit-2TIt 5 -229.05067 7.2583 7.1580 7.0924 
EQ (12) 66 -Djt_jTIt 4 -229.93036 7.2215 7.1412 7.0888 
EQ(13) 66 -Dit-2 3 -231.87864 7.2171 7.1569 7.1175 
EQ (14) 66 -constant 2 -233.11210 7.1910 7.1508 7.1246 
All WoCs 72 -252-09469 7.2402 7.1641 7.1137 
72 -HCAVit_1T2t -255.06311 7.2633 7.2062 7.1684 
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4. C. 4 Final estimates 
The final estimates of the equations for each type and category of company 
are numbered in this appendix as: 
Equation (HCAVI-F): WaSC CR 
Equation (HCAV2-F): WaSC NCR 
Equation (HCAV3-F): All WaSC's 
Equation (HCAV4-F): WoC CR 
Equation (HCAV5-F): WoC NCR 
Equation (HCAV6-F): All WoC's. 
The outputs from PcGive for each equation are set out on the following 
three pages. 
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EQ(HCAV1-F) Modelling DEBT by DPD 1-step (using WaSC CR data) 
---- 1-step estimation using DPD ---- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DEBT(-l) 0.849807 0.05800 14.7 0.000 
HCAV 0.717291 0.08330 8.61 0.000 
HCAVT1 0.0451968 0.009129 4.95 0.000 
HCAVT2 0.117944 0.02848 4.14 0.000 
HCAV(-l) -0.695859 0.1039 -6.70 0.000 
sigma 87.61454 
RA20.9793386 
RSS 422196.91246 
no. of observations 60 
sigma^2 
TSS 20434084.869 
no. of parameters 5 
7676.307 
Using robust standard errors 
number of individuals 
longest time series 
shortest time series 
Wald (joint): Chi^2(5) 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) 
5 (derived from year) 
12 [1992 - 20031 
12 (balanced panel) 
=2.623e+004 [0.0001 
0.1113 [0.9111 
-1.553 [0.1201 
Tests from modelling DEBT by OLS-CS 
Normality test: Chiý2(2) = 11.732 [0.00281** 
hetero test: F(10,44) = 3.6724 [0.00131*,, " 
hetero-X test: F(17,37) = 2.3779 [0.01371* 
RESET test: F(1,54) = 0.47084 [0.49551 
EQ(HCAV2-F) Modelling DEBT by DPD 1-step (using WaSC NCR data) 
---- 1-step estimation using DPD ---- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DEBT(-l) 0.861257 0.02513 34.3 0.000 
HCAV 0.418534 0.02382 17.6 0.000 
HCAVT1 0.0579330 0.007086 8.18 0.000 
HCAVT2 0.0611808 0.006382 9.59 0.000 
HCAV(-l) -0.385740 0.02833 -13.6 0.000 
sigma 124.1088 
R^2 0.9750227 
RSS 847165.18798 
no. of observations 60 
sigma^2 
TSS 33917339.459 
no. of parameters 5 
15403 
Using robust standard errors 
number of individuals 
longest time series 
shortest time series 
Wald (joint): Ch iA 2(5) 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) 
5 (derived from year) 
12 [1992 - 20031 
12 (balanced panel) 
9012. [0.0001 
-0.1255 [0.9001 
-0-9123 [0.3621 
Tests from modelling DEBT by OLS-CS 
Normality test: Chi, ý2(2) = 30.070 [0.0000]** 
hetero test: F(10,44) = 0.89600 [0.54451 
hetero-X test: F(17,37) = 0.74110 [0.74231 
RESET test: F(1, S4) = 0.33279 [0.56641 
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EQ(HCAV3-F) Modelling DEBT by DPD 1-step (using All WaSCs data) 
---- 1-step estimation using DPD ---- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DEBT(-l) 0.893932 0.02888 31.0 0.000 
HCAV 0.639570 0.09313 6.87 0.000 
HCAVT1 0.0507238 0.009435 5.38 0.000 
HCAVT2 0.0828719 0.01295 6.40 0.000 
HCAV(-l) -0.626875 0.1029 -6.09 0.000 
sigma 114.342 
R^2 0.9730087 
RSS 1503521.8264 
no. of observations 120 
Using robust standard errors 
number of individuals 
longeSt time series 
shortest time series 
Wald (joint): Chi-2(5) 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) 
sigma'ý2 13074.1 
TSS 55704025.479 
no. of parameters 5 
10 (derived from year) 
12 [1992 - 20031 
12 (balanced panel) 
=7.969e+004 [0.000] 
-0.4388 [0.6611 
-1.065 [0.2871 
Tests from modelling DEBT by OLS-CS 
Normality test: Chiý2(2) = 54.062 [0.00001** 
hetero test: F(10,104)= 1.8932 [0.05421 
hetero-X test: F(17,97) = 1.7839 [0.04101* 
RESET test: F(1,114) = 0.057174 (0.81141 
EQ(HCAV4-F) Modelling DEBT by DPD 1-step (using WoC CR data. xls) 
---- 1-step estimation using DPD ---- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DEBT(-l) 0.864012 0.02206 39.2 0.000 
HCAV 0.893743 0.1106 8.08 0.000 
HCAVT2 0.113757 0.03395 3.35 0.001 
HCAV(-l) -0.872756 0.1108 -7.87 0.000 
sigma 8.971958 
R^2 0.9019792 
RSS 5473.7300239 
no. of observations 72 
Using robust standard errors 
number of individuals 
longest time series 
shortest time series 
Wald (joint): ChiA2(4) 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) 
sigmaA2 80.49603 
TSS 55842.560023 
no. of parameters 4 
6 (derived from year) 
12 [1992 - 20031 
12 (balanced panel) 
=6.846e+004 [0.0001 
-1-898 [0.0581 
-1 .766[0.07 71 
Tests from modelling DEBT by OLS-CS 
Normality test: Chi^2(2) = 111.53 [0.0000]*+ 
hetero test: F(8,59) = 1.2434 [0.29061 
hetero-X test: F(13,54) = 1.5016 [0-1471] 
RESET test: F(1,67) = 5.6595 [0.02021* 
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EQ(HCAVS-F) Modelling DEBT by DPD 1-step (using WoC NCR data. xls) 
---- 1-step estimation using DPD ---- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DEBT(-l) 0.821309 0.1065 7.71 0.000 
HCAV 0.391348 0.09783 4.00 0.000 
HCAV(-l) -0.306005 0.06949 -4.40 0.000 
sigma 8.541054 sigma 
A2 72.94961 
R^2 0.9771839 
RSS 5033.5229362 TSS 220612.41213 
no. of observations 72 no. of parameters 3 
U-sing robust standard errors 
number of individuals 6 (derived from year) 
longest time series 12 [1992 - 20031 
shortest time series 12 (balance d panel) 
Wald (joint): Chiý2(3) =8.482e+004 [0.0001 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) = 0.8663 [0.3861 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) = -1.596 [0.1111 
Tests from modelling DEBT by OLS-CS 
Normality test: Chiý2(2) = 17.346 [0.00021** 
hetero test: F(6,62) = 6.1910 [0.00001", -k 
hetero-X test: F(9,59) = 9.4965 [0.00001-k* 
RESET test: F(1,68) = 1.9566 [0.16641 
EQ(HCAV6-F) Modelling DEBT by DPD 1-step (using All WoCs data. xls) 
---- 1-step estimation using DPD ---- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DEBT(-l) 0.809525 0.07686 10.5 0.000 
HCAV 0.805524 0.1005 8.01 0.000 
HCAVT2 0.0700239 0.02193 3.19 0.002 
HCAV(-l) -0.757572 0.1074 -7.05 0.000 
sigma 8.999367 
R, "2 0.9615015 
RSS 11338.405923 
no. of observations 144 
sigma^2 80.98861 
TSS 294515.66052 
no. of parameters 4 
Using robust standard errors 
number of individuals 12 (derived from year) 
longest time series 12 [1992 - 20031 
shortest time series 12 (balance d panel) 
Wald (joint): Ch iA 2(4) =1.012e+004 (0.0001 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) = -0.1158 [0.9081 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) = -1.810 (0.070] 
Tests from modelling DEBT by OLS-CS 
Normality test: Chi^2(2) = 89.661 [0.0000]** 
hetero test: F(8,131) = 2.5720 [0.01221ýk 
hetero-X test: F(13,126)= 3.0591 [0.00061" 
RESET test: F(1,139) = 0.66538 [0.41611 
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Appendix 4. D ADF Tests on Debt, HCAV and RCV 
The following Tables set out the results of the ADF tests on the variables 
Debt, HCAV and RCV. The ADF test of whether a variable yt has a unit root 
is a test of the null hypothesis that p=1 in the regression: 
Ayt =a+ ýt + (p - 1) yt- i+ ut ut %., -N i. i. d 
(01 U2) 5 
where t is a time trend. The 'constant/no trend' test assumes 3=0 and tests 
the null that yt has a non-stationary or stochastic trend against the alternative 
that yt is stationary around a constant mean. The constant term a is included 
to allow for a non-zero mean in the variable3l. The 'constant/with trend' test 
includes the time trend t and tests the null that yt has a quadratic stochastic 
trend against the alternative that yt is stationary around a linear trend (i. e. 
when it is not valid to assume, as an alternative hypothesis, that the variable 
is stationary around a constant mean ). 
The tests are calculated for the pooled data on the variables for each type 
and category of company and also for the data on each company separately. 
Critical values for the t-statistics are given at the bottom of each Table. Where 
the coefficient (p - 1) is significantly below zero (i. e. the null hypothesis of a 
unit root and hence non-stationarity is rejected) the significance level for the 
t-statistic is given in parentheses i. e. [5] or [1]. 
3 'The mean of a variable with a unit root is determined by its starting value. Also, under 
the alternative hypothesis of stationarity, if the constant term a is not included in the the 
test it is assumed that the variable has a zero mean. Consequently, a constant is included 
when it is not valid to assume that the mean of a series is zero. 
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Table 4.38: ADF tests - WaSC's and WoUs 
Category constant/no trend constant/with trend 
p-1 t-statistic p-1 t-statistic 
Debt WaSC's CR 0.200 1.936 0.201 1.275 
NCR -0.012 -0.403 0.004 0.077 
All 0.049 1.325 0.030 0.699 
WOC's CR 0.008 0.093 -0.014 -0.178 
NCR 0.041 1.403 0.040 1.341 
All 0.026 1.000 0.020 0.683 
HCAV WaSC's CR 0.093 1.691 0.102 1.767 
NCR -0.030 -1.24 0.010 0.372 
All 0.008 0.363 0.023 1.158 
WOC's CR 0.009 0.249 -0.004 -0.097 
NCR 0.040 3.019 0.047 3.704 
All 0.038 3.37 0.039 2.862 
RCV WaSC's CR 0.023 1.697 0.042 2.922 
NCR -0.002 -0-135 0.044 2.49 
All 0.017 1.71 0.044 4.25 
NVOC's CR 0.061 4.75 0.064 4.49 
NCR 0.039 3.78 0.044 4.811 
All 0.041 4.026 0.045 4.546 
Critical 5% -3.148 -3.873 
values 1% -4.137 -4.989 
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Table 4.39: ADF tests - Debt 
Company constant/no trend constant/with trend 
P-I t-statistic P-1 t-statistic 
WaSC's ANH 0.391 2.761 1.626 2.070 
CR WSH 0.090 1.115 -0.236 -1.027 
NES 0.114 1.509 -0.140 -0.568 
SRN 0.071 0.751 -0.184 -1.008 
WSx 0.070 0.424 -0.713 -1.290 
WaSC's SVT -0.073 -1.248 -0.471 -1.347 
NCR SWT -0.057 -0.954 -0.586 -2.269 
TMS -0.076 -0.698 -0.470 -1.636 
UUW -0.049 -0.787 -0.579 -1.752 
YKY 0.057 0.677 -0.305 -1.470 
WOC's brl -0.642 -2.063 -0.791 -2.372 
CR dvw -0.857 -1.402 -0.389 -0.546 
mkt 0.949 2.072 0.731 0.782 
prt -3.882 -3.102 -3.517 -2.462 
sst 0.251 0.231 2.327 2.528 
ses -0-104 -0.428 -0.201 -0.880 
WOC's bwh -0.148 -0.628 -0.306 -1.665 
NCR cam -0.384 -1.405 -0.798 -2.810 
flk -0.121 -0.488 -1.036 -2.822 
mse -0.366 -1.700 -0.868 -2.738 
thd -0.687 -2.778 -0.674 -2.538 
tvn -0.136 -0.545 -0.399 -1.256 Critical 5% -3.148 -3.873 
values 1% -4.137 -4.989 
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Table 4.40: ADF tests - HCAV 
Company constant/no trend constant/with trend 
P-I t-statistic P-1 t-statistic 
WaSC's ANH 0.239 1.708 0.222 0.261 
CR WSH 0.013 0.213 -0.808 -2.407 
NES -0.037 -0.892 -0.584 -1.671 
SRN -0.037 -0.332 -0.657 -2.193 
WSx -0.127 -0.995 -0.959 -3.136 
WaSC's SVT -0.233 -3.027 -0.325 -1.277 
NCR SWT -0.138 -4.048 [5] -0.302 -2.453 
TMS -0.258 -2.471 -0.256 -0.949 
UUW -0.154 -1.651 -0.740 -2.042 
YKY -0.33 -0.401 -0.377 -1.452 
WOUS brl -0.247 -2.001 -0.407 -1.147 
CR dvw -0.762 -2.311 -1.424 -2.613 
nikt 0.530 1.901 0.658 0.719 
prt -1.341 -1.222 -4.739 -11.233 [1] 
sst 0.107 1.333 -0.205 -0.606 
ses -0.205 -0.755 -0.291 -1.071 
WOUS bwh -0.148 -0.628 -0.489 -1.576 
NCR cam -0.587 -2.550 -0.419 -2.159 
flk -0.236 -0.198 -0.700 -2.164 
mse -0.141 -3.073 -0.336 -1.633 
thd -0.390 -4.510 [1] -0.520 -2.801 
tvn -0.127 -1.380 -0.601 -1.990 
Critical 5% -3.148 -3.873 
values 1% -4.137 -4.989 
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Table 4.41: ADF tests - RCV 
Company constant/no trend constant/with trend 
P-I t-statistic P-1 t-statistic 
WaSC's ANH -0.019 -0.600 -1.164 -2.857 
CR WSH -0.008 -0.309 -1.061 -3.180 
NES -0.008 -0.160 -0.815 -2.562 
SRN -0.056 -0.956 -0.218 -0.730 
WSx 0.021 1.184 -0.245 -1.011 
WaSC's SVT -0.110 -3.636 [51 -0.041 -0.231 
NCR SWT -0.156 -3.358 [5] -0.133 -0.978 
TMS -0.053 -1.502 0.000 0.000 
UUW -0.118 -2.025 -0.115 -0.624 
YKY 0.011 0.485 -0.377 -1.764 
WOC's brI 0.036 0.554 -0.461 -1.431 
CR dvw -0.175 -2.114 -0.230 -0.982 
mkt 0.044 1.110 -0.304 -1.034 
prt 0.027 0.335 -0.515 -2.049 
sst 0.009 0.159 -0.703 -2.012 
ses 0.017 0.084 -0.699 -1.871 
WOC's bwh -0-098 -1.168 -0.495 -1.416 
NCR cam -0.424 -5.651 [1] -0.454 -3.497 
flk 0.013 0.185 -0.420 -1.478 
mse -0.023 -0.725 -0.451 -1.401 
thd -0.157 -3.988 [5] -0.420 -1.880 
tvn -0.134 -3.006 0.040 0.232 
Critical 5% -3.148 -3.873 
values 1% -4.137 -4.989 
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Appendix 4. E Critical Values Tables 
Table 4.42: MacKinnon (1991) 
No of Critical Values for sample size 
variables Test size Pa P, P2 T= 12 
Constant + 
no trend 1 1 -3.4336 -5.999 -29.25 -4.13664 
5 -2.8621 -2.738 -8.36 -3.14832 
10 -2.5671 -1.438 -4.48 -2.71804 
Constant + 
no trend 2 1 -3.9001 -10.534 -30.03 -4.98648 
5 -3.3377 -5.967 -8.98 -3.89731 
10 -3.0462 -4.069 -5.73 -3.42508 
Constant + 
no trend 3 1 -4.2981 -13.79 -46.37 -5.76928 
5 -3.7429 -8.352 -13.41 -4.53203 
10 -3.4518 -6.241 -2.79 -3.99126 
Constant + 
no trend 4 1 -4.6493 -17.188 -59.2 -6.49274 
5 -4.1 -10.745 -21.57 -5.14521 
10 -3.811 -8.317 -5.19 -4.54013 
Note: 
CV = Pjý + PI/T + P2/T 
2 
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Table 4.43: Ericsson and MacKinnon (1999) 
No of 
variables Test size 
k % 
No constant 2 1 -3.2106 -4.69 -10.5 48 
5 -2.5937 -1.53 -0.8 -24 
10 -2.2643 -0.41 -0.5 -9 
No constant 31 -3.6215 -6.14 -5.3 -67 
5 -3.0048 -2.11 2.1 -61 
10 -2.6744 -0.57 1.2 -44 
No constant 41 -3.9433 -7.15 -3.1 -69 
5 -3.3268 -2.04 -6.4 19 
10 -2.9942 -0.21 -5.1 13 
Note: 
T=N- (2k-1) -d 
CV = Pe + Pi/T + P2/T 2+ Ps/T' 
Critical Values for sample 
d N= 12 
T= 9 
0 -3.79550 
-2.80650 
-2.32837 
T= 8 
0 -4.80214 
-3.44121 
-2.85962 
T= 5 
0 -6.04930 
-3.83880 
-3.13620 
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000 Appendix 4. F Restrictions in the Engle-Granger Pro- 
cedure 
In this study the first stage of the Engle-Granger procedure is to estimate the 
long-run relationship: 
Dit = g*Vit + uit, 
and then to use the residuals from the estimated relationship to test whether 
the error term, uit, is stationary. 
Let: 
Auit = auit-1 + sit, 
where Eit is an error term with zero mean and constant variance 32. Conse- 
quently, if u has a unit root then a=0 and u is non-stationary in which case 
Dit and Vit are not cointegrated. Conversely, if a<0 then u is stationary and 
Dit and Vit are'cointegrated. 
It follows from the above that: 
Dit = g*Vit + (I + a) uit-1 + sit, 
Dit - (I + a) (Dit- 1- g* Vit- 1) 
= 9*Vit + Eit) 
Dit [I - (I + a) L] = g*Vit [1 - (I + a) L] + Eit 
where L is the lag operator. Consequently, the Engle-Granger procedure im- 
poses a common factor restriction since [1 - (I + a) L] is a factor that is com- 
mon to both Dit and Vit. The effect of this restriction can be seen by noting 
that: 
ADit = g*AVit + Auit, 
ADit == g* AVit + auit- 1+ Eit, 
and so: 
ADit = g* AVit +a (Dit- 1- 9* Vit- 1) + 'it - 
This is the ECM in (4.19) with the restriction (4.36): 
7ý9* 
32 For these purposes the dummy variables have been excluded. 
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that is, the short-run adjustment factor is the same as the long run effect in 
equilibrium. 
Note also that -a = a, the long-run adjustment factor in (4.19). 
The common factor restriction imposes a further significant assumption 
if the Engle-Granger procedure is applied to the PAM. It can be seen from 
(4.20) that the PAM is a special case of the ECM when -y = ag*, that is: 
ADit = ag*AVit -a (Dit-, - g*Vit-, ), 
or: 
Dit = ceg*Vit + (1 - a) Dit-1. 
Consequently, in the PAM, the common factor restriction implies: 
ceg* =7= g* ) 
which also implies (4.51): 
a=1. 
This is the limiting case of the PAM in which there is full adjustment to 
the long-run equilibrium in each period. In other wordsý applying the Engle- 
Granger procedure to a PAM assumes the SLRM applies. 
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Appendix 4. G Adjustment Factors-Further Estimates 
based on HC" 
The following tables present the results from estimating an ECM in the form 
of: 
9 equation (4.42) using the results from the SLRM and 
9 equation (4.44) using the results from Stage I of the Engle-Granger pro- 
cedure. 
The short-run and long-run adjustment factors derived from these results 
are also given. 
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Table 4.44: ECM based on results from SLRM 
Diagimstic 
Variahie, Musted tests 
Equation AHCAV, A(HCAVTl, ) A(HCAVT2, ) q, 
-, 
Fe rejected 
WaSOs 
CR Cbefficiert 0.751 0.038 0.123 -0.124 0.868 N [1], H [1], HX [1], R [5] 
t-statistic 17.70 2.25 5.50 -5.94 
NCR Cbefficient 0.431 0.039 0.026 -0.156 0.736 N [1], R [5] 
t-statistic 32.20 1.54 1.10 -6.55 
AD WaSCs Cbefficient 0.646 0.041 0.058 -0.122 0.770 N [1), R [1] 
t-statistic 12.60 2.32 2.91 -6.05 
wock 
CR Cbefficient 0.976 - 0.025 -0.189 0.745 N [1], H [5], HX [5] 
t-stýatistic 9.49 2.87 -3.26 
NCR Coefficient 0.391 - -0.179 0.290 N [1], H [11, HX [11, R [1) 
t-statistic 4.01 1.99 
AN VbCý Coefficient 0.8m 0.044 -0.214 0.579 N (1] 
t-statistic 7.89 1.83 -5.61 
NOTES 
Clit qt is tl-r- the difference betweentFe actual ard predicted long nzi equililmiLurivalue of Dt derived frorn ttie SLRM 
t-statistic Calculated uýrg robist stan dard errors from panel data nDdels. 
Adjusted R? (b1cdated from 1- Adi Rý =(1- Fe) (n-1)/(n-k) wil-ere 1- Ime = RSS / EAD ýt 
2 
RSS is the Residual Sum of Squares, n is the nunb-z of observations and k is d-ie nurrEff of regressors. 
Dagnostic tests 
AhL 
OIS ri-odels Non-nality 
rvn 
N Tests the mill that the distribubion of the residuals is nom-Ed. 
pDoled data Hetero H Tests U-e null of 1mr-soadasticity usirg squar-es of regressors. 
Fletero-X HX Tests O-e null of hon-csoedasticity LE; Lr-g squares ard crcs-, prodLicts of regressois. 
RESET R Tests the null tlýat the rnodel is omectly specified agairst orrittirg tYe square of tfe 
Fredicted. value of the deper&A variade. 
PbLM data nr&ls 'vvWd (joirit) W All the nDdels reject the mil that all the coefficients are zero at the 1% significance level. 
AR(l) Al Tests tl-e null of no first order serial oorrelation ) All the rnD&ls accept these tests. 
AR(2) A2 Tests tF& null of no secorxi order gerial correlation) 
Significance levels 1% Ill 
5% 151 
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Table 4.45: ECM based on results from Engle-Granger Stage 11 
EXagnostic 
Variable Adjusted tests 
Equation AHCAV, A(HCAV, Tl, ) A(HCAV, U, ) Rt-1 Fe rejected 
WaSCs 
Ca Coefficient 0.864 0.027 0.124 -0.135 0.850 H [11, HX ý1], R [1] 
t-statistic 12.30 1.64 5.70 -1.713 
NCR Coeff icient 0.566 0.049 0.081 -0.233 0.606 N [1), R ý1] 
t-statistic 20.80 2.14 4.21 -7.98 
All WaSa Coefficient 0.717 0.039 0.087 -0.192 0.696 N [1], H [1), HX [5], R [1] 
t-statistic 8.20 2.17 5.84 -3.46 
Wo Cs 
CR Coefficient 1.019 -O. C)06 -0.279 0.673 N [1] 
týstatistic 8.08 -0.39 -3.29 
NCR Coefficient 0.415 - -0.183 0.289 N [1], H [1], HX [1], R [51 
t-statistic 4.00 -1.90 
AD WoCs Coefficient 0.722 0.013 -0.238 0.489 N [11, R [5) 
t-statistic 6.13 0.50 -2.76 
NOTES 
Rit-, Residual from the E-G Stage I Nlodels, i. e. the difference between t1 ie actual and predicted long-run 
equilibrii-im value of D,. 
t-statistic Calculated using robList star dard errors from panel data nudels. 
Adjusted R2 Calculated from 1- AdJRý 2 I-n-1n-k) where 1- Fe = RSS / EAD, 
RSS is the Residual Sum of Squares, n is the number of observations and k is the nurriber of regressors. 
Diagnostic tests 
Abt-x-vn 
OLS models Norn-ality N Tests the ndl that the distribAion of the residuals is normal. 
pooled data lietero H Tests the null of homoscedasticity using squares of regressors. 
Hetero-X HX Tests the nJ1 of homoscedasticity using squares and cross-products of regressors. 
RESET R Tests the null that the rriodel is correctly specified against omitting the square of tl-r, 
predicted value of the deprident variable. 
Panel data n-odels, Wald 6oint) W AU the models reject the null that aH the coefficients are zero at the 1% significance level. 
ARýl) Al Tests the null of no first order serial con-elation All tl-e models accept these tests. 
AR(2) A2 Tests the mill of no second order serial correlation 
Significance levels 1% Ill 
5% [5] 
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Table 4.46: Adjustment factors based on SLRM 
Equation 
Short run adjustment 
7 71 72 
Long run 
adjustment 
wascs 
CR 0.751 0.789 0.874 0.124 
NCR 0.431 0.469 0.457 0.156 
All WaSCs 0.646 0.687 0.704 0.122 
WOCS 
CR 0.976 0.976 1.002 0.189 
NCR 0.391 0.391 0.391 0.179 
All WoCs 0.835 0.835 0.879 0.214 
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Table 4.47: Adjustment factors based on Engle-Granger Stage 11 
Equation 
Short run adjustment 
71 T2 
Long run 
adjustment 
OL 
WaSCs 
CR 0.864 0.892 0.988 0.135 
NCR 0.566 0.616 0.648 0.233 
All WaSCs 0.717 0.756 0.804 0.192 
WOCS 
CR 1.019 1.019 1.013 0.279 
NCR 0.415 0.415 0.415 0.183 
All WoCs 0.722 0.722 0.734 0.238 
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Appendix 4. H Detailed Results based on RCV 
4. H. 1 Initial equations 
The OLS estimates of the initial equations for each type and category of 
company are numbered in this appendix as: 
Equation (RCVI-I): WaSC CR 
Equation (RCV2-I): WaSC NCR 
Equation (RCV3-1): All WaSC's 
Equation (RCV4-1): WoC CR 
Equation (RCV5-1): WoC NCR 
Equation (RCV6-I): All WoC's. 
The outputs from PcGive for each equation are set out on the following 
three pages. 
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EQ(RCV1-I) Modelling DEBT by OLS-CS (using WaSC CR data) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part. R^2 
Constant -10.6598 181.0 -0.0589 0.953 0.0001 
T1 73.1027 209.9 0.348 0.729 0.0030 
T2 -131.364 225.5 -0.583 0.563 0.0084 
RCV -0-120158 1.731 -0.0694 0.945 0.0001 
RCVT1 -0.347873 1.844 -0.189 0.851 0.0009 
RCVT2 -0.150650 1.769 -0-0852 0.933 0.0002 
RCV-1 0.158238 1.922 0.0823 0.935 0.0002 
RCV-1T1 0.518125 2.041 0.254 0.801 0.0016 
RCV-lT2 0.403010 1.961 0.206 0.838 0.0011 
DEBT-1 1.58724 1.356 1.17 0.249 0.0331 
DEBT-1T1 -0-916961 1.407 -0.652 0.518 0.0105 
DEBT-1T2 -0.208982 1.398 -0.149 0.882 0.0006 
DEBT-2 -0.690616 1.109 -0.623 0.537 0.0096 
DEBT-2T1 0.643281 1.168 0.551 0.585 0.0075 
DEBT-2T2 0.0268798 1.257 0.0214 0.983 0.0000 
sigma 165.444 RSS 1094873.05 
Rý2 0.941618 F(14,40) 46.08 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood -350.259 DW 1.98 
no. of observations 55 no. of par ameters 15 
mean(DEBT) 822.731 var(DEBT) 340976 
Normality test: Chiý2(2) = 26.001 [0.0000]++ 
hetero test: F(26,13) = 3.3369 [0.01331-k 
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RESET test: F(1,39) = 15.154 [0.00041++ 
EQ(RCV2-I) Modelling DEBT by OLS-CS (using WaSC NCR data) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part. R^2 
Constant -27.3852 110.9 -0.247 0.806 0.0015 
T1 -89.7461 137.9 -0.651 0.519 0.0105 
T2 137.381 171.8 0.800 0.429 0.0157 
RCV 0.0791597 0.2093 0.378 0.707 0.0036 
RCVT1 -0.619683 0.4399 -1.41 0.167 0.0473 
RCVT2 0.139852 0.3831 0.365 0.717 0.0033 
RCV-1 -0.0256088 0.2834 -0.0904 0.928 0.0002 
RCV-1T1 0.854974 0.5296 1.61 0.114 0.0612 
RCV-1T2 -0.151272 0.4534 -0.334 0.740 0.0028 
DEBT-1 1.26863 0.5958 2.13 0.039 0.1018 
DEBT-1T1 -0.645125 0.6143 -1.05 0.300 0.0268 
DEBT-1T? -0.479179 0.7600 -0.630 0.532 0.0098 
DEBT-2 -0.615434 0.3666 -1.68 0.101 0.0658 
DEBT-'12TI 0.520575 0.4314 1.21 0.235 0.0351 
DEBT-2T2 0.714900 0.5130 1.39 0.171 0.0463 
sigma 140.187 RSS 786101.221 
R^2 0.973762 F(14,40) 106 [0.000 1.1-1, 
log-likelihood -341.148 DW 2 . 09 
no. of observati ons 55 no. of parameters 15 
mean(DEBT) 1062.55 var(DEBT) 544742 
Normality test: Chiý2(2) = 27.771 [0.0000], ý'-, ' 
hetero test: F(26,13) = 0.21735 [0.99951 
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RESET test: F(1,39) = 0.99989 [0.32351 
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EQ(RCV3-I) Modelling DEBT by OLS-CS (using All WaSCs data) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part. R^2 
Constant 14.7221 73.22 0.201 0.841 0.0004 
T1 -14.1841 93.90 -0.151 0.880 0.0002 
T2 56.3169 112.9 0.499 0.619 0.0026 
RCV 0.0806675 0.2302 0.350 0.727 0.0013 
RCVT1 -0.445337 0.4100 -1.09 0.280 0.0123 
RCVT2 0.161342 0.3379 0.478 0.634 0.0024 
RCV-1 -0.0792231 0.2818 -0.281 0.779 0.0008 
RCV-1Tl 0.649833 0.4712 1.38 0.171 0.0196 
RCV-1T2 -0.0960037 0.3784 -0.254 0.800 0.0007 
DEBT-1 1.48860 0.5081 2.93 0.004 0.0829 
DEBT-1T1 -0.820190 0.5306 -1.55 0.126 0.0245 
DEBT-1T2 0.0821378 0.5486 0.150 0.881 0.0002 
DEBT-2 -0.638950 0.3758 -1.70 0.092 0.0295 
DEBT-2T1 0.650073 0.4212 1.54 0.126 0.0245 
DEBT-2T2 -0.0815384 0.4605 -0.177 0.860 0.0003 
sigma 161.778 RSS 2486364.35 
R^2 0.950565 F(14,95) 130.5 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood -707.505 DW 1.98 
no. of observations 110 no. of parameters 15 
mean(DEBT) 942.641 var(DEBT) 457237 
Normality test: Ch iA 2(2) 
hetero test: F(26,68) 
Hetero-X test: not enough 
RESET test: F(1,94) 
58.461 [0.00001'k* 
1.3475 [0.16431 
observations 
= 0.021400 [0.88401 
EQ(RCV4-I) Modelling DEBT by OLS-CS (using WoC CR data) 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part. R^2 
Constant -6.79633 12.91 -0.527 0.601 0.0054 
T1 3.17897 16.23 0.196 0.845 0.0008 
T2 -12.9229 18.02 -0.717 0.477 0.0100 
RCV 0.566208 1.926 0.294 0.770 0.0017 
RCVT1 -0.395882 2.150 -0.184 0.855 0.0007 
RCVT2 -0.179954 2.054 -0.0876 0.931 0.0002 
RCV-1 -0.473711 1.943 -0.244 0.808 0.0012 
RCV-1T1 0.359758 2.171 0.166 0.869 0.0005 
RCV-1T2 0.603310 2.076 0.291 0.773 0.0017 
DEBT-1 0.695821 0.6523 1.07 0.291 0.0218 
DEBT-1T1 0.331613 0.7585 0.437 0.664 0.0037 
DEBT-1T2 0.145984 0.7355 0.198 0.843 0.0008 
DEBT-2 0.171381 0.6975 0.246 0.807 0.0012 
DEBT-2Tl -0.303983 0.8124 -0.374 0.710 0.0027 
DEBT-2T2 -0.919162 0.7813 -1.18 0.245 0.0264 
sigma 14.5039 RSS 10728.4761 
R"2 0.79801-1 F(14,51) 14.39 [0.000]-k+ 
log-likelihood -261.653 DW 2.14 
no. of observations 66 no. of parameters 15 
mean(DEBT) 27.9329 var(DEBT) 804.8 
Normality test: Chi^2(2) = 14.439 [0.00071, kl 
hetero test: F(ý 26,24) = 1.6787 [0.10301 
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RESET test: F(1,50) = 1.3507 [0.25071 
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EQ(RCV-'-I) Modelling DEBT by OLS-CS (using WoC NCR data) 
Constant 
Tl 
T2 
RCV 
RCVT1 
RCVT2 
RCV-1 
RCV-lTl 
RCV-lT2 
DEBT-1 
DEBT-lTl 
DEBT-lT2 
DEBT-2 
DEBT-2Tl 
DEBT-2T2 
Coefficient 
1.14768 
-1.64989 
-2.97410 
1.17942 
-0.982738 
-1.60545 
-1.24970 
1.10174 
1.81332 
1.17769 
-0.401622 
-0.432430 
-0.268210 
0.35OZ-02 
0.172960 
Std. Error 
2.581 
3.253 
3.723 
0.6048 
0.6265 
0.6990 
0.6712 
0.6905 
0.7487 
0.1801 
0.2429 
0.3541 
0.2313 
0.2914 
0.3955 
t-value 
0.445 
-0.507 
-0.799 
1.95 
-1.57 
-2.30 
-1.86 
1.60 
2.42 
6.54 
-1.65 
-1.22 
-1.16 
1.20 
0.437 
t-prob 
0.658 
0.614 
0.428 
0.057 
0.123 
0.026 
0.068 
0.117 
0.019 
0.000 
0.104 
0.228 
0.252 
0.235 
0.664 
Part. R^2 
0.0039 
0.0050 
0.0124 
0.0694 
0.0460 
0.0937 
0.0636 
0.0475 
0.1032 
0.4560 
0.0509 
0.0284 
0.0257 
0.0275 
0.0037 
siqma 7.75138 RSS 3064.28136 
R^2 0.98516 F(14,51) 241.8 [0-0001** 
log-likelihood -220.301 DW 2.36 
no. of observations 66 no. of parameters 15 
mean(ADEBT) 50.4458 var(ADEBT) 3128.57 
Normality test: Ch iA 2(2) = 28.712 [0.0000]*-'- 
hetero test: F(26,24) = 0.88596 [0.61981 
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RESET test: F(1,50) = 3.2445 [0.07771 
EQ(RCV6-I) Modelling ADEBT by OLS-CS (using All WoCs data) 
Constant 
Tl 
T2 
RCV 
RCVT1 
RCVT2 
RCV-1 
RCV-lTl 
RCV-lT2 
DEBT-1 
DEBT-lTl 
DEBT-lT2 
DEBT-2 
DEBT-2Tl 
DEBT-2T2 
Coefficient 
1.40397 
-2.86863 
0.159703 
1.02349 
-0.821331 
-0.392174 
-1.06792 
0.901944 
0.652217 
1.11302 
-0.224896 
-0.0330067 
-0.238479 
0.256388 
-0.540597 
Std. Error 
3.058 
3.791 
4.562 
0.7014 
0.7362 
0.7792 
0.7371 
0.7721 
0.8056 
0.2362 
0.3039 
0.3291 
0.2473 
0.3218 
0.3393 
t-value 
0.459 
-0.757 
0.0350 
1.46 
-1.12 
-0.503 
-1.45 
1.17 
0.810 
4.71 
-0.740 
-0.100 
-0.964 
0.797 
-1.59 
t -prob 
0.647 
0.451 
0.972 
0.147 
0.267 
0.616 
0.150 
0.245 
0.420 
0.000 
0.461 
0.920 
0.337 
0.427 
0.114 
Part. Rý2 
0.0018 
0.0049 
0.0000 
0.0179 
0.0105 
0.0022 
0.0176 
0.0115 
0.0056 
0.1595 
0.0047 
0.0001 
0.0079 
0.0054 
0.0212 
sigma 11.8617 RSS 16461.8329 
RA 2 0.940426 F(14,117) 131.9 [0.000]-- 
log-likelihood -505.816 DW 2.05 
no. of observations 132 no. of parameters 15 
mean(DEBT) 39-1894 var(DEBT) 2093.39 
Normality test: Chi"2(2) = 82-927 (0.00001** 
hetero test: F(26,90) = 1.5458 [0.06851 
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RESET test: F(1,116) = 8.1229 [0.00521-1, * 
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4. H. 2 Tests for serial correlation 
Table 4.48 sets out the resiflts of the first two tests for serial correlation based 
on the residuals U-it from the six initial equations as described in subsection 
4.6.3. Each test calculates an estimate p, the coefficient of u'it-1; the first by 
including u-it- 1 as an additional regressor in the initial equation and the second 
by regressing -Uit on u-it-1. The t-statistics marked * are heteroscedasticity- 
robust t-statistics based on White (1980). In only one of the equations is the 
t-statistic significant at the 5% level with a critical value of 2.02 . 
Table 4.48: Tests for serial correlation 
Equation 
Include u-it-, as an 
additional regressor 
Regression of -uit on Vit-, 
p t-statistic p t-statistic 
RCV1-I: WaSC CR 0.153154 0.233 0.0165040 0.084 
RCV2-1: WaSC NCR -0.158034 -0.489 -0.0406429 -0.285 
RCV3-I: All WaSC's 0.344343 1.25 0.0860796 0.659 
RCV4-1: WoC CR -0.746798 -2.08 [5] -0.239908 -0.71327* 
RCV5-1: WoC NCR -0.445646 -1.67 -0.203393 -0.84753* 
RCV6-1: All WoC's -0.530036 -1.6861* -0.203981 -1.1617* 
Table 4.49 gives the results of the third test for serial correlation described 
in subsection 4.6.3. This uses the residuals U-it from the six initial equations 
to test for serial correlation by estimating p for each company separately. The 
t-statistics marked * are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics based on White 
(1980). The critical values of the t-test are 2.262 at the 5% level and 3.250 
at the 1% level. Where the coefficient is significantly different from zero the 
significance level for the t-statistic is given in parentheses i. e. [51 or [1]. 
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Table 4.49: Tests for serial correlation 
Residuals U-it from Residuals U-it from 
Category Company RCV3-1 & 6-1 RCV1-11 2-1,4-1 & 5-1 
P t-statistic P t-statistic 
ANH 0.825213 0.60750* -0.267508 -0.496 
WSH 0.202049 0.540 0.181643 0.525 
WaSC CR NES -0.502263 -1.45 -0.0822472 -0.181 
SRN -0.224795 -0.574 0.256682 0.676 
wSx -0.210875 -0.382 0.220627 0.342 
SVT -0.0459407 -0.410 -0.0332185 -0.0995 
SWT -0.0520932 -0.148 0.226459 0.664 
WaSC NCR TMS -0.0704462 -0.209 -0.00807595 -0.0243 
UUw -0.0813406 -0.246 -0.225778 -0.689 
YKY 0.533866 2.04 -0.127372 -0.485 
brl 0.0395038 0.122 0.0434322 0.119 
dvw 0.0121865 0.0334 -0.624364 -1.35 
WOC CR mkt 0.284303 0.342 -0.283622 -0.487 
prt -0.809307 -0.63669* -0.989312 -0.93927* 
sst -0.673088 -0.57360 0.0360716 0.047848* 
ses -0.262975 -0.865 -0.310415 -0.926 
bwh 0.712256 2.61 [5] 0.0510999 0.150 
cam -0.463746 -1.28 -0.455745 -1.52 
WoC NCR flk 0.231712 0.586 0.330051 0.947 
mse -0.372309 -1.27 -0.267911 -0.67602* 
thd 0.698829 2.64 [5] 0.258714 0.779 
tvn 0.0195317 0.0611 -0.149880 -0.478 
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4. H. 3 Final estimates 
The final estimates of the equations for each type and category of company 
are numbered in this appendix as: 
Equation (RCVI-F): WaSC CR 
Equation (RCV2-F): WaSC NCR 
Equation (RCV3-F): All WaSC's 
Equation (RCV4-F): WoC CR 
Equation (RCV5-F): WoC NCR 
Equation (RCV6-F): All WoC's. 
The outputs from PcGive for each equation are set out on the following 
three pages. 
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EQ(RCV1-F) Modelling DEBT by DPD 1-step (using WaSC CR data. xls) 
---- 1-step estimation using DPD ---- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DEBT(-l) 0.897642 0.1005 8.93 0.000 
RCV 0.0680846 0.02864 2.38 0.021 
RCVT1 0.0295181 0.01030 2.87 0.006 
RCVT2 0.106359 0.02302 4.62 0.000 
sigma 155.563 
RA2 0.9336799 
RSS 1355191.5087 
no. of observations 60 
sigma^2 24199.85 
TSS 20434084.869 
no. of parameters 4 
Using robust standard errors 
number of individuals 5 (derived from year) 
longest time series 12 [1992 - 20031 
shortest time series 12 (balance d panel) 
Wald (joint): Ch 
iA 2M =2.953e+006 [0.0001 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) = -0.1517 [0.8791 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) = -1-195 [0.2321 
Tests from modelling DEBT by OLS-CS 
Normality test: Chiý2(2) = 30.340 [0.00001** 
hetero test: F(8,47) = 8.2634 [0.0000)** 
hetero-X test: F(11,44) = 18.267 [0.00001** 
RESET test: F(1,55) ý 6.2889 [0.0151]* 
EQ(RCV2-F) Modelling DEBT by DPD 1-step (using WaSC NCR data. xls) 
---- 1-step estimation using DPD ---- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DEBT(-l) 0.714894 0.02568 27.8 0.000 
RCV 0.0882133 0.008945 9.86 0.000 
RCVT1 0.0647764 0.008535 7.59 0.000 
RCVT2 0.0604051 0.01250 4.83 0.000 
sigma 137.6198 
R-2 0.96873 
RSS 1060595.1338 
no. of observations 60 
sigma^2 18939.2 
TSS 33917339.459 
no. of parameters 4 
Using robust standard errorS 
number of individuals 5 (derived from year) 
longest time series 12 [1992 - 20031 
shortest time series 12 (balance d panel) 
Wald (joint): Chi"2(4) =8.249e+004 [0.0001 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) = 0.9803 [0.3271 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) = -0.7105 [0.4771 
Tests from modelling DEBT by OLS-CS 
Normality test: Chi-2(2) 30.861 [0-00001" 
hetero test: F(8,47) 1.3244 (0.25511 
hetero-X test: F(11,44) 1.2563 [0.28101 
RESET test: F(1,55) 1.1563 [0.28691 
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EQ(RCV3-F) Modelling DEBT by DPD 1-step (using All WaSCs data. xls) 
---- 1-step estimation using DPD ---- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DEBT(-l) 0.831847 0.05739 14.5 0.000 
RCV 0.0762582 0.01149 6.64 0.000 
RCVT1 0.0436576 0.008972 4.87 0.000 
RCVT2 0.0522781 0.01096 4.77 0.000 
sigma 168.7876 
R-2 0.940673 
RSS 3304752.5214 
no. of observations 120 
sigma"2 28489.25 
TSS 55704025.479 
no. of parameters 4 
Using robust standard errors 
number of individuals 10 (derived from year) 
longest time series 12 [1992 - 20031 
shortest time series 12 (balance d panel) 
Wald (joint): Ch 
iA 2(4) =3.236e+004 [0.0001 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) = 2.072 [0-0381 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) = -1.002 [0.3171 
Tests from modelling DEBT by OLS-CS 
Normality test: Chiý2(2) = 69.840 [0.00001** 
hetero test: F(8,107) = 1.3460 [0.22901 
hetero-X test: F(11,104)= 2.1277 [0.02441* 
RESET test: F(1,115) = 2.1173 [0.14841 
EQ(RCV4-F) Modelling DEBT by DPD 1-step (using WoC CR data. xls) 
---- I-step estimation using DPD ---- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DEBT(-l) 0.835126 0.03491 23.9 0.000 
RCV 0.0454089 0.01893 2.40 0.019 
RCVT2 0.136430 0.05488 2.49 0.015 
sigma 14.01108 sigma^2 196.3104 
R'2 0.7574356 
RSS 13545.419646 TSS 5 5842.560023 
no. of observations 72 no. of para meters 3 
Using rcbust standard errcrs 
number of individuals 6 (derived from year) 
longest time series 12 [1992 - 20031 
shortest time series 12 (balanced panel) 
Wald (joint): Chiý2(3) = 1191. [0.0001 
ARU) test: N(0,1) = -0.3271 [0.7441 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) = -1.963 [0.0503 
Tests from modelling DEBT by OLS-CS 
Normality test: Ch iA 2(2) = 45.728 [0.00001+* 
hetero test: F(6,62) = 4.8583 [0.00041*+ 
hetero-X test: F(8,60) 4.2322 [0.00051+* 
RESET test: F(1,68) 2.0503 [0.15681 
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EQ(RCVS-F) Modelling DEBT by DPD 1-step (using WoC NCR data. xls) 
---- 1-step estimation using DPD ---- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DEBT(-l) 0.816686 0.02911 28.1 0.000 
RCV 0.0691729 0.01101 6.29 0.000 
sigma 9.056018 sigmaý2 82.01146 
R^2 0.9739779 
RSS 5740.8024216 TSS 2 20612.41213 
no. of observations 72 no. of parameters 2 
Using robust standard errors 
number of individuals 6 (derived from year) 
longest time series 12 [1992 - 20031 
shortest time series 12 (balanced panel) 
Wald (joint): Chiý2(2) =3.762e+004 [0.0001 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) = 0.9437 [0.3451 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) = -1.450 [0-1471 
Tests from modelling DEBT by OLS-CS 
Normality test: Chi^2(2) = 26.416 [0.0000)-1-1 
hetero test: F(4,65) = 7.3330 [0.00011** 
hetero-X test: F(5,64) = 6.4988 (0.00011*, 1 
RESET test: F(1,69) = 0.94393 [0.33471 
EQ(RCV6-F) Modelling DEBT by DPD 1-step (using All WoCs data. xls) 
---- 1-step estimation using DPD ---- 
Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
DEBT(-l) 0.817718 0.04302 19.0 0.000 
RCV 0.0739380 0.01401 5.28 0.000 
sigma 12.80639 sigma^2 164.0037 
RA2 0.920926 
RSS 23288.52601 TSS 2 94515.66052 
no. of observ ations 144 no. of para meters 2 
Using robust standard errors 
number of individuals 
longest time series 
shortest time series 
12 (derived from year) 
12 [1992 - 20031 
12 (balanced panel) 
Wald (joint): Chiý2(2) 4356. [0.0001 
AR(1) test: N(0,1) 1.678 [0.093) 
AR(2) test: N(0,1) -1.519 [0.129) 
Tests from model ling DEBT by OLS-CS 
Normality test: Chi"2(2) = 210.15 
[0.0000]*, k 
hetero test: F(4,137) = 2.9219 [0.02341* 
hetero-X test: F(5,136) = 2.3708 [0.04251", 
RESET test: F(1,141) = 3.2833 [0.07211 
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Appendix 4.1 Adjustment Factors-Further Estimates 
based on RCV 
Equation (4.53) can be derived as follows. The estimated PAM can be written 
as: 
ADit (D*it - Dit-1 + U-it 
where D*it is calculated from the estimated SLRM given by equation (4.52). 
Let 
CIit = Dit - D*it, 
so: 
ADit =a 
(D*it 
- Dit-I + U-it 
=a (Dit - Clit - Dit- 1) + Uit 
aADit - ceClit + uýit 
ADit a- cht + Uit 
-aa 
a 
T- -ý Clit + vit 
Since 1-a= ý30 in equation (4.45) then: 
030 
ADit - cht + 
-vit. 
ý330 
Equation (4.55) can be derived in a similar way. In this instance D*it 
is calculated from (4.50) in Stage I of the Engle-Granger procedure and the 
residuals are given by: 
14-t = Dit - D*it, 
It follows from the above, therefore, that: 
ý30) 
ADit Rit + Pit. 
ý30 
The following tables present the results from estimating a PAM in the form 
of: 
9 equation (4.53) using the results from the SLRM and 
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9 equation (4.55) using the results from Stage 11 of the Engle-Granger 
procedure. 
The adjustment factors derived from these results are also given. 
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Table 4.50: PAM based on results from SLRM 
Aitustrrmt Diagnostic 
VariaLie factor Adjusted tests 
Equation Fe rei ected 
WaSCs 
CIR Cbefficient -0.104 0.094 0.468 W (1], N [1], H [1], HX [1] 
t-statistic -8.06 
NCR, Cbefficient -0.299 0.230 0,375 W [1), N [1], R [5] 
t-statistic -7.21 
AD Wa9C s Cbefficient -0.154 0.134 0.282 W [1], N [1], H [11, HX [1] 
t-statistic -15.50 
wocs 
CR Coefficient -0.099 0.090 0.057 W [1], A2 [5], N [11 
t-statistic -2.42 
NCR Cbefficient -0.021 0.021 -0.012 N 11], R [5] 
t-statistic -0.463 
All WbC s Cbefficient 0.091 -0.100 0.015 N [1), H [11, HX [1], R [1] 
t-statistic 1.05 
NOTES 
q, C1, is the the difference betvmaen tfe actual ard predicted lorg run equilibriurn valte of D, derived from the SIRM 
t-statistic Clalculated umr-g rob-Et standard errors from parel data rnxiels. 
Adjusted RF Cadculated from 1- AdjFe =(1- R) (n-1)/(n-k) whexe I- if = RSS / EAD, 
2 
RSS Ls t1r Residual Sum of Squares, n is tlýr rnznbfz- of observations and k is the nunher of regressors. 
Diagnostic tests 
AU 
OLS nrdels Nbmality 
xvn 
N Tests the null that the distribution of the residuals is norrnal. 
pooled data Hetero, H Tests the null of horrDscedasticity usirg squares of regressors. 
Fletero-X RX Tests the null of hDnrsoedastiaty usirg squares and cross-products of regressors. 
RESET R Tests the null that the nrdel is correctly sperdfied agairEt orrittirg the square of the 
predicted value of the dependent variatie. 
Parel data rmdels Wald Ooint) W Tests the null that all the mefficients are zero. 
AR(l) Al Tests the null of nc, first order serial correlation. 
Si&ficance levels 1% Ill 
5% 151 
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Table 4.51: PAM based on results from Engle-Granger Stage 11 
Adjustment Diagnostic 
Variable factor Adjusted tests 
Equation Rit OL Rý rejected 
WaSCs 
CR Coefficient 0.367 -0.581 0.083 W [11, N [11, H ý11, HX Ill, R [1] 
t-statistic 3.59 
NCR Coefficient 0.124 -0.142 -0.038 Al [51, N [1], H [5], HX [5], R [1] 
t-statistic 0.90 
All WaSC s Coefficient 0.314 -0.458 0.097 W [51, Al [1), A2 [5], 
t-statistic 1.97 
Wocs 
CR Coefficient 0.383 -0.62D 0.188 W (11, Al [5), A2 [5], N [1], H [1], HX [11, R [1) 
t-statistic 2.73 
NCR Coefficient 0.2,46 -0.326 0.112 W [1), N [1), H [5], HX [51, R [11 
t-statistic 2.82 
All WoC s Coefficient 0.389 -0.635 0.252 W [1], Al [51, N [1], H [1], HX [1], R [1) 
t-statistic 3.66 
NOTES 
R, Rt is the difference between the actual and predicted long run equilibrium value of Dt from the E-G I Models. 
t-statistic Calculated using robust standard errors from panel data models, 
Adjusted R2 Calculated from 1- AcbR? = (1- W) (n-1)/(n-k) where 1-R? = RSS 2 
RSS is the Residual Sum of Squares, n is the number of observations and k is the nun-ber of regressors. 
Diagnostic tests 
Abbrvn 
OLS models Norii-ality N Tests the null that the distribution of the residuals is normal. 
pooled data Hetero H Tests the null of homosceclasticity using squares of regressors. 
Hetero-X HX Tests the null of homosceclasticity using squares and cross-products of regressors. 
RESET R Tests the null that the model is correctly specified against ornitting the square of the 
predicted value of the dependent variable. 
Panel data rmdels Wald (joint) W Tests the null that all the coefficients are zero. 
AR(l) Al Tests the null of no first order serial correlation. 
AR(2) A2 Tests the null of no second order serial correlation. 
Significance levels 1% Ill 
5% [5] 
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Appendix 4. J ECM and PAM Results for Individ- 
ual Companies 
The following Tables set out the results from applying ECM's and PAM's 
to the individual companies. The form of the equation that was estimated 
corresponds to the model for the relevant category. The SLRM's derived from 
these models are also given except where marked N/A. In these cases the 
estimated parameters of the ECM and/or PAM do not permit the model to 
converge to a long-run solution. 
There were 12 observations for each company and the equations were esti- 
mated using PcGive 10.3 - OLS Single Equation Dynamic Modelling. 
The diagnostic. tests used in estimating the ECM's and PAM's are: 
Abbrvn 
AR 1-1 A Tests the null of no first order autocorrelation 
ARCH 1-1 AC Tests the null of no first order autoregressive, conditional 
heteroscedasticity using the squares of the residuals 
Normality N Tests the null that the distribution of the residuals 
is normal 
Hetero H Tests the null of homoscedasticity using the squares 
of the regressors. Only enough observations to apply 
the test to the WoC NCR companies in the 
ECM's and to the WoCs in the PAM's. 
Hetero-X HX Test not available as not enough observations. 
RESET R Tests the null that the model is correctly specified 
against omitting the square of the predicted value 
of the dependent variable. 
The Wald test applied to the SLRM tests the null that all the coefficients 
are zero. 
Significance levels are indicated as: 
1% [1] 
5% [5) 
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Table 4.54: SLRM results using HCAV - WaSCs 
Variable Gearing Wald test 
HCAVj, HCAVj, T1t HCAV,, T2, go* gl* 92 
WaSCs 
CR 
ANH Coefficient N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
t-statistic 
WSH Coefficient 0.060 0.331 0.802 6.0 39.1 86.1 Ill 
t-statistic 0.46 2.70 5.54 
NES Coefficient 0.127 0.147 0.547 12.7 27.4 67.4 
t-statistic 2.15 3.81 6.71 
SRN Coefficient 0.450 -0.009 0.175 45.0 44.1 62.5 
t-statistic 11.30 -0.17 2.95 
WSX Coefficient 0.774 -0.230 1.953 77.4 54.4 272.7 
t-statistic 0.15 -0.06 0.12 
NCR 
SVT Coefficient 0.158 0.438 0.453 15.8 59.6 61.1 11) 
t-statistic 1.16 2.34 2.65 
SWT Coefficient 0.555 -0.083 0.418 55.5 47.2 97.3 
t-statistic 0.55 -0.11 0.58 
TMS Coefficient 0.266 0.396 0.472 26.6 66.2 73.8 
t-statistic 0.66 0.59 0.77 
UUW Coefficient 0.234 0.340 0.359 23.4 57.5 59.4 Ill 
t-statistic 2.30 3.14 3.52 
YKY Coefficient 0.071 0.168 0.393 7.1 23.9 46.4 Ill 
I t-statistic 1.61 2.36 5.23 
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Table 4.55: SLRM results using HCAV - WoCs 
Variable Gearing Wald test 
HCAVj, HCAVj, Tl, HCAVJ2, 90 gi* 92 
wocs 
CR 
brl Coefficient 0.410 - 0.158 41.0 41.0 56.8 [11 
t-statistic 3.98 0.76 
dvw Coefficient -0.131 - 1.097 -13.1 -13.1 96.6 
t-statistic -0.65 0.93 
mkt Coefficient 0.223 - 0.181 22.3 22.3 40.3 
t-statistic 2.18 0.98 
prt Coefficient 0.258 - -0.016 25.8 25.8 24.3 
t-statistic 9.52 -0.29 
sst Coefficient N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
t-statistic 
ses Coefficient 0.077 - 0.440 7.7 7.7 51.6 Ill 
t-statistic 1.31 4.09 
NCR 
bwh Coefficient 0.224 - - 22.4 22.4 22.4 Ill 
t-statistic 5.69 
cam Coefficient 0.382 - - 38.2 38.2 38.2 Ill 
t-statistic 10.30 
flk Coefficient 0.286 - - 28.6 28.6 28.6 
t-statistic 0.75 
mse Coefficient 0.419 - - 41.9 41.9 41.9 Ill 
t-statistic 9.97 
thd Coefficient 0.322 - - 32.2 32.2 32.2 Ill 
t-statistic 6.82 
tvn Coefficient 0.497 - - 49.7 49.7 49.7 Ill 
I t-statistic 6.07 
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Table 4.56: PAM results using RCV - WaSCs 
Adjustment Unit Diagnostic 
Vari able factor Adjusted root tests 
RCVj, RCV,, Tlt RCViT2, Di, 
-, CL 
R2 t-test rejected 
WaSCs 
CR 
ANH Coefficient -0.119 -0.081 -0.087 1.796 -0.796 0.969 1.45 R [1) 
t-statistic -0.95 -0.80 -0.56 3.27 
WSH Coefficient 0.081 0.131 0.337 0.598 0.402 0.987 -2.86 
t-statistic 1.33 1.61 2.96 4.23 
NES Coefficient 0.143 0.043 0.108 0.656 0.344 0.994 -2.04 
t-statistic 2.25 1.09 2.35 3.89 
SRN Coefficient 0.141 0.004 0.033 0.739 0.261 0.991 -0.77 
t-statistic 0.83 0.05 0.73 2.19 
WSX Coefficient 0.259 -0.007 0.080 0.490 0.510 0.968 -1.26 R [5] 
t-statistic 1.86 -0.08 0.80 1.21 
NCR 
SVT Coefficient 0.091 0.078 0.070 0.697 0.303 0.992 -2.14 
t-statistic 3.27 1.79 1.07 4.93 
SWT Coefficient 0.150 -0.034 0.041 0.744 0.256 0.986 -1.92 
t-statistic 3.91 -0.57 0.53 5.57 
TMS Coefficient 0.110 0.048 0.041 0.701 0.299 0.970 -1.11 N [51 
t-statistic 1.49 0.72 0.42 2.60 
UUW Coefficient 0.087 0.087 0.095 0.646 0.354 0.994 -2.52 
t-statistic 2.90 2.34 1.68 4.61 
Y-KY Coefficient 0.032 0.092 0.094 0.735 0.265 0.992 -1.30 
1 t-statistic 0.85 3.12 1.90 3.61 1 1 1 
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Table 4.57: PAM results using RCV - WoCs 
Adjustment Unit Diagnostic 
Variable ffictor Adjusted root tests 
RCv,, RCV,, Tl, RCNýJn, Di, 
-, 
R, t-test rejected 
WOCS 
CR 
brl Coefficient 0.235 - -0-047 0.550 0.450 0.985 -1.65 
t-statistic 1.72 -1.06 2.02 
dvw Coefficient -0.049 - 0.203 0.454 0.546 0.062 -0.88 H [5], R [1] 
t-statistic -0.70 1.59 0.74 
mkt Coefficient -0.112 - 0.165 1.531 -0.531 0.886 0.72 R 11) 
t-statistic -0.59 1.92 2.07 
prt Coefficient 0.743 - -0.179 -2.161 3.161 0.637 -2.05 AC [11, H [5], R [1] 
t-statistic 2.00 -0.78 -1.40 
sst Coefficient -0.056 - 0.241 1.218 -0.218 0.748 0.33 AC [5], N [5], R [1] 
t-statistic -0.42 2.43 1.86 
ses Coefficient 0.035 - 0.332 0.337 0.663 0.925 -4.0115] R [5) 
t-statistic 1.17 5.18 2.04 
NCR 
bwh Coefficient 0.080 -- 0.569 0.431 0.970 -2.24 
t-statistic 2.40 2.96 
cam Coefficient 0.072 -- 0.804 0.196 0.966 -0.78 
t-statistic 0.67 3.20 
fik Coefficient 0.236 -- 0.150 0.850 0.957 -2.51 [10] 
t-statistic 2.86 0.45 
mse Coefficient 0.159 -- 0.571 0.429 0.985 -1.52 
t-statistic 1.67 2.03 
thd Coefficient 0.099 -- 0.564 0.436 0.961 -1.67 H [5] 
t-statistic 1.76 2.15 
tvn Coefficient 0.071 -- 0.800 0.200 0.986 -0.87 
t-statistic 1.10 3.45 1 11 
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Table 4.58: SLRM results using RCV - WaSCs 
Variable Gearing Wald test 
RCVj, RCVjT1, RCVj, T2, go* 91 92* 
WaSCs 
CR 
ANH Coefficient N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
t-statistic 
WSH Coefficient 0.202 0.326 0.838 20.2 52.8 104.0 
t-statistic 1.20 1.90 4.59 
NES Coefficient 0.415 0.124 0.313 41.5 53.9 72.8 
t-statistic 3.78 1.04 2.32 
SRN Coefficient 0.541 0.014 0.128 54.1 55.5 66.8 
t-statistic 3.27 0.05 0.56 
WSX Coefficient 0.509 -0.014 0.158 50.8 49.4 66.6 
t-statistic 2.37 -0.08 1.01 
NCR 
SVT Coefficient 0.300 0.257 0.231 30.0 55.7 53.0 
t-statistic 2.24 2.57 1.76 
SWT Coefficient 0.587 -0.134 0.159 58.7 45.3 74.7 Ill 
t-statistic 1.64 -0.46 0.67 
TMS Coefficient 0.366 0.160 0.135 36.6 52.5 50.1 Ill 
t-statistic 1.53 0.75 0.55 
UUW Coefficient 0.245 0.245 0.270 24.5 49.0 51.5 Ill 
t-statistic 2.80 2.88 3.04 
YKY Coefficient 0.122 0.348 0.353 12.2 47.0 47.5 11) 
I t-statistic 1.36 1.44 2.31 
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Table 4.59: SLRM results using RCV - WoCs 
Variable Gearing Wald test 
RCVj, RCVjTlt RCV, tT2, 90* gi* 92* 
wocs 
CR 
brl Coefficient 0.521 -0.104 52.1 52.1 41.7 
t-statistic 9.80 -1.30 
dvw Coefficient -0.089 0.371 -8.9 -8.9 28.2 
t-statistic -0.69 0.69 
mkt Coefficient N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
t-statistic 
prt Coefficient N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
t-statistic 
sst Coefficient N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
t-statistic 
ses Coefficient 0.053 - 0.501 5.3 5.3 55.5 
t-statistic 1.28 5.05 
NCR 
bwh Coefficient 0.185 - - 18.5 18.5 18.5 
t-statistic 7.87 
cam Coefficient 0.368 - - 36.8 36.8 36.8 Ill 
t-statistic 2.74 
f1k Coefficient 0.277 - - 27.7 27.7 27.7 Ill 
t-statistic 10.90 
mse Coefficient 0.370 - - 37.0 37.0 37.0 Ill 
t-statistic 9.61 
thd Coefficient 0.226 - - 22.6 22.6 22.6 Ill 
t-statistic 6.99 
tvn Coefficient 0.355 - - 35.5 35.5 35.5 Ill 
t-statistic 3.33 1 1 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
5.1 Capital structure and the allocation of risk 
5.1.1 The theoretical analysis 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis set out theoretical models that analyse the 
role of capital structure in a regulated firm, its relationship to the regulator's 
pricing decision and the allocation of risk between consumers and investors. 
Highly stylized models have been developed for this purpose and analyse the 
regulation of a monopolist that supplies a product which is fixed in quality 
and for which the demand is price inelastic. The models make reasonably 
realistic assumptions about the attitude of the various stakeholders towards 
risk. Consumers and shareholders are risk averse, managers are risk neutral up 
to a point, and debtholders are infinitely risk averse. A number of interesting 
results have been obtained from the analysis and they can be summarized as 
follows. 
Firstly, the models demonstrate that a price-cap system, where prices are 
prices are fixed or vary only in exceptional circumstances, is almost certainly 
sub-optimal. If the regulator maximizes the welfare of consumers with a stan- 
dard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, the optimal regulatory mech- 
anism is such that consumers pay more in adverse economic conditions, except 
in the unlikely case that the managers' willingness to carry risk exceeds the 
inherent risk in the business. This is because consumers are willing to trade-off 
increased price variations against a lower expected price. Even if the regula- 
tor has complete information and there are no information asynunetries, as is 
assumed in the models, a fixed price-cap rule leads to welfare losses for the 
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consumer. 
Secondly, the models also indicate that the regulator should take a view 
on the capital structure of the regulated firm as this can affect the firm's cost 
of capital and, ultimately, the price paid by consumers. Even in the absence 
of corporate taxation, capital structure does matter because it determines the 
amount of equity finance and, in conjunction with the regulator's decision on 
price variations, the distribution of risks between consumers and shareholders. 
The model set out in chapter 2 only allows the regulator's decision on prices 
to influence the cost of equity indirectly through the regulator's choice of 
capital structure. Chapter 3 examines the more general case when the level 
of gearing and the regulator's decision on prices both have an independent 
and direct effect on the firm's cost of equity. In both cases there is a socially 
optimal capital structure that depends not only on consumers' aversion to the 
risk of price variations but also on the shareholders' trade-off between risk and 
returns. 
Thirdly, when. the firm's costs vary with fluctuations in the economy as 
a whole, the regulator's decision on price variations determines the degree to 
which systematic risks are carried by shareholders and, therefore, the cost 
of equity. Chapter 3 shows that it is open to the regulator to set prices so 
that shareholders' returns are either positively correlated, uncorrelated or even 
negatively correlated with the market return. This means it is not necessary for 
the shareholders' risks and rewards to be tied to the regulated firm's business 
risks and so its cost of equity can either be greater than, equal to or lower 
than the cost of debt. Consequently, although consumer prices should be 
higher when there are adverse economic conditions, it is not necessary for the 
shareholders' returns to be lower. Whether or not this is optimal depends on 
the consumers' and the shareholders' relative aversion to risk. For example, 
consumers might have such a low aversion to risk that prices should be set 
to provide shareholders with higher returns when economic conditions are 
unfavourable. Shareholder returns would then be negatively correlated with 
the market return providing shareholders with insurance against market risk. 
As result the cost of equity would be lower than the cost of debt leading to 
lower financing costs and a lower expected price for consumers. 
Finally, chapter 3 explains how differences in the attitudes of consumers 
and shareholders towards risk determine the nature of the socially optimal 
capital structure. If the optimum for consumer prices is such that, at the 
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margin, consumers and shareholders do not have the same aversion to risk 
then the social optimum is a capital structure with no debt. When consumers 
have relatively high risk aversion compared to shareholders then consumers 
prefer the lowest possible price variation even though this produces a higher 
expected price. Conversely, when consumers' risk aversion is relatively low, it 
is optimal to set prices so that the risks for shareholders are consistent with 
a cost of equity that is lower than the cost of debt in order to produce the 
lowest possible expected price. In either case, debt finance produces no benefit 
for consumers. However, if consumers and shareholders both have the same 
aversion to the risk of price variations at the margin, then there is only one 
very special set of conditions in the model where it is socially optimal for the 
regulated firm to be a 'not-for-profit' company which relies wholly on debt for 
its external finance; otherwise there should be a combination of equity and 
debt finance. For this to be the case the consumer optimum for prices must 
result in a rate of return on equity that is both equal to the cost of debt and 
just sufficient to satisfy shareholders. 
5.1.2 Policy implications 
These results raise a number of policy issues. In practice, even under price 
cap systems, prices do change in response to changes in the firm's costs. In 
the UK system there are often 'cost pass through' arrangements which allow 
price adjustments in specified circumstances and there is generally a complete 
reassessment of costs when a price cap is reviewed. However, such arrange- 
ments are typically designed to protect the regulated firm from material and 
unavoidable cost increases outside its control. For example, in the water in- 
dustry, prices can be adjusted between price reviews if the government imposes 
costly new obligations to improve drinking and/or waste water quality. Firms 
are still expected to carry all normal business risks and, at price reviews, con- 
sumers receive the benefit of past efficiency savings. As a result little or no 
consideration is given to the possibility that consumers might prefer to carry 
some of the firm's normal business risks if this would lead to a lower expected 
price. 
The various industry regulators in the UK pay considerable attention to 
the capital structures of regulated firms. At price reviews each regulator has 
usually stated explicitly the assumption that has been made about what con- 
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stitutes an appropriate capital structure. Although there is no requirement 
that firms adjust their capital structures in line with the regulators' judgments, 
the models in chapters 2 and 3 show that they clearly have an incentive to 
adjust gearing levels to the extent that this reduces the cost of capital. This 
has recently become a significant policy issue. After the 1999 Periodic Review 
several water companies took action to increase leverage wen above the level 
assumed by the regulator. 'Not-for-profit' companies that rely 100% on debt 
for external finance have also been created to replace privatized utilities which 
have encountered serious financial problems. Glas Cymru and Network Rail 
were both established on this basis and replaced, respectively, Dyr Cymru 
(Welsh Water) in May 2001 and Railtrack in October 2002. 
However, as the models in chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate, there is no theo- 
retical reason to suggest that a 100% debt financed company is socially opti- 
mal and, indeed, a unique set of conditions must apply for this to be the case. 
Further, if 100% debt financing produces too much variability in prices there 
is no equity buffer to absorb the risks that consumers do not wish to carry. 
This possibility seems to have been recognized in the design of 'not-for-profit' 
structures where a buffer is created, in the form of liquid reserves, to protect 
consumers and lenders from unexpected variations in costs. Even so, con- 
sumers pay for this protection and, in effect, take on the role of shareholders 
(but without the ownership rights) to the extent that these reserves have to 
be built up initially and then replenished out of revenuesi. 
The use of 'not-for-profit' and highly leveraged structures remains con- 
troversial. In such restructurings the attitude of lenders towards risk and, 
therefore, the terms on which the new debt finance can be raised, has been a 
key consideration and it seems almost certain that the resulting risk proffle for 
consumers will not be optimal. In Ofwat (2002) the water regulator expressed 
the view that capital structure is a matter for management and investors and 
that the assumptions about the cost of capital used to set prices should not 
pressure companies to adopt highly geared capital structures which would cre- 
ate undue risks for consumers. However, Ofwat's actions in the 2004 Periodic 
Review suggest a degree of concern about these developments on the part of 
the regulator. As explained in chapter 4, Ofwat reinforced the mechanisms 
that prevent firms from using high gearing levels to exert a price-influence 
1 In the case of Network Rail it could also be the taxpayer who provides this kind of 
insurance. 
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effect and effectively transferred the additional tax benefits of restructuring to 
consumers. This may well act as a deterrent to many more restructurings in 
the water industry. 
5.1.3 Future research 
The role of management in the models is relatively limited and they do not 
allow for the possible effects of capital structure on management incentives. 
This suggests the models might usefully be extended or others might be devel- 
oped to look at such effects. Two examples are briefly discussed to illustrate 
issues that could be investigated. 
The first example is related to agency costs. In the agenc .y cost literature 
high levels of gearing are associated with high monitoring and bonding costs 
and with distortions to investment incentives. On the other hand a lower 
level of 'free cashflow' reduces the scope for unwise investments and produces 
a greater alignment of interests between internal and external shareholders. 
This leads to a trade-off and the familiar conclusion that there is an optimal 
capital structure. However, in the regulated firm, as has been seen, capital 
structure affects the allocation of risks between consumers and investors and, 
therefore, the firm's cost of capital. Although it is common to assume that a 
regulated firm's investment programme is determined exogenously, in practice 
there may be opportunities to invest to reduce future operating costs. Con- 
sequently, the effect of the regulator's pricing decision on the cost of capital 
might influence which cost saving investments are undertaken by management. 
Greater price variations and a lower cost of capital could lead to more cost 
saving investments. 
Debt contracts, however, usually contain covenants to protect the interests 
of bondholders and to reduce bonding and monitoring costs. Typically, they 
include constraints on the levels of certain key financial ratios which, if con- 
travened, allow bondholders to intervene or invoke default procedures. The 
ratios that are used for this purpose include interest cover and gearing. At 
high levels of gearing, therefore, managers might be more cautious about which 
discretionary cost saving investments are undertaken. This disincentive effect 
is likely to be reinforced by the absence of shareholders in a 'not-for-profit' 
company. Since efficiency savings create the opportunity for price reductions 
there is, therefore, a further trade-off for the regulator to consider; one which 
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reflects the differing effects of capital structure on the incentives to increase 
efficiency. It may be possible to develop a model which examines the condi- 
tions under which a capital restructuring can lead to a welfare improvement 
though its effect on efficiency incentives. 
The second example concerns the effect of cost pass through arrangements. 
The literature generally views this problem from the perspective of the firm. 
Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994), for example, set out a simple model 
where there is a risk averse monopoly supplier and consumer demand is in- 
elastic. In this model the optimal level of cost pass through is determined 
by a trade-off between incentives and insurance. While lower price variations 
provide a greater incentive to improve efficiency through increased effort, they 
also reduce the firm's insurance against risk. A risk averse management would, 
therefore, be less inclined to make that effort. Consequently, the greater the 
uncertainty in costs and the greater the management's aversion to risk then 
the higher should be the level of cost pass through. Their model explicitly 
assumes that consumers are risk neutral but the authors recognize that, if 
consumers are also risk averse, the possibility of risk sharing has to be con- 
sidered. The optimal allocation of risk between consumers and the regulated 
firm is analysed in Cowan (2004) and, while he acknowledges the possibility of 
a relationship between the form of the price control and the cost of capital, he 
takes a different approach and also assumes that the firm is risk averse with 
a utility function that is solely dependent on the firm's profits. The models 
developed in chapters 2 and 3 might provide a framework for analysing the 
interaction between both sets of issues. 
5.2 The water industry: an empirical study 
5.2.1 Findings from the study 
Chapter 4 considers the question of whether the behaviour of regulated firms 
is consistent with the trade-off or pecking order theories by taking the water 
industry over the period 1990/91 to 2002/03 as a case study. 
For the purposes of analysis the WaSC's and the WoUs have each been 
divided into two categories according to whether or not the companies im- 
plemented a capital restructuring after 1999/00. The aim was to establish 
categories within which the behaviour of the companies is likely to be rela- 
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tively homogeneous so that separate models could be estimated for each cate- 
gory using pooled data. Econometric models of the relationship between debt 
and capital value have been estimated for each category and provide reason- 
able support for the proposition that water companies, at least when viewed 
collectively, have behaved as though they had target levels of gearing. 
The models have been developed using a 'general-to-specific' model reduc- 
tion procedure that starts with an unrestricted ADLM as the initial equation. 
When HCAV is used to measure capital value the procedure shows that an 
ECM provides the best explanation of the relationship between debt and cap- 
ital value. ECM's have been estimated for each category of company and they 
provide plausible estimates of the target levels of HCAV gearing and of the 
speed of response both to short-run changes in capital value and to deviations 
from the long-run target. A particular feature of this study is that it includes 
tests for cointegration between the variables to assess whether the results re- 
flect a causal relationship and not merely stochastic time trends in the data. 
Although the available data only covers the 13 years to 2002/03, which is a 
relatively short time period, half of the models accept one or more of these 
tests. This represents at least indicative evidence that the variables are coin- 
tegrated and that the target gearing levels derived from the models are not 
the spurious result of stochastic time trends. 
Models that use RCV as the measure of capital value have also been es- 
timated. In these models the PAM provides the best explanation. However, 
the results of the diagnostic tests are less satisfactory and encompassing tests 
show that the ECM's based on HCAV are superior. This is to be expected 
as the water companies, Ofwat and, indeed, the capital markets all focused 
on the HCAV measure of gearing until attention moved to the RCV measure 
after the 1999 Periodic Review. 
The overall conclusion of this case study is that the empirical evidence is 
more consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure than the peck- 
ing order theory. It should be emphasized that the presence of target levels 
of gearing does not necessarily mean that a trade-off actually exists. The 
adjustment models on which this study has been based simply indicate that 
water companies appear to have behaved as though there is a trade-off. In 
order to validate the trade-off model it would be necessary to develop more 
extensive models where the target level of gearing is specified as a function of 
the explanatory variables that determine the costs and benefits of increasing 
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gearing. Unfortunately, a number of those variables, for example, agency costs 
and the costs of financial distress, are extremely difficult to measure. How- 
ever, adjustment models can provide evidence that the behaviour of firms is 
inconsistent with the pecking order theory since it predicts that firms do not 
have target gearing levels. 
As the water companies are highly regulated it is important to assess 
whether they have increased gearing in order to exert a price-influence ef- 
fect on regulatory decisions because it possible that their behaviour might 
otherwise have reflected the pecking order theory. There is, however, little 
indication that the water companies have generally tried to manipulate their 
financial positions to that end. Consequently, their behaviour does not appear 
to have been consistent with the pecking order theory. 
There could be several reasons for the apparent absence of attempts to 
exert a price-influence effect. The potential for this kind of 'hidden action' or 
moral hazard problem is inherent in a regulatory environment and Ofwat put 
mechanisms in place that would act as a deterrent to such behaviour. In addi- 
tion, the firm also runs the risk of an adverse reaction from the capital markets 
which would provide a further deterrent, especially for a company acting in 
isolation. This is likely to have been a particularly important consideration 
for the WaSC's in the early years following privatization. 
This finding should not be surprising. At each review of price limits large 
amounts of research and evidence on the cost of capital, the capital structure 
and the financial profile of water companies have been commissioned by the 
companies and by Ofwat. Similar debates have also taken place when the 
price limits for other utilities in the UK have been reviewed. It is not Unlikely, 
therefore, that the behaviour of water companies has been influenced by the 
detailed discussion of these issues that has taken place. 
When the initial price limits were set in 1989 one of the government's aims 
was to ensure the financial proffles of the companies would be acceptable to 
the capital markets and, in particular, had the capacity to accommodate a 
significant increase in gearing.. Although this might have encouraged behav- 
iour consistent with the pecking order theory the results of this study indicate 
that, in the early years, the companies generally moved towards targets which 
are broadly consistent with the projection of the longer term position that was 
made by the government. 
In the 1994 and 1999 Periodic Reviews Ofwat decided that companies could 
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operate at much higher levels of gearing than the govermnent had assumed 
in 1989 and concluded that 50% gearing would represent an efficient capital 
structure. The evidence from this study indicates that, after the 1994 Periodic 
Review, the WaSC's target levels of gearing increased accordingly. However, 
the targets for the WoUs appear to have remained stable which probably 
reflects the fact they were mature companies that had been in private sector 
ownership for many years. 
In addition, the pecking order theory does not appear to be compatible 
with the capital restructurings which followed so rapidly after the 1999 re- 
view. These restructurings seem to be more readily explainable in terms of 
the trade-off theory with some companies being driven to take a quite radical 
approach to reducing the cost of capital after a tight regulatory review. As 
would be expected the results of the study indicate that the target gearing 
levels for these companies have increased to well over 75%. The restructur- 
ings might also have reflected a defensive price-influence effect to protect the 
companies concerned against further tightening of the regulatory contract at 
the 2004 Periodic Review, but this was probably a second order consideration. 
Ofwat had previously put mechanisms in place to avoid such effects and these 
were reinforced for the 2004 review. Further, many water companies did not 
implement a capital restructuring and the estimated target levels of gearing for 
these companies do not appear to have changed materially after the 1999 re- 
view. This is also consistent with the trade-off theory. These companies seem 
to have certain common ownership characterstics which suggest the reduced 
management flexibility required by a restructuring might have been perceived 
as a costly limitation on their strategic options for future growth. 
5.2.2 Future research 
The finding that water companies in England and Wales appear to have target 
levels of gearing suggests two areas for further research. 
The first concerns the mechanisms that water companies have used to move 
towards target gearing levels. The capital expenditure of water companies is 
almost entirely determined by the requirements of domestic and EU legisla- 
tion. Consequently, if companies wish to move towards their target gearing 
levels more quickly than this allows, their only option is to return funds to 
shareholders; normally the relevant parent company. However, the data from 
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water company June Returns shows that, prior to the capital restructurings 
that followed the 1999 Periodic Review, only four companies carried out share 
buybacks and these were all WoUs. The amounts involved were also quite 
small as a proportion of net assets. This raises the question of whether the 
dividend policies of the water companies have been influenced by their objec- 
tives regarding the achievement of target gearing levels. 
The classic study of management behaviour in relation to dividend policy 
was carried out by Lintner (1956) who used a PAM to show that firms gradu- 
ally adjust their dividend levels over time in order to achieve a target payout 
ratio. This has been confirmed in subsequent research and the surveys by Be- 
nartzi et al (1997) and Lease et al (2000) both conclude that Lintner's model 
remains the best available model of firm behaviour regarding dividend pol- 
icy. However, preliminary estimates indicate that the PAM does not provide 
a good explanation of the data on dividends paid by water companies to their 
parent companies. This implies other factors need to be taken into account 
and the possible effect of decisions on capital structure could be investigated. 
The second possible area for further research concerns the effect of the 
regulatory framework on capital structure decisions. It seems likely that the 
behaviour of water companies in this respect has been very much influenced 
by the incentives inherent in a price-cap system and the particular form of 
that system which has been adopted in the UK. This has encouraged both 
the regulator and the water companies to pay close attention to the issue of 
capital structure. The regulator's focus has been on the question of what 
represents an efficient and sustainable capital structure so that water prices 
are set at the lowest possible level consistent with maintaining the companies' 
financial viability. However, while the companies may be influenced by the 
regulator's views they do not have to accept them. Indeed, they have a clear 
incentive to find ways of improving financing efficiency and outperforming the 
assumptions which the regulator uses to set price limits. It seems probable 
that this was the main reason many companies decided to implement a major 
capital restructuring after the 1999 Periodic Review. 
In the US, however, the system is closer to rate of return regulation and 
this issue seems to attract less attention. Most regulated firms in the US are 
long established and, typically, regulators take the capital structure as a given. 
Sidak and Spulber (1997) note that US regulators generally set the allowed rate 
of return as the weighted average of the cost of debt and equity, with weights 
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given by the proportions of debt and equity finance, measured according to the 
firm's book value. It would, therefore, be interesting to investigate the capital 
structure decisions of companies in one of the US utiltity industries especially 
as, in some states, the regulators have moved towards incentive regulation 
with price caps. 
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Glossary 
ADF Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
ADLM Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model 
AEM Adaptive Expectations Model 
AIC Akaike information criterion 
ARCH AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
CR Capital restructuring post 1999/00 
DGWS Director General of Water Services 
DWI Drinking Water Inspectorate 
EA Environment Agency 
ECM Error Correction Model 
EU European Union 
HCA Historical Cost Accounts 
HCAV Historical Cost Asset Value 
HQC Hanna-Quinn criterion 
NCR No capital restructuring 
Ofwat Office of Water Services 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
PAM Partial Adjustment Model 
RCV Regulatory Capital Value 
RESET Regression Specification Test 
SC Schwarz criterion 
SLRM Static Long Run Model 
WaSC Water and Sewerage Company 
WoC Water only Company 
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Water and Sewerage Companies 
ANH Anglian 
WSH Dyr Cymru 
NES Northumbrian 
SVT Severn Týent 
SWT South West 
SRN Southern 
TMS Thames 
UUW United Utilities 
WSX Wessex 
YKY Yorkshire 
Water only Companies 
bwh Bournemouth and West Hampshire 
brI Bristol 
carn Cambridge 
dvw Dee Valley 
flk Folkestone and Dover 
mkt Mid Kent 
prt Portsmouth 
mse South East 
sst South Staffordshire 
ses Sutton and East Surrey 
thd Tendring Hundred 
tvn Three Valleys 
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